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 Prince Henry under the weight of more than two-fold numbers. The prince had been driven into an entrenched position above Gahmig near Dresden and Daun was about to attack, but the mere name of Frederick was enough, and learning of his arrival Daun fell back to Stolpen on the 12th of September.

The Prussian army now lay around Grossenhain, Prince Henry’s force covering Dresden and the Elbe bridges. The Empire Army was at Pirna, Daun at Stolpen, and in these positions they remained until the 26th of September, the Prussians getting the rest they so urgently needed. On that date, however, the state of truce was broken and the king moved towards Bischofswerda, where Daun’s subordinate Loudon was posted. The latter retired, opening the road to Bautzen. The king arrived at Bautzen on the 7th of October and had to wait until the 10th for provisions from Dresden. He then moved forward to Hochkirch, where he found Daun strongly entrenched across his path at Kittlitz with 90,000 men, the Prussians having only 37,000. The king determined to attack the Austrian right. So confident had the Prussians become in the belief that Daun would never take the offensive himself that the most elementary precautions of safety were forgotten and only Zieten kept his horses saddled. During the night of the 13th the Austrians, leaving their watch-fires burning and moving silently through the woods, which covered much of the ground, formed up almost all round the Prussian camp. At 5 a.m. the attack was delivered from all quarters simultaneously and a most desperate struggle ensued. Nothing but the superb discipline of the Prussians saved the situation. Zieten with his squadrons managed to keep a way of escape open, and after a most obstinate conflict the wreck of the army succeeded in withdrawing, leaving 101 guns and 9450 men on the ground or in their enemies’ hands (25·5%). The Austrians, in spite of the advantage of a well-conceived surprise, lost 7590 men and were too shaken for pursuit. They fell back to their old camp, where they remained for a week, thus giving Frederick time to bring up reinforcements from Dresden (6000 men) and, starting on the 23rd, he marched right round the Austrian right and raised the siege of Neisse, the prime object with which he had set out. Daun, learning that the king had gone past him into Silesia, now laid siege to Dresden. On the 15th of November he heard that Frederick was marching to its relief through Lusatia and incontinently gave way, retiring on Pirna. The king was in Dresden again on the 20th.

Campaign of 1759.—The drain on Frederick’s resources had been prodigious. On the battlefields of the previous three years he had lost at least 75,000 men, not counting the waste of life in his marches and skirmishes; but he still managed to keep 150,000 men in the field, though for want of the old two years training in loading, firing and manœuvring the average efficiency had much diminished. In cavalry, too, he was relatively weaker, as there was no time to train the remounts. His enemies felt their losses far less and were beginning to understand his tactics; fortunately they remained incapable of combined action.

After minor operations on the frontiers the Russians took the field. Fermor had been superseded by Soltikov, and Dohna with his 18,000 men proved quite inadequate to arrest the Russians’ progress. He was superseded by Wedell, who, on the 23rd of July, with 26,000 men boldly attacked the 70,000 Russians whilst on the march near Züllichau. He was defeated with a loss of 6000 and fell back to Crossen bridge, 5 m. below Crossen, which Soltikov occupied next day, thence he moved down the river towards Frankfurt, keeping on the eastern bank. Daun had detached Loudon and Hadik with 35,000 men to join him, and it became vital to Frederick to prevent the combination. Leaving Prince Henry at Schmöttseifen to watch Daun, he marched with all available forces and joined Wedell on the 6th of August at Müllrose near Frankfurt, after vainly searching for the Hadik-Loudon force. Here he was joined on the 10th by Finck with 10,000 men, bringing his whole force up to 50,000 against the Russian and Austrian 90,000, who lay entrenched in the sand hills about Kunersdorf. On the 11th, he crossed his whole force over the Oder at Reitwein and on the 12th marched forward, intending to envelop the Russians on both flanks; but his columns lost their way in the woods and their attacks were delivered successively. In spite of their usual disciplined gallantry, the Prussians were completely beaten, even Seydlitz and his squadrons failed to achieve the impossible, and the night closed down on the greatest calamity Frederick had ever experienced. Of 43,000 men 20,720 (48·2%) were left on the ground and 178 guns and 28 colours fell into the hands of the enemy; and the allied Austro-Russian force only lost 15,700. The battle had only lasted six hours. In the depression following this terrible day he wrote to Schmettau, commanding at Dresden, telling him to expect no help, and on the 4th of September Dresden fell.

As usual Frederick was saved by the sluggishness of his enemies, who attempted no pursuit, and being reinforced the day after the battle by 23,000 men, and having ordered up Kleist (who had been watching the Swedes), he was again at the head of an army. Week after week went by, during which he countered all attempts of Daun and Soltikov to combine, and ultimately the Russians, having consumed all the food and forage in the districts they occupied, were compelled to fall back on their own frontiers. Then, uniting with Prince Henry, the king turned to fall upon Daun; but his contempt for his adversary proved his own undoing. Contrary to all his own teaching, he sent a detachment of 12,000 men under Finck to work round the Austrians’ flank by Dippoldiswald to Maxen, but the latter, learning of the movement and calling up a wing of the Empire Army to their assistance, fell upon Finck with 42,000 men and compelled him to surrender after two days’ hard fighting. The combination having failed, the two armies stood facing one another till far into the winter. But for Prince Ferdinand’s glorious victory at Minden on the 1st of August, the year would have been one catalogue of disaster to the Prussian arms, and these operations must now be mentioned.

In the early part of 1758 Prince Ferdinand with 30,000 men had advanced from Lüneburg and was joined by Prince Henry with 8600 from Halberstadt. The approach of the latter threatened the right wing of the French army under Clermont, which was posted along the Aller, and the whole line gave way and retreated without making any serious stand behind the Rhine. Prince Ferdinand followed and defeated them on the 23rd of June at Crefeld. Clermont was relieved by Contades and at the same time Soubise, who had at last reorganized his command, shattered by the disaster of Rossbach, moved forward through Hesse and compelled Prince Ferdinand to withdraw from his very advanced position. No engagement followed; Soubise fell back upon Frankfurt and Prince Ferdinand held a line through Münster, Paderborn and Cassel during the winter.

Fortunately events in Canada and the glory of his victories had made Frederick’s cause thoroughly popular in Great Britain, and at last it became possible to detach a considerable force of British troops to Prince Ferdinand’s assistance, whose conduct turned the scale in the critical moment of the campaign. During the winter the French had organized their forces in two columns based on Frankfurt and Wesel respectively. Broglie was now in command of the former; Contades still led the latter.

In April Prince Ferdinand advanced to drive the French out of Hesse and Frankfurt, and actually reached Bergen, a village some 10 m. to the north, but here he was defeated by Broglie (13th April) and forced to retreat the way he had come, the French following along their whole front and by sheer weight of numbers manœuvring him successively out of each position he assumed. On the 10th of July Broglie surprised Minden, thus securing a bridge over the Weser and free access into Hanover, and light troops overran the south of the electorate. On the 16th Contades with the left column joined Broglie and the French now had some 60,000 men against the 45,000 Ferdinand could muster. (The latter’s position was extremely difficult, for the French had only to continue in possession of the bridges at Minden to ruin the whole country by their exactions, and the position they held was too well protected on the flanks and too strong in front for direct attack.