Page:EB1911 - Volume 23.djvu/974

Rh of Oyama's forces (January 8th-16th) the only change in the relative positions of Oyama and Kuropatkin as they stood after the battle of the Sha-ho was that the Japanese had extended somewhat westwards towards the Hun-ho. The Russians, 300,000 strong, were now organized in three armies, commanded by Generals Linievich, Grippenberg and Kaulbars; the total strength of the Japanese 1st, 2nd and 4th Armies and reserve was estimated by the Russians at 220,000. Towards the end of January, Kuropatkin took the offensive. He wished to inflict a severe blow before the enemy could be reinforced by the late besiegers of Port Arthur, and sent Grippenberg with seven divisions against Oku's two on the Japanese left. The battle of Sandepu (Heikoutai), fought in a terrible snowstorm on the 26th and 27th of January 1905, came near to being a great Russian victory. But the usual décousu of Russian operations and their own magnificent-resistance saved the Japanese, and after two days' severe fighting, although Grippenberg had not been checked, Kuropatkin, in face of a counter-attack by Oyama, decided to abandon the attempt. The losses were roughly 8000 Japanese to over 10,000 Russians.

Both sides stood fast in the old positions up to the verge of the last and greatest battle. Kuropatkin was reinforced, and appointed Kaulbars to succeed Grippenberg and Bilderling to the command of the 3rd Army vacated by Kaulbars. On the other hand, Nogi's 3rd Army, released by the fall of Port Arthur, was brought up on the Japanese left, and a new army under Kawamura (5th), formed of one of the Port Arthur and two reserve divisions, was working from the upper Yalu through the mountains towards the Russian left rear. The Russian line in front of Mukden from the Hun-ho, through the Putilov and Novgorod hills on the Sha-ho, to the mountains, was 47 m. long, the armies from right to left being II. (Kaulbars), III. (Bilderling) and I. (Linievich); a general reserve was at Mukden. On the other side from left to right, on a line 40 m. long, were Oku (2nd Army), Nozu (4th), Kuroki (1st) and Kawamura (5th), the general reserve in rear of the centre at Yentai and the 3rd Army in rear of Oku. Each side had about 310,000 men present. The entire front of both armies was heavily entrenched. The Russians had another offensive in contemplation

when the Japanese forestalled them by advancing on the 21st of February. The 5th Army gradually drove in Kuropatkin's

small, detachments in the mountains, and came up in line with Kuroki, threatening to envelop the Russian left. The events on this side and misleading information induced Kuropatkin to pay particular attention to his left. The Japanese 1st and 5th Armies were now engaged (25th February), and elsewhere all was quiet. But on the 27th the fighting spread to the centre, and Nogi (originally behind Oku) was on the march to envelop the Russian right. He was held under observation throughout by Russian cavalry, but it seems that little attention was paid to their reports by Kuropatkin, who was still occupied with Kuroki and Kawamura, and even denuded his right of its reserves to reinforce his left. With a battle-front exceeding two days' marches the wrong distribution of reserves by both sides was a grave misfortune. Kuropatkin was are last convinced, on the 28th of February, of the danger from the west, and did all in his power to form a solid line of defence on the west side of Mukden. Nogi's first attack (1st-2nd March) had not much success, and a heavy counter stroke was delivered on the 2nd. Fighting for localities and alterations in the interior distribution of the opposing forces occupied much time, and by the 3rd, though the battle had become severe, Kuropatkin had merely drawn in his right and right centre (now facing W. and S.W. respectively) a little nearer Mukden. His centre on the Sha-ho held firm, Kuroki and Kawamura made but slight progress against his left in the mountains. Nogi and Oyama were equally impressed with the strength of the new (west) Russian front, and like Grant at Petersburg in 1864, extended farther and farther to the outer flank, the Russians following suit. The Japanese marshal now sent up his army reserve, which had been kept far to the rear at Yentai, to help Nogi. It was not before the evening of the 6th of March that it came up with the 3rd Army and was placed in position opposite the centre of the Russian west front. On