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HISTORY: ANCIENT] of these sources see separate articles on, &c.; ; and.

Of modern accounts see especially Th. Nöldeke, Aufsätze zur persischen Geschichte (1887). The works of Marquart, Untersuchungen zur Geschichte von Eran (2 pts., 1896–1905), abound in daring theories and must be used with caution. On the chronology, cf. Eduard Meyer, Forschungen zur alten Geschichte, ii.

The external history of the empire is treated under the

of the individual kings (see also history sections of articles ; ; &c.). The order is as follows:—

(558–528); conquered the Medes in 550; king of Babylon from 538.

(528–521).

(521).

I. (521–485).

I. (485–465).

I. (465–425).

( II. and Secydianus or Sogdianus, 425–424.)

II. Nothus (424–404).

II. (404–359).

III. Ochus (359–338).

(338–336).

III. (336–330).

The chronology is exactly verified by the Ptolemaic canon, by numerous Babylonian and a few Egyptian documents, and by the evidence of the Greeks. The present article gives only a brief conspectus of the main events in the history of the empire.

Though, unlike Cyrus and Cambyses, Darius made no new expeditions of conquest, yet a great empire, which is not bounded by another equally great, but touches on many small against tribes and independent communities, is inevitably driven to expansion. We have already seen that the attempt of Darius to control the predatory nomads in the north

led to his expedition against the Scythians; this, again, led to the incorporation of Thrace and Macedonia, whose king Perdiccas submitted. And since a great portion of the Mediterranean coast-line belonged to the empire, further complications resulted automatically. In contrast with the Greeks Carthage took the part of Persia. Darius, indeed, numbers the city—under the name of Karka—among his dominions: as also the Maxyans (Maciya) on the Syrtes (Andreas, Verhandl. d. xiii. oriental. Congresses, Hamburg, 1902, p. 97). But, above all, the Greek cities with their endless feuds and violent internal factions, were incessant in their appeals for intervention. Nevertheless, Darius left European Greece to itself, till the support accorded to the Ionian and Carian insurgents by Athens and Eretria (499 ) made war inevitable. But not only the expeditions of Mardonius (492) and Datis (490), but even the carefully prepared campaign of Xerxes, in conjunction with Carthage, completely failed (480–479). On the fields of Marathon and Plataea, the Persian archers succumbed to the Greek phalanx of hoplites; but the actual decision was effected by Themistocles, who had meanwhile created the Athenian fleet which at Salamis proved its superiority over the Perso-Phoenician armada, and thus precluded beforehand the success of the land-forces.

The wreck of Xerxes' expedition is the turning-point in the history of the Persian Empire. The superiority of the Greeks was so pronounced that the Persians never found courage to repeat their attack. On the contrary, in 466 their army and fleet were again defeated by Cimon on the Eurymedon, the sequel being that the Greek provinces on the Asiatic coast, with all the Thracian possessions, were lost. In itself, indeed, this loss was of no great significance to such a vast empire; and the attempts of Athens to annex Cyprus and conquer the Nile valley, in alliance with the revolted Egyptians, ended in failure. Athens, in fact, had not sufficient strength to undertake a serious invasion of the empire or an extensive scheme of conquest. Her struggles with the other Hellenic states constrained her, by the peace of Callias (448), definitely to renounce the Persian war; to abandon Cyprus and Egypt to the king; and to content herself with his promise—not that he would surrender the littoral towns, but that he would abstain from an armed attack upon them. The really decisive point was, rather, that the disasters of Salamis and Plataea definitely shattered the offensive power

of the empire; that the centre of gravity in the world’s history had shifted from Susa and Babylon to the Aegean Sea; and that the Persians were conscious that in spite of all their courage they were henceforward in the presence of an enemy, superior in arms as well as in intellect, whom they could not hope to subdue by their own strength.

Thus the great empire was reduced to immobility and stagnation—a process which was assisted by the deteriorating influences of civilization and world-dominion upon the character of the ruling race. True, the Persians continued to produce brave and honourable men. But the influences of the harem, the eunuchs, and similar

court officials, made appalling progress, and men of energy began to find the temptations of power stronger than their patriotism and devotion to the king. Thus the satraps aspired to independence, not merely owing to unjust treatment, but also to avarice or favourable conditions. As early as 465, Xerxes was assassinated by his powerful vizier (chiliarch) Artabanus, who attempted to seize the reins of empire in fact, if not in name. A similar instance may be found in (q.v.), after the murder of Artaxerxes III. (338 ). To these factors must be added the degeneration of the royal line—a degeneration inevitable in Oriental states. Kings like Xerxes and more especially Artaxerxes I. and Artaxerxes II., so far from being gloomy despots, were good-natured potentates, but weak, capricious and readily accessible to personal influences. The only really brutal tyrants were Darius II., who was completely dominated by his bloodthirsty wife Parysatis, and Artaxerxes III. who, though he shed rivers of blood and all but exterminated his whole family, was successful in once more uniting the empire, which under the feeble sway of his father had been threatened with dissolution.

The upshot of these conditions was, that the empire never again undertook an important enterprise, but neglected more and more its great civilizing mission. In considering, however, the subsequent disorders and wars, it must be borne in mind that they affected only individual portions of the empire, and only on isolated occasions involved more extensive areas in long and serious strife. To most of the provinces the Achaemenid dominion was synonymous with two centuries of peace and order. Naturally, however, the wild tribes of the mountains and deserts, who could be curbed only by strict imperial control, asserted their independence and harassed the neighbouring provinces. Among these tribes were the Carduchians in Zagros, the Cossaeans and Uxians in the interior of Elam, the Cadusians and other non-Aryan tribes in northern Media, the Pisidians, Isaurians and Lycaonians in the Taurus, and the Mysians in Olympus. All efforts to restore order in these districts were fruitless; and when the kings removed their court to Ecbatana, they were actually obliged to purchase a free passage from the mountain tribes (Strabo xi. 524; Arrian iii. 17, 1). The kings (e.g. Artaxerxes II.) repeatedly took the field in great force against the Cadusians, but unsuccessfully. When, in 400 , Xenophon marched with the mercenaries of Cyrus from the Tigris to the Black Sea, the authority of the king was nonexistent north of Armenia, and the tribes of the Pontic mountains, with the Greek cities on the coast, were completely independent. In Paphlagonia, the native dynasts founded a powerful though short-lived kingdom, and the chieftains of the Bithynians were absolutely their own masters. The frontier provinces of India were also lost. Egypt, which had already revolted under Libyan princes in the years 486484, and again with Athenian help in 460–454, finally asserted its independence in 404. Henceforward the native dynasties repelled every attack, till they succumbed once more before Artaxerxes III. and Mentor of Rhodes.

In the other civilized countries, indeed, the old passion for freedom had been completely obliterated; and after the days of Darius I.—apart from the Greek, Lycian and Phoenician towns—not a single people in all these provinces dreamed of shaking off the foreign dominion. All the more clearly, then, was the inner weakness of the empire revealed by the revolts