Page:EB1911 - Volume 23.djvu/350

 The complete cessation of fire at intervals enables the leaders to observe the progress of the engagement, to change their target, to economize ammunition, to select the ground for the next rush and the next burst of fire, and to regain control-of the men, whom prolonged fire-fight hypnotizes and rivets to the ground, The chief use of “slow” fire, which is generally employed by skirmishers working in pairs, is to keep the enemy under; the storm of well-directed “rapid fire” the fire-director should hold in his own hands, ready to release it at the night moment. Slow fire averages 3 rounds a minute, rapid (aimed) 8–12. The configuration of the ground has often a great influence on fire effect. If the target is on a sharp forward slope, the beaten zone is greatly diminished in depth, ranging errors are no longer neutralized by the flatness of trajectory and (the bullets meeting the ground at a steeper angle) the dangerous space is reduced; if, on the other hand, the slope descends gently in rear of the target so that the falling -bullets instead of making a. pattern upon the ground, skim along parallel to the surface, the zone is increased. For instance, at 1500 yds., if there is a reverse slope of about 5° in rear of the target the depth of the beaten zone is tenfold that of the zone for the same range on level ground. Similarly if the target is on the crest of a hill and the firers below, the “over” half of the cone of fire may graze the reverse slope or pass far above, according as the reverse slope is gentle or sharp with respect to the line of sight.

The normal position for the firing infantryman in action is lying; the kneeling position is used for firing from behind cover, the sitting for firing down hill. Standing, formerly the usual position, is now employed chiefly for firing behind cover with the rifle rested, and-for snap-shooting during an advance when it is undesirable to halt and lie down. As regards cover, it may be mentioned that well-covered or in trenched troops generally shoot less accurately than troops in the open, the soldier in security being 10th to expose. himself long enough to take careful aim. This was particularly noticeable in the Russo-Turkish War, and its effect is to create a zone of unaimed fire behind the assailants’ fighting line, which sometimes causes serious losses to his supports and reserves. The relation between the cone of dispersion of peace-time experiments, even when these are specially designed to-establish that relation (for example, series fired in France by third-class shots, after a long march without food), has never been satisfactorily established. An arbitrary figure of one-tenth or one-twentieth of peace-time effect has generally been assumed as representing war results, but some think that however the normal cone may be multiplied or divided, no relation can be found between peace and war effect, and that in battle the brave men aim and fire as if on the practice range, and the rest ire absolutely at hazard. From a musketry point of view, this brings, again into the foreground the question of distance-judging, as, if the sights be wrongly set, the more accurate the fire the less its effect, and a