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 On this day d’Aurelle and the French generals assembled to receive de Freycinet’s orders for the next advance. The 18th and 20th corps were to attack Beaune-la-Rolande, the 15th and 16th Pithiviers, while the 17th, aided by the 21st from Le Mans, was to look after the security of Orleans against a possible southward advance of the Detachment. A wise modification was arranged between d’Aurelle and Chanzy, whereby the first day’s operations should be directed to driving away the Detachment with the 17th and 16th corps, preparatory to the move on Pithiviers. On the 1st of December, then, no events of importance took place on the front of the II. Army, the centre of gravity having shifted to Orgeres-Toury and the direction of events to the grand

duke and Stosch. Fortunately for the Germans the cavalry general von Schmidt, who had been called upon to return to the II. Army with his division, managed to impress Stosch, in a farewell interview, with the imminence of the danger, and a still more urgent argument was the action of Villepion-Terrainiers, in which Chanzy with one infantry and one cavalry division attacked part of the I. Bavarian corps and drove it to Orgeres with a loss of 1000 men. Von Stosch, therefore, so far from literally obeying the waiting policy indicated in the orders from Prince Frederick Charles, cautiously led the grand duke to prepare for a battle, and the grand duke, seeing the chance of which he had been cheated so often, and secure in his royal rank and in the support of Moltke, Stosch and Blumenthal, took control again. Lastly, von Stosch called back the 22nd division, which had been taken from the Detachment to form the reserve of the II. Army.

The result of the decision thus made at the Detachment headquarters was of the highest importance. The French main body moving north-westward in the general direction of Toury encountered first the I. Bavarian corps, then the 17th division, and finally the 22nd division, and the leadership of the German generals, who took every advantage of the disconnected and spasmodic movements of the enemy, secured a complete success (battle of Loigny-Poupry, 2nd Dec). Meanwhile, and long before victory had declared itself. Prince Frederick Charles, still keeping the III. and X. corps on the side of Boiscommun and Bellegarde, had sent the IX. corps westward to support the Detachment, and halted von Schmidt’s returning cavalry division on the Paris road. But from this point there began an interchange of telegrams which almost nullified the strategical effect of the battle. The grand duke and von Stosch, desirous above all of enveloping—that is, driving into Orleans—the target that after so many disappointments they had found and struck, wished to expand westwards so as to prevent the escape of the French towards Chateaudun, and with that object asked the II. Army “to attack Artenay and to take over the protection of the great road.” Both von Stosch and von Waldersee had reported to the II. Army the importance of the French troops west of the main road, and Prince Frederick Charles, as above mentioned, had already moved the IX. corps and 6th cavalry division towards the Detachment. But when after the battle the grand duke’s request to the II. Army arrived at the prince’s headquarters, the reply was a curt general order for a direct concentric attack on Orleans by all forces under his command.

This was Moltke’s doing. Before Waldersee’s telegrams from the front arrived at Versailles, he had sent to the prince a peremptory order “to attack Orleans and thus to bring about the decision.” This order was based on Moltke’s view that the main body of the French had, after Beaune-la-Rolande, gathered on the west side of the great road, and although the king, in spite of the repulse of the great sortie from Paris, was still uneasy as to the possibility of a French offensive on Fontainebleau, he allowed the chief of his staff to have his way. The order, consequently, went forth. Long before it could be translated into action, the battle of Loigny-Poupry had completely changed the situation. Yet it was obeyed, and no attempt was made by the prince either to obtain its cancellation or to override it by the exercise of the beloved “initiative.” At the prince’s headquarters it was construed as a reflection upon the lethargy of that army after Beaune-la-Rolande, and—although it was the incompleteness of his own reports of that action that had misled Moltke as to the magnitude of the effort that had been expended to win it—the prince, bitterly resentful, fell into that dangerous condition of mind which induces a punctilious execution of orders to the letter, at whatever cost and without regard to circumstances. Hence the order to the Detachment, which allowed the French field army to escape, and substituted for a decisive victory the barren “second capture of Orleans.”

The plan for this second capture was simple: III. corps to fight its way from Pithiviers to Chilleurs-aux-Bois and thence down the Pithiviers-Orleans road through the forest, IX. corps to advance on Artenay and thence down the main road, Detachment to fight its way southward over the plains.

X. corps in rear of the centre as reserve. Only a small force was left on the side of Montargis, and the III. and X. corps, which were many miles away to the south and south-east, had to get into position at once (evening of the 2nd) by night marches if necessary. In short, a single grand line of battle, 40 m. long, supported only by one corps in rear of the centre, was to sweep over all obstacles, woods, fields, orchards and enemy, at a uniform rate of progress, and on the evening of the second day to converge on Orleans. The advance opened on the morning of the 3rd of December. The French left or main group included the 15th, 16th and 17th corps, the right of the 15th corps being in advance of the forest edge near Santeau. The right group, now under Bourbaki, consisted of the 18th and 20th corps, and faced north-east towards Beaune-la-Rolande and Montargis, the left flank being at Chambon. Fortunately for the III. corps, which numbered barely 13,000 rifles in all, the thinnest part of the opposing cordon was its centre, and the adventurous march of this corps carried it far into the forest to Loury. Only at Chilleurs was any serious resistance met with; elsewhere the French sheered off to their left, leaving the Pithiviers-Orleans road clear. In the night of the 3rd-4th isolated fractions of the enemy came accidentally in contact with von Alvensleben’s outposts, but a sudden night encounter in woods was too much for the half-trained French, and a panic ensued, in which five guns were abandoned. But, as Alvensleben himself said, when he marched into the forest from Chilleurs he “went with open eyes into a den” from which it was more than probable he would never emerge—Chilleurs was, in fact, reoccupied behind him by part of the 15th corps. By the fortune of war the III. corps actually did emerge safely, but only thanks to the inactivity of the French right group under Bourbaki, and to the almost entire absence of direct opposition, not to Prince Frederick Charles’s dispositions.

On the main road, meantime, the IX. corps had captured a series of villages, and at nightfall of the short December day reached the N.W. corner of the Forest. The Detachment, slowly pushing before it part of the army it had defeated at Loigny, and protecting itself on the outer flank by a flank guard (I. Bavarians) against the rest, had closed in towards Chevilly. Prince Frederick Charles, angered by the slow, painful and indecisive day’s work, ordered the advance to be continued and the French positions about Chevilly stormed in the dark, but fortunately was dissuaded by von Stosch, who rode over to his headquarters. But the prince never (except perhaps for a brief moment during the battle of Loigny-Poupry) believed that there was any serious obstacle in the way of the Detachment except its own fears, and repeatedly impressed upon Stosch the fact that Orleans was the watchword and the objective for every one.

In pursuance of the idee fixe, the prince issued orders for the 4th to the following effect: III. corps to advance on Orleans and to “bring artillery into action against the city,” at the same time carefully guarding his left flank; IX. and 6th cavalry division to go forward along the general line of the main road; Detachment to make an enveloping attack on Gidy in concert with the attack of the IX. corps. In the forest Alvensleben, knowing that he could not capture Orleans single-handed, guarded his left with a whole division and with the other advanced on the city, stormed the village of Vaumainbert, which was stubbornly defended by a small French force, and close upon nightfall perfunctorily threw a few shells into Orleans. The flank-guard division had meanwhile been gravely imperilled by the advance of Crouzat’s 20th corps, but once again the III. corps was miraculously saved, for Bourbaki, receiving word from d’Aurelle that the left group could not hold its position in advance of the Loire, and that the line of retreat of the right group was by Gien, ordered the fight to be broken off.

In the centre the IX. corps, after fighting hard all day, progressed no farther than Cercottes. The prince and the grand duke had a short interview, but, being personal enemies, their intercourse was confined to the prince’s issuing his orders without inquiring closely into the positions of the Detachment and its opponents. Thus while the main body of the French left group, under the determined Chanzy, slipped away to the left, to continue the struggle for three months longer, the Detachment was compelled to conform to the movements of the IX. corps. But it was handled resolutely, and in the afternoon its right swung in to Ormes. The 2nd cavalry division, finding a target and open ground, charged the demoralized defenders with great effect, a panic began and spread, and by nightfall, when the prince, who was with the IX. corps, had actually given up hope of capturing Orleans that day and had issued orders to suspend the fight, his rival and subordinate was marching into Orleans with bands playing and colours flying. There was no pursuit, and the severed wings of the French army thenceforward carried on the campaign as two separate armies under Chanzy and Bourbaki respectively.

See F. Hoenig, Volkskrieg an der Loire, and L. A. Hale, The People’s War, besides general and special histories and memoirs referred to in.

ORLEY, BERNARD VAN (1401–1542), Flemish painter, the son and pupil of the painter Valentyn van Orley, was born at