Page:EB1911 - Volume 23.djvu/979

Rh Bulgarian troops joining the garrison on the Shipka. Suleiman

remained at Yeni Zagra till the 17th of August, when he set out for the Shipka. On August 21st the heights attack on east of the pass were taken, and during the next few days there was desperate fighting; but the original garrison was gradually reinforced, and the Russians held on. In this fighting the Russian losses amounted to close on 4000, while the Turkish casualties were about treble that number. Suleiman now intrenched himself close to the Russian position, and there he remained till Sept. 17th, when after a three days' bombardment he again assaulted the position, but was repulsed with considerable loss. This was the last assault made on the Russian position. Suleiman replaced Mehemet Ali as commander-in-chief on Oct. 2nd, and was himself succeeded by Reouf Pasha. Thus, under orders from Constantinople, Suleiman frittered away his opportunity and his army in a fruitless attempt to retake the Shipka Pass.

It was not till the middle of August that Mehemet Ali decided to move against the Russians and ordered an advance. The

Cesarevich (afterwards Alexander III.), who was opposing him with the XI., XII. and XIII. Corps, in all about 50,000, was extended on the line of the White Lom from Pirgos to Eski Djuma. On August 22nd and 23rd there were engagements about Ayaslar, resulting in the retirement of the Russians. On August 30th he attacked at Karahassankoi and drove the Russians across the river. On September 3rd he crossed the White Lom and again defeated them at Katzelevo, the enemy retiring behind the Banitcha Lom. On September 12th Mehemet Ali continued his advance, but halted on the 14th for a week. He then made an attack on Cerkovna on the 21st, but was repulsed with a loss of 1600 men, and two days later retired his army behind the White Lom. He had effected nothing. As will be seen later, the Russian operations against Plevna had not been in any way disturbed. The containing force under the Cesarevich had retired a certain distance, but it still held the main Turkish army. Mehemet Ali's original plan had been to advance by Osman Bazar, effect a junction with Suleiman, and move on Tirnova. But Suleiman was averse to his plan and it was negatived at Constantinople, though if this plan had been carried out with vigour, the position of the Russians should have been critical. He then advanced on a front of 50 m. instead of moving concentrated, which is the explanation of his failure. It is true that he was much hampered by the state of his cavalry, which was exhausted, and consequently was without information, while the Russians were well served. Mehemet Ali now concentrated his force, but at this juncture he was superseded by Suleiman Pasha.

To return to Plevna. At this time the Russians were disposed in a semicircle round Plevna, their right or N. flank

resting on Ribina and the S. flank resting on Bogot. On August 30th Osman had moved out with a column of all arms towards Pelishat. The following day he engaged the Russians. The Turks lost 300 killed and 1000 wounded, and the Russian losses were about 1000. It is difficult to say what was the object of this sortie, which was of the nature of a reconnaissance in force. It achieved nothing. The Turks were not defeated, but retired again into Plevna the same evening. By the end of August the whole of the Rumanian army had crossed the Danube, and during the first days of September the first Russian reinforcements, consisting of the 2nd and 3rd infantry divisions and the 3rd Rifle Brigade, had arrived and joined the forces round Plevna. Mehemet Ali's advance and the assaults on the Shipka had been repulsed. The Russians could expect no further reinforcements before October, and it was therefore decided to make a third attempt to take Plevna, but first of all to occupy Lovcha. Skobelev had already made an unsuccessful attempt on August 6th, and General Prince Imeretinski, with a force of two infantry

divisions and a brigade of Cossacks, in addition to Skobelev's mixed brigade, was now entrusted with the task. The garrison under Rifaat Pasha amounted to 8 battalions, 6 guns and some Circassians. Fighting commenced

on Sept. 1st and on the 3rd the Turks were driven out, most of the survivors finding their way to Plevna, and bringing 5 guns with them. The Russians lost 1500, the Turks 2500. On Sept. 2nd, Osman set out with a strong relieving column from Plevna, but on the 4th, hearing that the Russians had already occupied the town, he turned back and reached Plevna on the 6th. On Sept. 5th, 8 battalions and 2 batteries reached Orkhanie, and Osman's force, including the Lovcha troops, numbered about 30,000 men and 72 guns. The Russian forces, including the Rumanians, numbered about 90,000. Their plan was, after a long artillery bombardment, to attack the eastern front with the Rumanian forces, the south-eastern front with the IV. and IX. Corps and the southern front with Imeretinski's command. The attacks were to be simultaneous. The cavalry divisions were to be kept in rear and close to the flank of the attacking infantry. During the night of Sept. 6th/7th the troops were moved into preparatory position, and batteries were constructed at 3000 to 5000 yds. from the outer works. The artillery bombardment was commenced at 6 a.m. on Sept. 7th and continued till midday Sept. 11th. So far the infantry had only been engaged on the south flank, where Skobelev had succeeded Imeretinski in the command. He had succeeded in advancing to within 2000 yds. of the southern Turkish redoubts and had entrenched himself. The orders for Sept. 11th were for the infantry assaults to be delivered at 3 p.m. after a six hours cannonade. A dense fog interfered with the artillery bombardment. At the end of the day the Rumanians had taken No. 1 Grivitza redoubt, the attack on the S.E. front had been repulsed and Skobelev had established himself within 1000 yds. of Plevna, having taken Kavanlik and Issa forts. On Sept. 12th the Turks retook these forts and drove Skobelev back. During the next two days the Russians continued to bombard the works, but no further attack was made. The Rumanians remained in possession of the Grivitza redoubt, defeating an attempt made by the Turks to retake it on Sept. 14th. The Russians then decided to retire and entrenched themselves on a line with Verbitza-Radischevo, with their cavalry extending to the Vid on either flank. There was no question of pursuit; in the first and second battles the numbers had been about equal, but now the Russians were vastly superior and Osman would have been crushed by a powerful counter-attack.

In their third battle the Turks had lost 5000, while the Russian casualties amounted to close on 20,000. The Russian bombardment, lasting four days, had effected nothing. It had not caused 200 casualties. The object of the artillery is to cover the advance of the infantry, and the arms must work in combination. The defender does not expose himself to the artillery fire unless compelled to do so by the approaching infantry. The Russians failed to realize this and practically wasted their ammunition. They had again failed to reconnoitre the position and attacked along the whole front instead of pressing home in strength at the decisive points. Their attacks were not even simultaneous, and Osman was able to shift his reserves from point to point. In addition to this, when the Russians retired one-third of their force had not been engaged. The defects in their plan of action are largely attributable to the fact that though control was nominally centred in one man, senior officers were present who interfered with his arrangements.

It was now decided to complete the investment of Plevna, and Todleben, the defender of Sevastopol, was entrusted

with supreme control of the operations. He arrived on the scene on Sept. 28th, but it was not till Oct. 24th that the investment was completed, and, meanwhile, on Sept. 24th and again on Oct. 8th, st r ong reinforcements arrived, raising the Turkish force under Osman to 84 battalions, 25 squadrons and 96 guns, with an effective of 48,000 men. Plevna had been re-victualled and the sick and wounded had been sent back to Orchanie. General Krilov, who had been operating west of the Vid, with 52 squadrons and 30 horse artillery guns, had failed to prevent these movements, and was superseded by General Gurko on Oct. 8th. The Russian