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 hot coals, but not in serious trials like that of carrying a heavy red-hot iron. The fire-ordeals are still performed by mountebanks, who very likely keep up the same means of trickery which were in official use when the accused was to be acquitted. The actual practice of the fire-ordeal contrasts shamefully with its theory, that the fire rather than harm the innocent restrained its natural action. Thus it stands in the Hindu code of Manu (viii. 115): "“He whom the flame does not burn, whom the water does not cast up, or whom no harm soon befals, is to be taken as truthful in his oath.” The water-ordeal here referred to is that well known in Europe, where the accused is thrown bound into the water, which receives him if innocent, but rejects him if guilty. The manner of carrying out this test is well explained in the directions given by Archbishop Hincmar in the 9th century: he who is let down into the water for trial is to be fastened by a rope, that he may not be in danger if the water receives him as innocent, but may be pulled out. In the later middle ages this ordeal by “swimming” or “fleeting” became the most approved means of trying a suspected witch: she was stripped naked and cross bound, the right thumb to the left toe, and the left thumb to the right toe. In this state she was cast into a pond or river, in which it was thought impossible for her to sink (Brand iii. 21). The cases of “ducking” witches which have occurred in England within the last few years are remains of the ancient ordeal.

If there is one thing that may be predicated of man in a state of nature it is that two disputants tend to fight out their quarrel. When in the warfare of Greeks and Trojans, of Jews and Philistines, of Vandals and Alamans, heroes come out from the two sides and their combat is taken to mark the powers of the opposing war-gods and decide the victory, then the principle of the ordeal by battle has been practically called in. Among striking instances of the Teutonic custom which influenced the whole of medieval Europe may be cited the custom of the Franks that the princes, if they could not quell the strife, had to fight it out between themselves, and Wipo's account of the quarrel between the Christian Saxons and the Pagan Slavs as to which broke the peace, when both sides demanded of the emperor that it should be settled by duel, which was done by choosing a champion on each side, and the Christian fell. The Scandinavian term “holmgang” refers to the habit of fighting duels on an island. A passage from old German law shows the single combat accepted as a regular legal procedure: “If there be dispute concerning fields, vineyards, or money, that they avoid perjury let two be chosen to fight, and decide the cause by duel” (Grimm, Rechtsaltert., p. 928). In England, after the Conquest, trial by combat superseded other legal ordeals, which were abolished in the time of Henry III. Among famous instances is that of Henry de Essex, hereditary standard-bearer of England, who fled from a battle in Wales, in 1158, threw from him the royal standard, and cried out that the king was slain. Robert de Montfort afterwards, accusing him of having done this with treasonable intent, offered to prove his accusation by combat, and they fought in presence of Henry II. and his court, when Essex was defeated, but the king spared his life, and, his estate being confiscated, he became a monk in Reading Abbey. A lord often sent his man in his stead to such combats, and priests and women were ordinarily represented by champions. The wager of battle died out so quietly in England without being legally abolished that in the court of king’s bench in 1818 it was claimed by a person charged with murder, which led to its formal abolition (Ashford v. Thornton in Barnewall and Alderson 457; see details in H. C. Lea, Superstition and Force, ii.). A distinct connexion may, however, be traced between the legal duel and the illegal private duel, which has disappeared from England, but still flourishes in France and Germany (see ).

ORDER (through Fr. ordre, for earlier ordene, from Lat. ordo, ordinis, rank, service, arrangement; the ultimate source is generally taken to be the root seen in Lat. oriri, rise, arise, begin; cf. “origin”), a row or series, hence grade, class or rank, succession, sequence or orderly arrangement; from these, the original meanings of ordo, have developed the numerous applications attached to the word, many, if not most, of which appear in classical and medieval Latin. In the sense of a class or body of persons or things united by some common status, rank or distinguishing characteristics, or as organized and living under some common rules and regulations, we find the term applied, in such expressions as “lower” or “higher orders,” to the class divisions of society; to the various grades of persons exercising spiritual functions in the Christian church (see, below); to the bodies of persons bound by vows to a religious life (see, and separate articles on the chief religious orders); to the military and monastic fraternities of the middle ages, such as the Templars, Hospitallers, &c., and to those institutions, founded by sovereigns or states, in part imitation of these fraternities, which are conveniently divided into orders of knighthood, or orders of merit (see ). The term “order” is thus used, in an easily transferred sense, for the various insignia, badge, star, collar, worn by the members of the institution. As applied to a group of objects, an “order” in zoological, botanical and mineral classification ranks next below a “class,” and above a “family.” The use of the word in architecture is treated in a separate article below.

The word has several technical mathematical usages. In number-theory it denotes a relative rank between the elements of an aggregate so that the collection becomes an ordered aggregate (see Number). The order of a plane curve is the number of points (real or imaginary) in which the curve is intersected by a straight line; it is equal to the degree (or coefficient of the highest power) of the Cartesian equation expressing the curve. The order of a non-plane curve is the number of points (real or imaginary) in which the curve intersects a plane (see ). The order of a surface is the number of points in which the surface intersects a straight line. For the order of a congruence and complex see Surface. The order of a differential equation is the degree of its highest differential coefficient (see ).

Another branch of the sense-development of the word starts from the meaning of orderly, systematic or proper arrangement, which appears in the simplest form in such adverbial expressions as “in order,” “out of order” and the like. More particular instances are the use of the word for the customary procedure observed in the conduct of the business of a public meeting, or of parliamentary debates, and for the general maintenance and due observance of law and authority, “public order.”

In liturgical use “order” is a special form of divine service prescribed by authority, e.g. the “Order of Confirmation,” in the English Prayer Book.

The common use of “order” in the sense of a command, instruction or direction is a transference from that of arrangement in accordance with intention to the means for attaining it. It is a comparatively late sense-development; it does not appear in Latin, and the earliest quotations in the New English Dictionary are from the 16th century. Particular applications of the term are, in commercial usage, to a direction in writing to a banker or holder of money or goods, by the person in whom the legal right to them lies, to pay or hand over the same to a third person named or to his order. A bill or negotiable instrument made “payable to order” is one which can be negotiated by the payee by endorsement. At common law a negotiable instrument must contain words expressly authorizing transfer. By the Bills of Exchange Act 1882, § 8, “a bill is payable to order which is expressed to be so payable, or which is expressed to be payable to a particular person, and does not contain words prohibiting transfer or indicating an intention that it should not be transferable.” Other applications are to a direction for the supply of goods and to a pass for free admission to a place of amusement, a building, &c.

In law an “order of the court” is a judicial direction on matters outside the record; as laid down by Esher, M.R., in Onslow v. Inland Revenue, 59, L.J.Q.B. 556, a “judgment” is a decision obtained in an action and every other decision is an “order.” For “Order in Council” see below.