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 to one of his unaccountable attacks of apparent intellectual paralysis. He seemed unaware of the vital importance of the moment, crouched shivering over a bivouac fire, and finally rode back to Dresden, leaving no specific orders for the further pursuit.

49. French Defeats.—The allies, however, continued to retreat, but unfortunately Vandamme, with his single corps and unsupported, issued out of the mountains on their flank, threw himself across their line of retreat near Kulm, and was completely overwhelmed by sheer weight of numbers (29th). In spite of this misfortune, Napoleon could claim a brilliant success for himself, but almost at the same moment news reached him that Oudinot at Grossbeeren near Berlin, and Macdonald on the Katzbach opposed to Blücher, had both been severely defeated.

50. Napoleon’s Movements.—During the next two days the emperor examined his situation and dictated a series of notes which have been a puzzle to every strategical thinker ever since. In these he seems suddenly to have cut adrift from every principle the truth of which he had himself so brilliantly demonstrated, and we find him discussing plans based on hypothesis, not knowledge, and on the importance of geographical points without reference to the enemy’s field army. From these reveries he was at length awakened by news which indicated that the consequences of Macdonald’s defeat had been far more serious to the moral of that command than he had imagined. He immediately rode over to establish order, and his manner and violence were so improper that Caulaincourt had the greatest difficulty in concealing the scandal. Blücher, however, hearing of his arrival, at once retreated and the emperor followed, thus uncovering the passes over the Bohemian mountains, a fact of which Schwarzenberg was quick to take advantage. Learning of his approach, Napoleon again withdrew to Bautzen. Then hearing that the Austrians had counter-marched and were again moving towards Dresden, he hastened back there, concentrated as many men as could conveniently be handled, and advanced beyond Pirna and Königstein to meet him. But the Austrians had no intention of attacking him, for time was now working on their side and, leaving his men to starve in the exhausted district, the emperor again returned to Dresden, where for the rest of the month he remained in an extraordinary state of vacillation. On the 4th of October he again drew up a review of the situation, in which he apparently contemplated giving up his communications with France and wintering in and around Dresden, though at the same time he is aware of the distress amongst his men for want of food.

51. Campaign of Leipzig.—In the meanwhile Blücher, Schwarzenberg and Bernadotte were working round his flanks. Ney, who had joined Oudinot after Grossbeeren, had been defeated at Dennewitz (6th Sept.), the victory, won by Prussian troops solely, giving the greatest encouragement to the enemy. Suddenly Napoleon’s plans are again reviewed and completely changed. Calling up St Cyr, whom he had already warned to remain at Dresden with his command, he decides to fall back towards Erfurt, and go into winter quarters between that place and Magdeburg, pointing out that Dresden was of no use to him as a base and that if he does have a battle, he had much better have St Cyr and his men with him than at Dresden. He then on the 7th of October drew up a final plan, in which one again recognizes the old commander, and this he immediately proceeded to put into execution, for he was now quite aware of the danger threatening his line of retreat from both Blücher and Schwarzenberg and the North Army; yet only a few hours afterwards the portion of the order relating to St Cyr and Lobau was cancelled and the two were finally left behind at Dresden. From the 10th to the 13th Napoleon lay at Düben, again a prey to the most extraordinary irresolution, but on that day he thought he saw his opportunity. Blücher was reported near Wittenberg, and Schwarzenberg was moving slowly round to the south of Leipzig. The North Army under Bernadotte, unknown to Napoleon, lay on Blücher’s left around Halle. The emperor decided to throw the bulk of his force on Blücher, and, having routed him, turn south on Schwarzenberg and sever his communications with Bohemia. His concentration was effected

with his usual sureness and celerity, but whilst the French moved on Wittenberg, Blücher was marching to his right, indifferent to his communications as all Prussia lay behind him.

This move on the 14th brought him into touch with Bernadotte, and now a single march forward of all three armies would have absolutely isolated Napoleon from France; but Bernadotte’s nerve failed him, for on hearing of Napoleon’s threat against Wittenberg he decided to retreat northward, and not all the persuasions of Blücher and Gneisenau could move him. Thus if the French movement momentarily ended in a blow in the air, it was indirectly the cause of their ultimate salvation.

52. The Battle of the Nations.—On the 15th Napoleon concentrated his forces to the east of Leipzig, with only a weak detachment to the west, and in the evening the allies were prepared to attack him. Schwarzenberg, with 180,000 men available at once and 60,000 on the following day; Blücher had about 60,000, but Bernadotte now could not arrive before the 18th.

Napoleon prepared to throw the bulk of his force upon Schwarzenberg and massed his troops south-east of the town, whilst Schwarzenberg marched concentrically against him down the valley of the Elster and Pleisse, the mass of his troops on the right bank of the latter and a strong column under Giulay on the left working round to join Blücher on the north. The fighting which followed was most obstinate, but the Austrians failed to make any impression on the French positions, and indeed Giulay felt himself compelled to withdraw to his former position. On the other hand, Blücher carried the village of Möckern and came within a mile of the gates of the town. During the 17th there was only indecisive skirmishing, Schwarzenberg waiting for his reinforcements coming up by the Dresden road, Blücher for Bernadotte to come in on his left, and by some extraordinary oversight Giulay was brought closer in to the Austrian centre, thus opening for the French their line of retreat towards Erfurt, and no information of this movement appears to have been conveyed to Blücher. The emperor when he became aware of the movement, sent the IVth Corps to Lindenau to keep the road open.

On the 18th the fighting was resumed and by about noon Bernadotte came up and closed the gap to the N.E. of the town between Blücher and the Austrians. At 2 the Saxons, who had remained faithful to Napoleon longer than his other German allies, went over to the enemy. All hope of saving the battle had now to be given up, but the French covered their retreat obstinately and by daybreak next morning one-half of the army was already filing out along the road to Erfurt which had so fortunately been left for them.

53. Retreat of the French and Battle of Hanau.—It took Blücher time to extricate his troops from the confusion into which the battle had thrown them, and the garrison of Leipzig and the troops left on the right bank of the Elster still resisted obstinately—hence no direct pursuit could be initiated and the French, still upwards of 100,000 strong, marching rapidly, soon gained distance enough to be reformed. Blücher followed by parallel and inferior roads on their northern flank, but Schwarzenberg knowing that the Bavarians also had forsaken the emperor and were marching under Wrede, 50,000 strong, to intercept his retreat, followed in a most leisurely fashion. Blücher did not succeed in overtaking the French, but the latter, near Hanau, found their way barred by Wrede with 50,000 men and over 100 guns in a strong position.

To this fresh emergency Napoleon and his army responded in most brilliant fashion. As at Krasnoi in 1812, they went straight for their enemy and after one of the most brilliant series of artillery movements in history, directed by General Drouot, they marched right over their enemy, practically destroying his whole force. Henceforward their march was unmolested, and they reached Mainz on the 5th of November.

54. The Defensive Campaign.—When the last of the French troops had crossed to the western bank of the Rhine, divided counsels made their appearance at the headquarters of the allies. Every one was weary of the war, and many felt that it would be unwise to push Napoleon and the French nation to extremes.