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 or Petrinja (the last also called the Banal). After the defeat of the Turkish power by Prince Eugene it was proposed to abolish the military constitution of the frontier, but the change was successfully resisted by the inhabitants of the district; in fact a new Slavonian frontier district was established in 1702, and Maria Theresa extended the organization to the march-lands of Transylvania (the Szekler frontier in 1764, the Wallachian in 1766).

As a reward for the service it rendered the government in the suppression of the Hungarian insurrection in 1848, the Military Frontier was erected in 1849 into a crown-land, with a total area of 15,182 sq. m. and a population of 1,220,503. In 1851 the Transylvanian portion (1177 sq. m.) was incorporated with the rest of Transylvania; and in 1871 effect was given to the imperial decree of 1869 by which the districts of the Warasdin regiments (St George and the Cross) and the towns of Zengg, Belovar, Ivanič, &c., were “provincialized” or incorporated with the Croatian-Slavonian crown-land. In 1872 the Banat regiments followed suit; and in 1873 the old military organization was abolished in the rest of the frontier. Not till 1881, however, were the Croatian-Slavonian march-lands completely merged in the kingdoms to which they naturally belonged.

The social aspect of the military frontier régime is interesting. The zadruga system of land tenure was artificially kept in existence (see ). Watch-towers with wooden clappers and the beacons which flashed the alarm along the whole frontier in a few hours are still features in the landscape.

MILITARY LAW, “the law which governs the soldier, in peace and in war, at home and abroad. At all times and in all places the conduct of officers and soldiers as such is regulated by military law.” The above is the definition as given in the opening chapter of the Manual of Military Law, which is issued under the authority of the English War Office, and which is the textbook used by all English courts martial. The definition is, however, somewhat too wide, as the British system does not exclude in time of peace the action of the civil courts. In time of peace all persons who belong to the military class in most European continental countries are judged by military law and by military courts. There is also in most continental countries an intermediate stage between war and peace, known as in état de siege, which may be declared for a fixed period for a district, or even a city, by reason of domestic insurrection or the presence of an enemy. It requires legislative enactment. Thirdly comes a state of war, when the military authorities are supreme; and whilst they can call upon the civil power to act in concert with them, the military authority is final. This is a brief summary of the system of military law that prevails in most countries of the continent. The cardinal point of difference between the British and the continental systems lies in the fact that in the United Kingdom the soldier is not only a soldier, but a citizen also; and although he may be tried for civil offences by a military tribunal, the power is not exercised in all cases. Thus treason, treason-felony, murder, manslaughter, rape, are brought before a civil court in times of peace, if the offence is committed in the United Kingdom, or if it is committed anywhere else in the king’s dominions, except Gibraltar, within a hundred miles from a place where the offender can be tried by a civil court. Minor civil offences, when not committed within military lines, or when the person affected by the offence is a civilian, or when it is a case for a jury, or where intricate questions of law may arise, may also be brought before a civil tribunal. But an offence, of whatever nature, committed on active service would be brought before a military tribunal.

The military law of England in early times existed, like the forces to which it applied, in a period of war only. Troops were raised for a particular service, and were disbanded upon the cessation of hostilities. The crown, of its mere prerogative, made laws known as Articles of War, for the government and discipline of the troops while

thus embodied and serving. Except for the punishment of desertion, which offence was made a felony by statute in the reign of Henry VI., these ordinances or Articles of War remained almost the sole authority for the enforcement of discipline until 1689, when the first Mutiny Act was passed and the military forces of the crown were brought under the direct control of parliament. Even the Parliamentary forces in the time of Charles I. and Cromwell 'were governed, not by an act of the legislature, but by articles of war similar to those issued by the king and authorized by, an ordinance of the Lords and Commons, exercising in that respect the sovereign prerogative. This power of law-making by prerogative was, however, held to be applicable during a state of actual war only, and attempts to exercise it in time of peace were ineffectual. Subject to this limitation it existed for considerably more than a century after the passing of the first Mutiny Act. From 1689 to 1803, although in peace time the Mutiny Act was occasionally suffered to expire, a statutory power was given to the crown to make Articles of War to operate in the colonies and elsewhere beyond the seas in the same manner as those made by prerogative operated in time of war. In 1715, in consequence of the rebellion, this power was created in respect of the forces in the kingdom. But these enactments were apart from and in no respect affected the principle acknowledged all this time—that the crown of its mere prerogative could make laws for the government of the army in foreign countries in time of war. The Mutiny Act of 1803 effected a great constitutional change, in this respect: the power of the crown to make any Articles of War became altogether statutory, and the prerogative merged in the act of parliament. So matters remained till the year 1879, when the last Mutiny Act was passed and the last Articles of War were promulgated. The Mutiny Act legislated for offences in respect of which death or penal servitude could be awarded, and the Articles of War, while repeating those provisions of the act, constituted the direct authority for dealing with offences for which imprisonment was the maximum punishment as well as with many matters relating to trial and procedure. The act and the articles were found not to harmonize in all respects. Their general arrangement was faulty, and their language sometimes obscure. In 1869 a royal commission recommended that both should be recast in a simple and intelligible shape. In 1878 a committee of the House of Commons endorsed this view and made certain recommendations as to the way in which the task should be performed. In 1879 the government submitted to parliament and passed into law a measure Consolidating in one act both the Mutiny Act and the Articles of War, and amending their provisions in certain important respects. This measure was called the “Army Discipline and Regulation Act 1879.” After one or two years' experience of its working it also was found capable of improvement, and was in its turn superseded by the Army Act 1881, which now forms the foundation and the main portion of the military law of England. It contains a proviso saving the right of the crown to make Articles of War, but in such a manner as to render the power in effect a nullity; for it enacts that no crime made punishable by the act shall be otherwise punishable by such articles. As the punishment of every conceivable offence is provided for by the act, any articles made thereunder can be no more than an empty formality having no practical effect. Thus the history of English military law up to 1879 may be divided into three periods, each having a distinct constitutional aspect: (1) that prior to 1689, when the army, being regarded as so many personal retainers of the sovereign rather than servants of the state, was mainly governed by the will of the sovereign; (2) that between 1689 and 1803, when the army, being recognized as a permanent force, was governed within the realm by statute and without it by the prerogative of the crown; and (3) that from 1803 to 1879, when it was governed either directly by statute or by the sovereign under