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 Spirit, and the ultimate restoration of all things. The doctrine of the restoration appeared necessary because the spirit, in spite of its inherent freedom, cannot lose its true nature, and because the final purposes of God cannot be foiled. The end, however, is only relative, for spirits are continually falling, and God remains through eternity the creator of the world. Moreover the end is not conceived as a transfiguration of the world, but as a liberation of the spirit from its unnatural union with the sensual. Here the Gnostic and philosophical character of the system is particularly manifest. The old Christian eschatology is set aside; no one has dealt such deadly blows to Chiliasm and Christian apocalypticism as Origen. It need hardly be said that he spiritualized the church doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh. But, while in all these doctrines he appears in the character of a Platonic philosopher, traces of rational criticism are not wanting. Where his fundamental conception admits of it, he tries to solve historical problems by historical methods. Even in the christology, where he is treating of the historical Christ, he entertains critical considerations; hence it is not altogether without reason that in after times he was suspected of “Ebionitic” views of the Person of Christ. Not unfrequently he represents the unity of the Father and the Son as a unity of agreement and harmony and “identity of will.”

Although the theology of Origen exerted a considerable influence as a whole in the two following centuries, it certainly lost nothing by the circumstance that several important propositions were capable of being torn from their original setting and placed in new connexions. It is in fact one of the peculiarities of this theology, which professed to be at once churchly and philosophical, that most of its formulae could be interpreted and appreciated in utramque partem. By arbitrary divisions and rearrangements the doctrinal statements of this “science of faith” could be made to serve the most diverse dogmatic tendencies. This is seen especially in the doctrine of the Logos. On the basis of his idea of God Origen was obliged to insist in the strongest manner on the personality, the eternity (eternal generation) and the essential divinity of the Logos. On the other hand, when he turned to consider the origin of the Logos he did not hesitate to speak of Him as a , and to include Him amongst the rest of God’s spiritual creatures. A  , which is at the same time , was no contradiction to him, simply because he held the immutability, the pure knowledge and the blessedness which constituted the divine nature to be communicable attributes. In later times both the orthodox and the Arians appealed to his teaching, both with a certain plausibility; but the inference of Arius, that an imparted divinity must be divinity in the second degree, Origen did not draw. With respect to other doctrines also, such as those of the Holy Spirit and the incarnation of Christ, &c., Origen prepared the way for the later dogmas. The technical terms round which such bitter controversies raged in the 4th and 5th centuries are often found in Origen lying peacefully side by side. But this is just where his epoch-making importance lies, that all the later parties in the church learned from him. And this is true not only of the dogmatic parties; solitary monks and ambitious priests, hard-headed critical exegetes, allegorists, mystics, all found something congenial in his writings. The only man who tried to shake off the theological influence of Origen was Marcellus of Ancyra, who did not succeed in producing any lasting effect on theology.

The attacks on Origen, which had begun in his lifetime, did not cease for centuries, and only subsided during the time of the fierce Arian controversy. It was not so much the relation between pistis and gnosis—faith and knowledge—as defined by Origen that gave offence, but rather isolated propositions, such as his doctrines of the pre-existence of souls, of the soul and body of Christ, of the resurrection of the flesh, of the final restoration, and of the plurality of worlds. Even in the 3rd century Origen’s view of the Trinity and of the Person of Christ was called in question, and that from various points of view. It was not till the 5th century, however, that objections of this kind became frequent. In the 4th century Pamphilus, Eusebius of Caesarea, Athanasius, the Cappadocians, Didymus, and Rufinus were on the side of Origen against the attacks of Methodius and many others. But, when the zeal of Epiphanius was kindled against him, when Jerome, alarmed about his own reputation, and in defiance of his past attitude, turned against his once honoured teacher, and Theophilus, patriarch of Alexandria, found it prudent, for political reasons, and out of consideration for the uneducated monks, to condemn Origen—then his authority received a shock from which it never recovered. There were, doubtless, in the 5th century church historians and theologians who still spoke of him with reverence, but such men became fewer and fewer. In the West Vincent of Lerins held up Origen as a warning example {Commonit. 23), showing how even the most learned and most eminent of church teachers might become a misleading light. In the East the exegetical school of Antioch had an aversion to Origen; the Alexandrians had utterly repudiated him. Nevertheless his writings were much read, especially in Palestine. The monophysite monks appealed to his authority, but could not prevent Justinian and the fifth oecumenical council at Constantinople (553) from anathematizing his teaching. It is true that many scholars (e.g. Hefele, Conciliengesch. ii. p. 858 sq.) deny that Origen was condemned by this council; but Möller rightly holds that the condemnation is proved (''Realencyklop. f. protest. Theol. u. Kirche'', xi. 113).

 ORIGINAL PACKAGE, a legal term in America, meaning, in general usage, the package in which goods, intended for interstate commerce, are actually transported wholesale. The term is used chiefly in determining the boundary between Federal and state jurisdiction in the regulation of commerce, and derives special significance by reason of the conflict between the powers of Congress to regulate commerce and the police legislation of the several states with respect to commodities considered injurious to public health and morals, such as intoxicating liquors, cigarettes and oleomargarine. By the Federal constitution Congress is vested with the power “to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes,” and each state is forbidden, without the consent of Congress, to “lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing