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Rh the neighbourhood of Krishin, temporarily occupied two redoubts, but a heavy counter-stroke by the Turkish reserves forced him back with severe loss. The Russians retreated, the northern column to Tristenik and Karagakh, the southern to Poradim. Their losses amounted to 7300, while the Turkish losses exceeded 2000. Had the Turkish garrison of Lovcha been called in, the result would have been still more disastrous to the Russians.

The victory was decisive, but Osman again failed to pursue. His troops were elated by success, the moral of the enemy severely shaken, the undefended Russian bridge over the Danube was within 40 m. of him, but he lost his opportunity, and contented himself with strengthening his defensive works. It is said that he was tied down to Plevna by orders from Constantinople.

The Russians now concentrated all their available forces against Plevna and called in the aid of the Rumanians. By the end of August they had assembled a force of 74,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry and 440 guns, including 24 siege guns, about 100,000 men in all. On the 30th of August Osman moved out of Plevna, with all his cavalry, 3 batteries of artillery and 19 battalions of infantry, and on the 31st attacked the Russians about Pelishat. He returned to Plevna the same evening. The Turks lost 1300 and the Russians 1000 men. The Russians determined to occupy Lovcha, and so cut Osman's communications before again attacking Plevna. After three days fighting this was accomplished by Skobelev, acting under Imeretinski, with a force of 20,000 men, on the 3rd of September. Osman moved out to the relief of the garrison that day with a strong column, but, finding he was too late, returned to Plevna on the 6th. The survivors from Lovcha were re-formed into 3 battalions, including which Osman had been reinforced by 13 battalions, 2½ batteries of artillery and 11 squadrons of cavalry. His strength was now 30,000, with 72 guns, 46 battalions, 19 squadrons and 12 batteries. This force was organized in 4 approximately equal commands, the northern, south-eastern and southern, and a general reserve.

The Russians moved to their preliminary positions on the night of September 6th-7th. Their plan was for the Rumanians,

the IX. and IV. corps and Imeretinski's column to attack the north-east, south-east and south fronts simultaneously. An artillery bombardment began at 6 a.m. on the 7th of September, was carried on till 3 p.m. on the 11th, when the infantry advanced. The Rumanians took one Grivitza redoubt, Skobelev occupied two redoubts on the south front, but the centre attack on the Radishevo front failed. On the 12th the Turks recaptured the southern redoubts, the Rumanians remained in possession of the Grivitza redoubt, but the Russian losses already amounted to 18,000 and they withdrew, and entrenched themselves on a line Verbitza-Radishevo, with cavalry on either flank to the Vid. The Turkish losses totalled 5000, of which only a few hundred were caused by the artillery fire of the first few days. There was no question of pursuit. The Russians were greatly superior in numbers and the Turks were completely exhausted.

Several causes contributed to the Russian defeat. The Russian bombardment, at ranges beyond the powers of their guns and lacking the co-operation of the infantry to give them a target, had been useless. No reconnaissance had been made of the position. The infantry attacks were not simultaneous, and were beaten in detail, besides which, they were spread over the whole of a strongly fortified front in equal strength, instead of being pressed home at definite points. The lack of unity of command, in that the commander-in-chief interfered with the dispositions and conduct of the operations as arranged by the commander of the Plevna forces also militated against the Russian success.

This was the last open-force attack on Osman's lines.

General Todleben, the defender of Sevastopol, was now entrusted with the conduct of the siege, and he determined to complete the investment, which was accomplished by the 24th of October, Osman's request to retire

from Plevna having been refused by Constantinople. Supplies eventually gave out and a sortie on the night of the 9th-10th of December failed, with the result that he and his army capitulated.

Plevna is a striking example of the futility of the purely passive defence, which is doomed to failure however tenaciously carried out. Osman Pasha repelled three Russian attacks and practically held the whole Russian army. It remained for the other Turkish forces in the field to take the offensive and by a vigorous counter stroke to reap the fruits of his successes. Victories which are not followed up are useless. War without strategy is mere butchery. The position of Plevna, threatening the Russian bridge and communications, was strategically important, but there was no necessity for the Russians to attack the position. On the eastern Hank was an army stronger than Osman's and the fortress of Rustchuk was nearer the bridge than Plevna, but they did not consider it necessary to attack them. They might have contained Osman's force as they did the army under Mehemet Ali, and either awaited his attack or attacked when he evacuated the position. They failed to realize the resisting force of improvised fortifications and the strength conferred by extensive and well-placed entrenchments, and despising their adversary made direct frontal attacks on a well-fortified position, instead of aiming at a flank or the rear. The part played by Plevna in the war was due in the first place to the imaginary importance set by the Russians on its capture, and later to their faulty procedure in attack on the one hand, and to the skill evinced by the Turks in fortifying and defending the position on the other. (J. H. V. C.)

See W. V. Herbert, The Defence of Plevna, 1877 (London, 1895); F. V. Greene, The Russian Army and its Campaign in Turkey (London, 1880); General Kuropatkin (Ger. trans. by Krahmer), Kritische Ruckblicke auf den russisch-turkischen Krieg; Mouzaffer Pacha and Talaat Bey, Défense de Plevna; Krahmer's German translation of the Russian Official History; General H. Langlois, Lessons of Two Recent Wars (Eng. trans., War Office, 1910); Th. von Trotha, Kampf um Plewna (Berlin, 1878); Vacaresco (Ger. trans.), Rumaniens Antheil am Kriege, 1877-1878 (Leipzig, 1888).

 PLEYEL, IGNAZ JOSEPH (1757-1831), Austrian musician, was born at Ruppersthal, near Vienna, on the 1st of June 1757, the twenty-fourth son of a poor village schoolmaster. He studied the pianoforte under Van Hal (known in England as Vanhall), and in 1772 learned composition from Haydn, who became his dearest friend. He was appointed temporary maître de Chapelle at Strasburg in 1783, receiving a permanent appointment to the office in 1789. In 1791 he paid a successful visit to London. He narrowly escaped the guillotine on returning to Strasburg, and was only saved by the existence of a cantata which he had written, and in which the inspiration could fairly be claimed to be on the side of liberty; so that he was permitted to remain until 1795, when he migrated to Paris. Here he opened a large music shop, published the first complete edition of Haydn's quartets, and founded, in 1807, the pianoforte manufactory which still bears his name. The latter years of his life were spent in agricultural pursuits. The July revolution of 1830 inflicted upon him a severe shock, and on the 14th of November 1831 he died in Paris.

, née Moke (1811-1875), the wife of his eldest son, Camille, was one of the most accomplished pianists of her time.  PLIGHT, an homonymous word now used chiefly with two meanings, (1) pledge, and (2) condition or state. The first appears more generally in the verbal form, “to plight one's troth,” &c., and the second with a direct or implied sense of misfortune. The derivations of the two words show they are quite distinct in origin. The O. Eng. pliht meant danger or risk, hence risk of obligation (cf. Ger. Pflicht, Du. plicht, care, duty). The root pleh- or pleg- is probably also to be seen in the much disputed word “pledge.” The M. Eng. plit or plyt, on the other hand, is an adaptation of O. Fr. ploit, fold, and therefore a doublet of “plait,” but appears in the 14th century with the neutral sense of condition or state in general.