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BALANCE OF NAVIES] and other establishments for providing the matèriel of a great navy. In the spring of 1909 the serious menace to British supremacy at sea, represented by the growth of the new German fleet of battleships, led in England to a “scare” which recalled that of 1888, and to an energetic campaign for additional expenditure on the British navy.

During the years following on the American Civil War (1862–66) the United States paid small attention to the navy. In 1881 a board was appointed to advise on the needs of the navy, and in 1890, the board recommended the formation of a fleet of 100 vessels of which 20 should be battleships of the largest class. The reviving interest in the navy was greatly stimulated by the diplomatic difference with Great Britain which arose over the frontier question between her and the republic of Venezuela in 1896. Resolutions were passed in congress approving of an increase of the navy. The war with Spain in 1898 completed the revival of American interest in the navy. The acquisition of Porto Rico, and the protectorate of Cuba in the West Indies, together with the annexation of the Philippines, and the visible approach of the time when the relations of the powers interested in the Pacific would call for regulation, confirmed the conviction that a powerful fleet must be maintained. In 1889 the United States possessed no modern battleship. In 1899 there were 4 built and 8 building. At the close of 1903 there were built and building 27 of 353,260 tons, only two of them being of less than 10,000 tons. From £5,119,850 in 1890 the expenditure grew to £16,355,380 in 1903.

The navy of Japan, the last comer among the great naval forces of the world, may be said to date from 1895, from, in fact, the eve of the war with China. As an insular power with a large seafaring population, Japan is called upon to possess a fleet. Even in the days of its voluntary isolation it had a known capacity for maritime warfare. Its capacity for assimilating the ideas and mastering the mechanical skill of Europe have been in no respect better shown than in naval matters. From the moment it was compelled to open its ports it began not only to acquire steamers but to apply itself under European guidance to learning how to make and use them. A navy on the western model was already organized by 1895, but it was still of trifling proportions. In 1896 the Japanese navy had become an object of serious attention to the world. A plan was drafted in that year, and confirmed in the next, by which Japan arranged to supply itself, mainly by purchase in Europe, with a fleet containing 4 of the most powerful battleships. The scheme was modified in detail in 1898, when the decision was taken to increase the tonnage of the vessels. A little later additions were arranged for, and vessels building for South America states in English ports were purchased. The British model was carefully followed in naval organization, the alliance with England giving special facilities for this. And by 1904, when the war with Russia began, the unknown Japanese fleet proved its competence by victories at sea which put the seal on her position as a naval power.

Conclusion.—When we look over the whole period from the end of the Napoleonic wars, one great fact is patent to our view. It is that this was an epoch of revival or development in the naval power of the whole world, in the course of which the position held by Great Britain in 1816 was partially lost simply by the growth of other powers. The situation in that year was by its very nature temporary, and a quotation of the respective numbers of warships then possessed by the world would have no value. An instructive comparison can, however, be made between the year 1838, when Great Britain began to be seriously concerned with the rise of possible enemies at sea, and the eve of the war between Russia and Japan. Battleships may again be taken as the test of strength, since nothing happened in the Russo-Japanese War to show that they do not still form the most vital element of naval power. We may also leave aside the many small fleets which cannot act collectively, and which individually do not weigh in the balance. The figures for 1838 are given above, but may be repeated for comparison. In that year Great Britain possessed, built and building, 90 ships of the line; France 49; Russia 50; the United States 15. In 1903 the number of vessels recognized as battleships, possessed by the great powers, was for Great Britain 67; for France 39; for Russia 18; for the United States 27; for Germany 27; for Italy 18; for Japan 5. At the first date the British fleet was among great powers as 90 to 114. At the latter it was as 67 to 134.

Such comparisons, however, as these become much more complicated in later years, when the importance of the preponderance of “Dreadnoughts”—the new type of battleship—(see and )—was realized. By the invention of this type Great Britain appeared to obtain a new lead; and in 1907, when it was calculated that by 1910 there would be ten British “Dreadnoughts” actually in commission while neither in Europe nor America would a single similar ship have been completed by any foreign power, the situation seemed to be entirely in favour of complete supremacy at sea for the British fleet. But the progress of German and American construction, and particularly the experience gained of German ability to build and equip much more rapidly than had been supposed, showed by 1909 that, so far as “Dreadnoughts” were concerned at all events, the lead of Great Britain could only be maintained by exceptional effort and exceptional expenditure. It was admitted in parliament by the prime minister, first lord of the admiralty and foreign secretary—themselves Liberals who had flirted with proposals for disarmament, and who depended for office on the support of more extreme “pacifists” who objected on principle to heavy military and naval expenditure—that, while for the moment the British “two-power standard” was still in existence, the revelations as to German shipbuilding showed that it could only be maintained in the future by the creation of a new fleet on a scale previously not contemplated. The supremacy of Great Britain in ships of the older types would be of no avail as years went by and other powers were equalling her in the output of ships of the new type, and a new race thus began, of which it is impossible here to indicate more than the start. It was no longer a question of completed ships, but one still more of programmes for building and of the rate at which these programmes could be accomplished. At the beginning of 1910, while Great Britain had her ten “Dreadnoughts,” it was not the case that other powers had none: Germany already had four and the United States two; and a knowledge of the naval programmes of both these countries, to speak of no others, showed that, unless either their policy changed or the British shipbuilding programme was modified so as to keep up with their progress, it would not take many years before the theory of the equality of the British fleet in “capital ships” to those of the next two naval powers would have to be abandoned. In England this situation created a profound sensation in 1909, since it was common ground that her fleet was her all in all, on which her empire depended; and the result was seen, not only in a considerable increase in the Naval Estimates of 1910–1911, but also in the beginning of a serious attempt to organize their fleets on the part of the British colonial dominions, which should co-operate with the mother country.

The British Admiralty figures for the state of the principal fleets as on March 31st, 1910, are summarized below. The letters at the heads of the columns have the following signification: E., England; F., France; R., Russia; G., Germany; I., Italy; U., United States; and J., Japan:—