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Rh Religion (Eng. trans., 3 vols., 1895); Pfleiderer, Die Religion (2 vols., Berlin, 1869); ''Philos. of Religion'', vol. iii. (Engl. trans., London, 1888); Religionsphilosophie³ (Berlin, 1896); F. Max Müller, Introd. to the Science of Religion (1873); Hibbert Lectures (1878); Gifford Lectures (4 vols., 1889-93); Spencer, Principles of Sociology, i. (1876); Fairbairn, Studies in the Philosophy of Religion and History (1876); E. von Hartmann, ''Das Relig. Bewusstsein der Menschheit (Berlin, 1882); Rauwenhoff, Weisbegeerte van den Godsdienst'' (Leiden, 1887); E. Caird, The Evolution of Religion (2 vols., 1893); Siebeck, Lehrbuch der Religionsphilosophie (Freiburg i. B., 1893); Tiele, Elements of the Science of Religion (2 vols., 1897); Raoul de la Grasserie, Des religions comparés au point de vue sociologique, and De la psycholgie des religions (Paris, 1899); Starbuck, Psychology of Religion (London, 1900); Jastrow, The Study of Religion (London, 1901); W. James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (1903); Dorner, Grundriss der Religionsphilosophie (Leipzig, 1903); Girgensohn, Die Religion, ihre Psychischen Formen und ihre Zentralidee (Leipzig, 1903); Wundt, Völkerpsychologie, Bd. ii. Mythus und Religion (1905-6); Ladd, The Philosophy of Religion (2 vols., London, 1906); Höffding, The Philosophy of Religion (Engl. trans., 1906); Westermaarck, The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas, i. (London, 1906); Hobhouse, Morals in Evolution (2 vols., London, 1906).

6. Periodicals, &c.—''Revue de l'hist. des religions (Paris, 1880 onwards); Folk-Lore (London, 1890 onwards); Archiv. für Religionswissenschaft'' (Freiburg i. B., 1898 onwards); L'Année sociologique (Paris, 1898 onwards); Actes du premier congrès international d'histoire des religions (Paris, 1900); Verhandlungen des II. Internationalen Kongresses für Allgemeine Religionsgeschichte in Basel (1904).

Much information on the growth and present condition of the study has been collected by Jordan, Comparative Religion, its Genesis and Growth (Edinburg, 1905).
 * (J. E. C.)

 REMAGEN, a town of Germany, in the Prussian Rhine Province, on the left bank of the Rhine, 12 m. above Bonn, by the railway from Cologne to Coblenz, and at the junction of the Ahr valley railway to Adenau. Pop. (1900) 3534. The (Roman Catholic) parish church is remarkable for a gate (Römertor) with grotesque sculptures of animals, dating from the 12th century. Archaeologists have variously interpreted its original purpose, whether as church door, city gate or palace gate. The industry of the place. is almost wholly concerned with the preparation of wine, in which a large export trade is done. ]ust below the town, on a height overlooking the Rhine, stands the Apollinaris church, built 1839–53 on the site of a chapel formerly dedicated to St Martin, and containing the relics of St Apollinaris. It is a frequent place of pilgrimage from all parts of the lower Rhine. According to legend, the ship conveying the relics of the three kings and of Bishop Apollinaris from Milan to Cologne in 1164 could not be got to move away from the spot until the bones of St Apollinaris had been interred in St Martin's chapel.

Remagen (the Rigomagus of the Romans) originally belonged to the duchy of Jülich. Many Roman antiquities have been discovered here. In 1857 a votive altar dedicated to Jupiter, Mars and Mercury was unearthed, and is now in the Provincial Museum at Bonn.

See Kinkel, Der Führer durch das Ahrthal nebst Beschreibung der Stadt Remagen (2nd ed., Bonn, 1854).  REMAINDER, REVERSION. In the view of English law a remainder or reversion is classed either as an incorporeal hereditament or, with greater correctness, as an estate in expectancy. That is to say, it is a present interest subject to an existing estate in possession called the particular estate, which must determine before the estate in expectancy can become an estate in possession. A remainder or reversion is in strictness confined to real estate, Whether legal or equitable, though a similar interest may exist in personalty. The particular estate and the remainder or reversion together make up the whole estate over which the grantor has power of disposition. Accordingly a remainder or reversion limited on an estate in fee simple is void. The difference between a remainder and a reversion, stated as simply as possible, is that the latter is that indisposed-of part of the estate which after the determination of the particular estate will fall into the possession of the original grantor or his representative, while a remainder is that part of the estate which under the same circumstances will fall into the possession of a person other than the original grantor or his representative. A reversion, in fact, is a special instance of a remainder, distinguishable from it in two important respects: (1) a reversion arises by operation of law on every grant of an estate where the whole interest is not parted with, whereas a remainder is created by express words; (2) tenure exists between the reversioner and the tenant of the particular estate, but not between the latter and the remainder man. Accordingly rent service is said to be an incident of a reversion but not of a remainder, and a reversioner could distrain for it at common law. A reversion may be limited upon any number of remainders, each of them as it falls into possession becoming itself a particular estate. A remainder or reversion may be alienated either by deed or by will. A conveyance by the tenant of a particular estate to the remainder man or reversioner is called a surrender; a conveyance by the remainder man or reversioner to the tenant is a release.

Remainder.—Remainders are either vested or contingent. “An estate is vested in interest when there is a present fixed right of future enjoyment. An estate is contingent when a right of enjoyment is to accrue on an event which is dubious and uncertain. A contingent remainder is a remainder limited so as to depend on an event or condition which may never happen or be performed, or which may not happen or be performed till after the determination of the preceding estate” (Fearne, Contingent Remainders, 2, 3). Contingent remainders are of two kinds, those limited to uncertain persons and those limited on uncertain events. A grant by A to B or life, followed by a remainder in fee to the heir of C is an example of a contingent remainder. Until the death of C he can have no heir. If C die during the lifetime of B, the contingent remainder of his heir becomes vested; if C survive B, the remainder is at common law destroyed owing to the determination of the particular estate, for every remainder must have a particular estate to support it. In the case of a contingent remainder, it must become vested during the continuance of the particular estate or at the instant of its determination. This rule of law no doubt arose from the disfavour shown by the law to contingent remainders on their first introduction. They were not firmly established even when Littleton wrote in the reign of Edward IV. (see Williams, Real Property). The inconveniences resulting from this liability of contingent remainders to destruction were formerly overcome by the device of appointing trustees to preserve contingent remainders at law. Equitable contingent remainders, it should be noticed, were indestructible, for they were supported by the legal estate. In modern times the matter has been dealt with by act of Parliament. By the Real Property Act 1845, § 8, a contingent remainder is rendered capable of taking effect notwithstanding the determination by forfeiture, surrender or merger of any preceding estate of freehold in the same manner as if such determination had not happened. The case of determination by any other means is met by the Contingent Remainders Act 1877. The act provides that a contingent remainder which would have been valid as a springing or shifting use or executor devise or other limitation had it not had a sufficient estate to support it as a contingent remainder is, in the event of the particular estate determining before the contingent remainder vests, to be capable of taking effect as though the contingent remainder had originally been created as a springing or shifting use or executor devise or other executor limitation. It will accordingly only be good if the springing use, &c. (for which see ), would be good. If the springing use be void as a breach of the rule against perpetuities (see ), the remainder will likewise be void. Apart from this act, there is some uncertainty as to the application of the rule against perpetuities to remainders. The better opinion is that it applies to equitable remainders and to legal remainders expectant upon an estate for life limited to an unborn person. In the latter case the rule as applied to contingent remainders is somewhat different from that affecting executor interests. The period is different, the remainder allowing the tying up of property for a longer time than the executor interest. There is also the further difference that the rule does not affect a contingent remainder if it become vested before the determination of the particular estate. An executor interest is void if it may transgress the rule, even though it do not actually do so. For the rule in Shelley's case, important in connexion with remainders, see that title.

The state laws of the United States affecting remainders will be found in Washburn, Real Property, ii. bk. ii. As a general rule contingent remainders have been rendered of little practical importance by enactments that they shall take effect as executor devises or shall not determine on determination of the particular estate.

Reversion.—Unlike remainders, all reversions are present or vested estates. The law of reversion, like that of remainder, has been considerably modified by statute. It was formerly considered