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Rh Turgot owed his appointment to the ministry to Maurepas, the “Mentor” of Louis XVI., to whom he was warmly recommended by the abbé Véry, a mutual friend. His appointment as minister of the marine on the 20th of July 1774 met with general approval, and was hailed with enthusiasm by the philosophes. A month later he was appointed comptroller-general (August 24). His first act was to submit to the king a statement of his guiding principles: “No bankruptcy, no increase of taxation, no borrowing.”  Turgot's policy, in face of the desperate financial position, was to enforce the most rigid economy in all departments. All departmental expenses were to be submitted for the approval of the comptroller-general, a number of sinecures were suppressed, the holders of them being compensated, and the abuse of the “acquits au comptant” was attacked, while Turgot appealed personally to the king against the lavish giving of places and pensions. He also contemplated a thorough-going reform of the ferme générale, but contented himself, as a beginning, with imposing certain conditions on the leases as they were renewed—such as a more efficient personnel, and the abolition for the future of the abuse of the croûpes (the name given to a class of pensions), a reform which Terray had shirked on finding how many persons in high places were interested in them, and annulling certain leases, such as those of the manufacture of gunpowder and the administration of the messageries, the former of which was handed over to a company with the scientist Lavoisier as one of its advisers, and the latter superseded by a quicker and more comfortable service of diligences which were nicknamed “turgotines.” He also prepared a regular budget. Turgot's measures succeeded in considerably reducing the deficit, and raised the national credit to such an extent that in 1776, just before his fall, he was able to negotiate a loan with some Dutch bankers at 4%; but the deficit was still so large as to prevent him from attempting at once to realize his favourite scheme of substituting for indirect taxation a single tax on land. He suppressed, however, a number of octrois and minor duties, and opposed, on grounds of economy, the participation of France in the War of American Independence, though without success.

Turgot at once set to work to establish free trade in corn, but his edict, which was signed on the 13th of September 1774, met with strong opposition even in the conseil du roi. A striking feature was the preamble, setting forth the doctrines on which the edict was based, which won the praise of the philosophes and the ridicule of the wits; this Turgot rewrote three times, it is said, in order to make it “so clear that any village judge could explain it to the peasants.” The opposition to the edict was strong. Turgot was hated by those who had been interested in the speculations in corn under the regime of the abbé Terray—among whom were included some of the princes of the blood. Moreover, the commerce des blés had been a favourite topic of the salons for some years past, and the witty Galiani, the opponent of the physiocrats, had a large following. The opposition was now continued by Linguet and Necker, who in 1775 published his treatise Sur la législation et le commerce des grains. But Turgot's worst enemy was the poor harvest of 1774, which led to a slight rise in the price of bread in the winter and early spring of 1774-1775. In April disturbances arose at Dijon, and early in May took place those extraordinary bread-riots known as the “guerre des farines," which may be looked upon as a first sample of the Revolution, so carefully were they organized. Turgot showed great firmness and decision in repressing the riots, and was loyally supported by the king throughout.  His position was strengthened by the entry of Malesherbes into the ministry (July 1775).

All this time Turgot had been preparing his famous “Six Edicts,” which were finally presented to the conseil du roi (Jan. 1776). Of the six edicts four were of minor importance, but the two which met with violent opposition were, firstly, the edict suppressing the corvées, and secondly, that suppressing the jurandes and maîtrises, the privileged trade corporations. In the preamble to the former Turgot boldly announced as his object the abolition of privilege, and the subjection of all three orders to taxation; the clergy were afterwards excepted, at the request of Maurepas. In the preamble to the edict on the jurandes he laid down as a principle the right of every man to work without restriction. He obtained the registration of the edicts by the lit de justice of the 12th of March, but by that time he had nearly everybody against him. His attacks on privilege had won him the hatred of the nobles and the parlements, his attempted reforms in the royal household that of the court, his free trade legislation that of the “financiers,” his views on tolerance and his agitation for the suppression of the phrase offensive to Protestants in the king's coronation oath that of the clergy, and his edict on the jurandes that of the rich bourgeoisie of Paris and others, such as the prince de Conti, whose interests were involved. The queen disliked him for opposing the grant of favours to her protégés, and he had offended Mme de Polignac in a similar manner (see Marquis de Ségur, Au Couchant de la monarchie, p. 305-306).

All might yet have gone well if Turgot could have retained the confidence of the king, but the king could not fail to see that Turgot had not the support of the other ministers. Even his friend Malesherbes thought he was too rash, and was, moreover, himself discouraged and wished to resign. The alienation of Maurepas was also increasing. Whether through jealousy of the ascendancy which Turgot had acquired over the king, or through the natural incompatibility of their characters, he was already inclined to take sides against Turgot, and the reconciliation between him and the queen, which took place about this time, meant that he was henceforth the tool of the Polignac clique and the Choiseul party. About this time, too, appeared a pamphlet, Le Songe de M. Maurepas, generally ascribed to the comte de Provence (Louis XVIII.), containing a bitter caricature of Turgot.

Before relating the circumstances of Turgot's fall we may briefly resume his views on the administrative system. With the physiocrats, he believed in an enlightened absolutism, and looked to the king to carry through all reforms. As to the parlements, he opposed all interference on their part in legislation, considering that they had no competency outside the sphere of justice. He recognized the danger of the recall of the old parlement, but was unable effectively to oppose it since he had been associated with the dismissal of Maupéou and Terray, and seems to have underestimated its power. He was opposed to the summoning of the states-general advocated by Malesherbes (May 6, 1775), possibly on the ground that the two privileged orders would have too much power in them. His own plan is to be found in his Mémoire sur les municipalités, which was submitted informally to the king. In Turgot's proposed system landed proprietors alone were to form the electorate, no distinction being made between the three orders; the members of the town and country municipalités were to elect representatives for the district municipalités, which in turn would elect to the provincial municipalités, and the latter to a grande municipalité, which should have no legislative powers, but should concern itself entirely with the administration of taxation. With this was to be combined a whole system of education, relief of the poor, &c. Louis XVI. recoiled from this as being too great a leap in the dark, and such a fundamental difference of opinion between king and minister was bound to lead to a breach sooner or later. Turgot's only choice, however, was between “tinkering” at the existing system in detail and a complete revolution, and his attack on privilege, which might have been carried through by a popular minister and a strong king, was bound to form part of any effective scheme of reform.