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 pass to-day in their position (which he believed to be Sahagun) they are lost.” But Moore had passed Astorga by the 31st of December, where Napoleon arrived on the 1st of January 1809. Thence he turned back, with a large portion of his army towards France, leaving Soult with over 40,000 men to follow Moore.

On the “Retreat to Corunna” fatigue, wet and bitter cold, combined with the sense of an enforced retreat, shook the discipline of Moore’s army; but he reached Corunna on the 11th of January 1809, where he took up a position across the road from Lugo, with his left on the river Mero. On the 14th of January the transports arrived; and on the 16th Soult attacked.

In this battle the French numbered about 20,000 with 40 guns; the British 15,000 with 9 very light guns. Soult failed to dislodge the British, and Moore was about to deliver a counter-attack when he himself fell mortally wounded. Baird was also wounded, and as night was approaching, Hope suspended the advance, and subsequently embarked the army, with scarcely any further loss. The British casualties were about 1000, the French 2000. When the troops landed in England, half clothed and half shod, their leader’s conduct of the campaign was at first blamed, but his reputation as a general rests solidly upon these facts, that when Napoleon in person, having nearly 300,000 men in Spain, had stretched forth his hand to seize Portugal and Andalusia, Moore with 30,000, forced him to withdraw it, and follow him to Corunna, escaping at the same time from his grasp. Certainly a notable achievement.

Campaign in Portugal and Spain, 1809.—On the 22nd of April 1809 Sir Arthur Wellesley reached Lisbon. By this time, French armies, to a great extent controlled by Napoleon from a distance, had advanced—Soult from Galicia to capture Oporto and Lisbon (with General Lapisse from Salamanca moving on his left towards Abrantes) and Marshal Victor, still farther to the left, with a siege train to take Badajoz, Merida and subsequently Cadiz. Soult (over 20,000), leaving Ney in Galicia, had taken and sacked Oporto (March 29, 1809); but the Portuguese having closed upon his rear and occupied Vigo, he halted, detaching a force to Amarante to keep open the road to Braganza and asked for reinforcements. Victor had crossed the Tagus, and defeated Cuesta at Medellin (March 28, 1809); but, surrounded by insurgents, he also had halted; Lapisse had joined him, and together they were near Merida, 30,000 strong. On the allied side the British (25,000), including some German auxiliaries, were about Leiria: the Portuguese regular troops (16,000) near Thomar; and some thousands of Portuguese militia were observing Soult in the north of Portugal, a body under Silveira being at Amarante, which Soult was now approaching. Much progress had been made in the organization and training of the Portuguese levies; Major-General William Carr Beresford, with the rank of marshal, as placed at their head. Of the Spaniards, Palafox, after his defeat at Tudela had most gallantly defended Saragossa a second time (Dec. 20, 1808–Feb. 20, 1809); the Catalonians, after reverses at Molins de Rey (Dec. 21, 1808) and at Valls (Feb 25, 1809) had taken refuge in Tarragona; and Rosas had fallen (Dec. 5, 1808) to the French general Gouvion St Cyr who, having relieved Barcelona, was besieging Gerona. Romaña’s force was now near Orense in Galicia. A supreme junta had been formed which could nominally assemble about 100,000 men, but jealousy among its members was rife, and they still declined to appoint any commander-in-chief.

On the 5th of May 1809, Wellesley moved towards the river Douro, having detached Beresford to seize Amarante, from which the French had now driven Silveira. Soult expected the passage of the Douro to be attempted near its mouth. with fishing craft; but Wellesley, by a daring surprise, crossed (May 12) close above

Oporto, and also by a ford higher up. After some fighting Oporto was taken, and Soult driven back. The Portuguese being in his rear, and Wellesley closing with him, the only good road of retreat available lay through Amarante, but he now learned that Beresford had taken this important point from Silveira; so he was then compelled, abandoning his guns and

much baggage, to escape, with a loss of some 5000 men, over the mountains of the Sierra Catalina to Salamonde, and thence to Orense.

During the above operations, Victor, with Lapisse, had forced the passage of the Tagus at Alcantara but, on Wellesley returning to Abrantes, he retired. News having been received that Napoleon had suffered a serious check at the battle of Aspern, near Vienna (May 22, 1809), Wellesley next determined—leaving Beresford (20,000) near Ciudad Rodrigo—to move with 22,000 men, in conjunction with Cuesta’s Spanish army (40,000) towards Madrid against Victor, who, with 25,000 supported by King Joseph (50,000) covering the capital, was near Talavera. Sir Robert Wilson with 4000 Portuguese from Salamanca, and a Spanish force under Venegas (25,000) from Carolina, were to co-operate and occupy Joseph, by closing upon Madrid. Cuesta, during the advance up the valley of the Tagus, was to occupy the pass of Baños on the left flank; the Spanish authorities were to supply provisions, and Venegas was to be at Arganda, near Madrid, by the 22nd or 23rd of July; but none of these arrangements were duly carried out, and it was on this that the remainder of the campaign turned. Writing to Soult from Austria, Napoleon had placed the corps of Ney and Mortier under his orders, and said: “Wellesley will most likely advance by the Tagus against Madrid; in that case, pass the mountains, fall on his flank and rear, and crush him.”

By the 20th of July Cuesta had joined Wellesley at Oropesa; and both then moved forward to Talavera, Victor falling back before them: but Cuesta, irritable and jealous, would not work cordially with Wellesley; Venegas—counter-ordered it is said by the Spanish junta—did not go to Arganda, and Wilson, though he advanced

close to Madrid, was forced to retire, so that Joseph joined Victor, and the united force attacked the Allies at Talavera de la Reina on the Tagus. The battle lasted for two days, and ended in the defeat of the French, who fell back towards Madrid. Owing to want of supplies, the British had fought in a half-starved condition; and Wellesley now learnt to his surprise that Soult had passed the mountains and was in his rear. Having turned about, he was on the march to attack him, when he heard (Aug. 23) that not Soult’s corps alone, but three French corps, had come through the pass of Baños without opposition; that Soult himself was at Naval Moral, between him and the bridge of Almaraz on the Tagus, and that Cuesta was retreating from Talavera. Wellesley’s force was now in a dangerous position: but by withdrawing at once across the Tagus at Arzobispo, he reached Jaraicejo and Almaraz (by the south bank) blowing up the bridge at Almaraz, and thence moved, through Merida, northwards to the banks of the Agueda, commencing to fortify the country around Lisbon.

Elsewhere in the Peninsula during this year, Blake, now in Catalonia, after routing Suchet at Alcaniz (May 23, 1809), was defeated by him at Maria (June 15) and at Belchite (June 18); Venegas, by King Joseph and Sébastiani, at Almonacid on the 11th of August; Del Parque (20,000), after a previous victory near Salamanca (Oct. 18), was overthrown at Alba de Tormes by General Marchand (Nov. 28); the old forces of Venegas and Cuesta (50,000), now united under Areizaga, were decisively routed by King Joseph at Ocaña (Nov. 19); and Gerona after a gallant defence, had surrendered to Augereau (Dec. 10).

Sir Arthur Wellesley was for this campaign created Baron Douro and Viscount Wellington. He was made captain-general by Spain, and marshal-general by Portugal. But his experience after Talavera had been akin to that of Moore; his expectations from the Spaniards had not been realized, he had been almost intercepted by the French, and he had narrowly escaped from a critical position. Henceforth he resisted all proposals for joint operations, on any large scale, with Spanish armies not under his own direct command.