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 for proof of the self-evident, on which all proof must ultimately depend. It is of course always possible that in any particular case we may be deceived; we may be assuming as self-evidently true what is in reality not so. But such incidental lapses are found to correct themselves by the consequences in which they involve us, and they have no power to shake our trust in the general validity of reason. It may, however, be granted that the possibility of lapse throws us open to the objections, ingenuous or disingenuous, of the sceptic; and we must remain exposed to them so long as we deal with our first principles as so many isolated axioms or intuitions. But the process of self correction referred to points to another proof—the only ultimately satisfactory proof of which first principles admit. Their evidence lies in their mutual interdependence and in the coherence of the system which they jointly constitute.

Of a scepticism which professes to doubt the validity of every reasoning process and every operation of all our faculties it is of course, as impossible as it would be absurd to offer any refutation. This absolute scepticism, indeed, can hardly be regarded as more than empty words; the position which they would indicate is not one which

has ever existed. In any case, such scepticism is at all times sufficiently refuted by the imperishable and justifiable trust of reason in itself. The real function of scepticism in the history of philosophy is relative to the dogmatism which it criticizes. And, as a matter of fact, it has been seen that many so-called sceptics were rather critics of the effete systems which they found cumbering the ground than actual doubters of the possibility of knowledge in general. And even when a thinker puts forward his doubt as absolute it does not follow that his successors are bound to regard it in the same light. The progress of thought may show it to be, in truth, relative, as when the nerve of Hume’s scepticism is shown to be his thoroughgoing empiricism, or when the scepticism of the Critique of Pure Reason is traced to the unwarrantable assumption of things-in-themselves. When the assumptions on which it rests are proved to be baseless, the particular scepticism is also overcome. In like manner, the apparent antinomies on which such a scepticism builds will be found to resolve themselves for a system based on a deeper insight into the nature of things. The serious thinker will always repeat the words of Kant that, in itself, scepticism is “not a permanent resting-place for human reason.” Its justification is relative, and its function transitional.

SCEPTRE. A rod or staff has always been regarded as a token of authority. Among the early Greeks the sceptre ( ) was a long staff used by aged men (Il. xviii. 416, Herod. 1. 196), and came to be used by judges, military leaders, priests and others. It is represented on painted vases as a long staff tipped with a metal ornament, and is borne by some of the gods. Among the Etruscans sceptres of great magnificence were used by kings and upper orders of the priesthood, and many representations of such sceptres occur on the walls of the painted tombs of Etruria. The British Museum, the Vatican and the Louvre possess Etruscan sceptres of gold, most elaborately and minutely ornamented. The Roman sceptre was probably derived from the Etruscan. Under the Republic an ivory sceptre (sceptrum eburneum) was a mark of consular rank. It was also used by victorious generals who received the title of imperator, and it may be said to survive in the marshal’s baton. Under the empire the sceptrum Augusti was specially used by the emperors, and was often of ivory tipped with a golden eagle. It is frequently shown on medallions of the later empire, which have on the obverse a half-length figure of the emperor, holding in one hand the sceptrum Augusti, and in the other the orb surmounted by a small figure of Victory.

 SCÈVE, MAURICE (c. 1500–1564), French poet, was born at Lyons, where his father practised law. Besides following his father’s profession he was a painter, architect, musician and poet. He was the centre of the Lyonnese coterie that elaborated the theory of spiritual love, derived partly from Plato and partly from Petrarch, which was enunciated in Antoine Heroet’s Parfaicte Amye.

 SCHACK, ADOLF FRIEDRICH, (1815–1894), German poet and historian of literature, was born at Brüsewitz near Schwerin on the 2nd of August 1815. Having studied jurisprudence (1834–1838) at the universities of Bonn, Heidelberg and Berlin, he entered the Mecklenburg State service and was subsequently attached to the “Kammergericht” in Berlin. Tiring of official work, he resigned his appointment, and after travelling in Italy, Egypt and Spain, was attached to the court