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 the Romans, but after defeating the emperor Galerius near Callinicum on the Euphrates in 296 was completely defeated in 297, and forced to conclude a peace, by which western Mesopotamia and five provinces on the left bank of the upper Tigris were ceded to the Romans and their sovereignty over the kingdom of Armenia was acknowledged. This peace, concluded in 297, lasted for forty years. Narses died in 303 and was succeeded by his son Hormizd II.

 NARSES (c. 478–573) an important officer of Justinian, in the 6th century. He was a eunuch, but we are nowhere distinctly informed that he was of servile origin. A native of Persarmenia (that portion of Armenia which was allotted to Persia by the partition of 384), he may have been prepared and educated by his parents for service in an oriental court. If the statement that he died at the age of ninety-five be correct, he was born about 478. He was probably brought young to Constantinople, and attained a footing in the officium of the grand chamberlain. He rose to be one of the three (spectabiles) “chartularii,” a position implying some literary attainment, and involving the custody of the archives of the household. Hence, probably in middle life, he became “praepositus sacri cubiculi,” an “illustris,” and entitled along with the praetorian prefects and the generals to the highest rank at the imperial court. In this capacity, in 530, he received into the emperor’s obedience another Narses, a fellow-countryman, with his two brothers, Aratius and Isaac. These Persarmenian generals, having formerly fought under the standard of Persia, now in consequence of the successes of Belisarius transferred their allegiance to the emperor Justinian, came to Constantinople, and received costly gifts from the great minister.

In 532 the insurrection known as the Nika broke out in Constantinople, when for some hours the throne of Justinian seemed doomed to overthrow. It was saved partly by the courage of his wife, Theodora, and partly by the timely prodigality of Narses, who stole out into the capital, and with large sums of money bribed the leaders of the “blue” faction, which was aforetime loyal to the emperor, to shout as of old “Justiniane Auguste tu vincas.”

The African and Italian wars followed. In the fourth year of the latter war (538) the splendid successes of Belisarius had awakened both joy and fear in the heart of his master. Reinforcements were sent into Italy, and Narses was placed at their head. Belisarius understood that Narses came to serve under him like any other officer of distinguished but subordinate rank, and he received a letter from Justinian which seemed to support this conclusion. But the friends of Narses continually plied him with suggestions that he, a great officer of the household, in the secrets of the emperor, had been sent to Italy, not to serve as a subaltern, but to hold independent command and win military glory for himself. The truth probably lay between the two. Justinian could not deprive his great general of the supreme command, yet he wished to have a very powerful emissary of the court constantly at his side. He would have him watched but not hampered.

The two generals met ( 538) at Fermo on the Adriatic coast. The first interference of Narses with the plans of Belisarius was beneficial. John, one of the officers highest in rank under Belisarius, had pressed on to Rimini, contrary to the instructions of his chief, leaving in his rear the difficult fortress of Osimo (Auximum) untaken. His daring march had alarmed the Goths for Ravenna, and induced them to raise the siege of Rome; but he himself was now shut up in Rimini, and on the point of being forced by famine to surrender. Belisarius and his followers were prepared to let him pay the penalty of his rashness and disobedience. But his friend Narses so insisted on the blow to the reputation of the imperial arms which would be produced by the surrender of Rimini that he carried the council of war with him, and Belisarius had to plan a brilliant march across the mountains, in conjunction with a movement by the fleet, whereby Rimini was relieved while Osimo was still untaken. When Belisarius and John met, the latter ostentatiously thanked Narses alone for his preservation.

His next use of his authority was less fortunate. Milan,

which was holding out for the Romans, was also hard pressed by famine. The two generals who were sent to relieve it loitered disgracefully over their march, and, when Belisarius wished to despatch further reinforcements, the commanders of, these new troops refused to stir till Narses gave them orders. Belisarius wrote to the eunuch pointing out the necessity of unity of purpose in the imperial army. At length, grudgingly, Narses gave his consent, and issued the required orders; but it was too late. Milan had been compelled by extremity of famine to surrender, and with it the whole province of Liguria fell into the hands of the enemy. This event forced Justinian to recognize the dangers of even a partially divided command, and he recalled Narses to Constantinople.

Twelve years elapsed before Narses returned to Italy. Meanwhile there had been great vicissitudes of fortune both for the Romans and the Goths. Italy, which appeared to have been won by the sword of Belisarius, had been lost again by the exactions and misgovernment of Alexander. Totila had raised up a new army, had more than kept Belisarius at bay in five difficult campaigns (544–548) and now held nearly all the country. Belisarius, however, in this his second series of campaigns, had never been properly seconded by his master. In the spring of 552 Narses set sail from Salona on the Dalmatian coast with a large and well-appointed army. It was a Roman army only in name. Lombards, Heruli, Huns, Gepidae and even Persians followed the standard of Narses, men equal in physical strength and valour to the Goths, and inspired by the liberal pay which they received, and by the hope of plunder.

The eunuch seems to have led his army round the head of the Adriatic Gulf. By skilfully co-operating with his fleet, he was able to cross the rivers of Venetia without fighting the Gothic general Teias, who intended to dispute their passage. Having mustered all his forces at Ravenna, he marched southward. He refused to be detained before Rimini, being determined to meet the Gothic king as soon as possible with his army undiminished. The occupation of the pass of Furlo (Petra Pertusa) by the Goths prevented his marching by the Via Flaminia, but, taking a short circuit, he rejoined the great road near Cagli. A little farther on, upon the crest of the Appenines, he was met by Totila, who had advanced as far as Tadini, called by Procopius Tagina. Parleys, messages and harangues by each general followed. At length the line of battle was formed, and the Gothic army, probably greatly inferior in number to the Byzantine was hopelessly routed (July 552), the king receiving a mortal wound as he was hurrying from the battlefield.

With Totila fell the last hopes of the Gothic kingdom of Italy. Teias, who was proclaimed his successor, protracted for a few months a desperate resistance in the rocky peninsula of Castellamare, overlooking the bay of Naples. At length want of provisions forced him into the plain, and there by the river Sarno, almost in sight of Pompeii, was fought (553) a battle which is generally named from the overlooking range of Mons Lactarius (Monte Lettere). The actual site of the battle, however, is about half a mile from the little town of Angri, and its memory is still vaguely preserved by the name Pozzo dei Goti (well of the Goths). In this battle Teias was killed. He was the last king of the Ostrogoths.

The task of Narses, however, was not yet ended. By the invitation of the Goths an army of 75,000 warlike Alamanni and Franks, the subjects of King Theudibald, crossed the Alps under the command of two Alamannic nobles, the brothers Lothair and Buccelin (553). The great strategic talents of Narses were shown even more conspicuously in this, than in his previous and more brilliant campaigns. Against the small but gallant bands of Totila and Teias he had adopted the policy of rapid marches and imperative challenges to battle. His strategy in dealing with the great host from Gaul was of the Fabian kind. He kept them as long as he could north of the Apennines, while he completed the reduction of the fortresses of Tuscany. At the approach of winter he gathered his troops into the chief cities and declined operations in the field, while the Alamannic brothers marched through Italy, killing and