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1870–1900] the Moderates in the Sacred College to fix their eyes upon him. The appointment of Franchi as secretary of state was a bid for peace that was viewed by the Irreconcilables with ill-disguised vexation. The following years of Leo XIII.’s pontificate only tended to increase their dissatisfaction. The first care of the new pope was to pave the way for the restoration of peace with Russia and the German Empire, and it was owing to his patience, persistence and energy that these efforts for peace were crowned with success. In the case of Germany he made many concessions which appeared to the Zelanti to be excessive, and made even still greater ones to France and Russia, to the great distress of the Poles. But at last Leo XIII. could boast not only of having re-established diplomatic relations with most of the powers, but also of having entered into a convention with the great powers of the North, which accorded him, in conjunction with the three emperors, a leading position as champion of the conservative interests of humanity. How proud Leo XIII. was of his importance in this position is shown by the beautiful encyclical, De civitatum constitutione christiana (“Immortale Dei” of Nov. 1, 1885), in which he adopted the strongest attitude against the principle of the sovereignty of the people (ex iis autem Pontificum præscriptis illud omnino intelligi necesse est, ortum publicæ potestatis a Deo ipso, non a multitudine repeti posse), refuting the notion that the principle of public power emanates from the will of the people alone (principatum non esse nisi populi voluntatem), and absolutely rejecting the sovereignty of the people as such. But this attitude was adopted by Leo XIII. not as an end but as a means. The real aims of his rule were disclosed in the second phase of his pontificate.

At its very commencement, the pope in his first encyclical (Easter 1878) proclaimed the necessity of a temporal hierarchy. This was at the time regarded merely as a formality imposed by circumstances, and one not to be seriously entertained; but it became more and more evident that the recovery of the temporalities was the real mainspring of Leo’s whole policy. In the negotiations with Germany, it was clearly seen that it was from that side that the pope expected intervention in favour of restitution; and, according to all appearances, Bismarck did for a while keep alive these representations, though with more tact than candour. After peace had been concluded, Leo, by the agency of Galimberti, reminded the chancellor of the settlement of the Roman question. Bismarck replied that he was “unaware of the existence of any such question.” The two visits paid by Emperor William II. to the Vatican could not fail to remove any doubts in the mind of the pope as to the fact that Germany did not dream of giving him back Rome. The Austro-German-Italian triple alliance was a dire blow to his expectations, and Crispi’s policy with its irritating and galling pin-pricks caused the cup to overflow.

Thus slowly, but yet deliberately, between 1887 and 1893, a transformation took place in Leo’s spirit and policy, and with it was brought about one of the most momentous changes in the attitude of the Church towards the problems of the times and their impelling forces. A rapprochement with France inevitably entailed not only an

alliance with modern democracy, but also a recognition of its principles and aims. In Rome there was no room for both pope and king. The note of the pope to Rampolla of the 8th of October 1895, in consequence of the celebrations on the 20th of September, declared, in terms more decided than any that had until then been uttered, that the papacy required a territorial sovereignty in order to ensure its full independence, and that its interests were therefore incompatible with the existence of the kingdom of Italy as then constituted. The inevitable consequences ensued. Italy regarded the pope more than ever as a foe within its walls; and the policy of the pope, as regards Italy, aimed at replacing the kingdom by one or more republics, in which the temporal power should, in some form or other, find a place. But the continuance of the Republic in Paris was a condition precedent to the establishment of a republic in Rome, and the first had no chance of existence if the democracy in France did not remain

in power. The result was the policy of the Ralliement. Instructions were given to the French Catholics to break with monarchical principles, and both externally and internally to cleave to the Republic as representing the best form of constitutional government. In carrying out the regime of Rampolla, which was, in every respect, a bad imitation of that of Antonelli, the Vatican left no stone unturned in its attempt to coerce the conscience of the French royalists; it did not even stop at dishonour, as was evidenced by the case of the unhappy Mgr d’Hulst, who, in order to evade the censorship of his pamphlet on Old Testament criticism, had to abandon both his king and his principles, only to die in exile of a broken heart. The case was characteristic of the whole Catholic monarchical party, which, owing to the pope’s interference in French politics, became disintegrated and dissolved, a fate that was all the more painful seeing that the Ralliement failed to influence the course of events. The “atheistic” Republic did not for one moment think of putting on sackcloth, or even of giving the Church a single proof of esteem and sympathy.

In one respect it was impossible for the papacy to continue on the path it had taken. In his first encyclical, Leo XIII. had sounded the clarion for battle against the Social Democracy; his encyclical Novarum rerum endeavoured to show the means to be employed, mainly in view of the condition of things in Belgium, for solving

the social question on Christian lines. But the Christian Democracy, which, starting in Belgium and France, had now extended its activity to Italy, Austria and Germany, and was striving to arrive at this solution, degenerated everywhere into a political party. The leaders of this party came into close contact with the Social Democrats, and their relations became so cordial that Social Democracy everywhere declared the “Démocratie Chrétienne” to be its forerunner and pioneer. The electioneering alliances, which were everywhere in vogue, but particularly in Germany, between the Catholics and popular party and the Social Democrats, throw a lurid light upon the character of a movement that certainly went far beyond the intentions of the pope, but which it was now difficult to undo or to hold in check. For it is the essence of the matter that there were further considerations going far beyond the Roman question and forcing the Curia to adhere to the sovereignty of the people.

The external rehabilitation of the Church had become, in many points, a fait accompli, but, internally, events had not kept pace with it. Catholic romanticism had withered away in France, as it had in Germany. “Liberal Catholicism,” which was its offspring, had died with Montalembert, after being placed under a ban by

Rome. The national religious movement, associated in Italy with the great names of Rosmini and Gioberti, had similarly been disavowed and crushed. The development of the last decade of the 19th century had clearly shown that the educated bourgeoisie, the tiers état, in whose hands the supreme power had since 1848 become vested throughout Europe, was either entirely lost to the Church or, at all events, indifferent to what were called Ultramontane tendencies. The educated bourgeoisie, which controls the fields of politics, science, finance, administration, art and literature, does not trouble itself about that great spiritual universal monarchy which Rome, as heir of the Caesars, claimed for the Vatican, and to which the Curia of to-day still clings. This bourgeoisie and the modern state that it upholds stand and fall with the motion of a constitutional state, whose magna carta is municipal and spiritual liberty, institutions with which the ideas of the Curia are in direct conflict. The more the hope of being able to regain these middle classes of society disappeared, the more decidedly did the Curia perceive that it must seek the support and the regeneration of its power in the steadily growing democracy, and endeavour through the medium of universal suffrage to secure the influence which this new alliance was able to offer.

The pontificate of Leo XIII. in its first phase aimed at preserving a certain balance of power. Whilst not openly repelling