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 revealed the depth of the hatred which her own follies and the calumnies of her enemies had aroused against her. The public held her responsible for the bankrupt state of the country; and though in 1788, following the popular outcry, she prevailed upon the king to recall Necker, it was impossible for him to avert the Revolution. The year 1789 was one of disaster for Marie Antoinette; on the 10th of March her brother Joseph II. died, and on the 4th of June her eldest son. The same year saw the assembling of the States-general, which she had dreaded; the taking of the Bastille, and the events leading to the terrible days of the 5th and 6th of October at Versailles and the removal of the royal family to the Tuileries. Then began the negotiations with Mirabeau, whose high estimate of the queen is well-known (e.g. his famous remark, “The king has only one man on his side, and that is his wife”). But the queen was violently prejudiced against him, believing him among other things to be responsible for the events of the 5th and 6th of October, and he never gained her full confidence. She was naturally incapable of seeing the full import of the Revolution, and merely temporised with Mirabeau. She dreaded the thought of civil war; and even when she had realized the necessity for decisive action the king’s apathy and indecision made it impossible for her to persuade him to carry into effect Mirabeau’s plan of leaving Paris and appealing to the provinces. Her difficulties were increased by the departure of Mercy for the Hague in September 1790, for Montmorin who now took his place in the negotiations had not her confidence to the same extent. Feeling herself helpless and almost isolated in Paris, she now relied chiefly on her friends outside France—Mercy, Count Axel Fersen, and the baron de Breteuil; and it was by their help and that of Bouillé that after the death of Mirabeau, on the 8th of April 1791, the plan was arranged of escaping to Montmédy, which ended in the flight to Varennes (June 21, 1791).

After the return from Varennes the royal family were closely guarded, but in spite of this they still found channels of communication with the outside world. The king being sunk in apathy, the task of negotiation devolved upon the queen; but in her inexperience and ignorance of affairs, and the uncertainty of information from abroad, it was hard for her to follow any clear policy. Her courageous bearing during the return from Varennes had greatly impressed Barnave, and he now approached her on behalf of the Feuillants and the constitutional party. For about a year she continued to negotiate with them, forwarding to Mercy and the emperor Leopold II. letters and memoranda dictated by them, while at the same time secretly warning her friends not to accept these letters as her own opinions, but to realize that she was dependent on the Constitutionals. She agreed with their plan of an armed congress, and on this idea both she and Fersen insisted with all their might, Fersen leaving Brussels and going on a mission to the emperor to try and gain support and checkmate the émigrés, whose desertion the queen bitterly resented, and whose rashness threatened to frustrate her plans and endanger the lives of her family.

As to the acceptance of the constitution (Sept. 1791), “tissue of absurdities” though the queen thought it, and much as she would have preferred a bolder course, she considered that in the circumstances the king was bound to accept it in order to inspire confidence. Mercy was also in correspondence with the Constitutionals, and in letter after letter to him and the emperor, the queen, strongly supported by Fersen, insisted that the congress should be formed as soon as possible, her appeals increasing in urgency as she saw that Barnave’s party would soon be powerless against the extremists. But owing to the lengthy negotiations of the powers the congress was continually postponed. On the 1st of March 1792 Leopold II. died, and was succeeded by the young Francis II. Marie Antoinette’s actions were now directed entirely by Fersen, for she suspected Mercy and the emperor of sacrificing her to the interests of Austria (Fersen, i. 251; Arneth, pp. 254, 256, &c.). The declaration of war which the king was forced to make (April 20) threw her definitely into opposition to the Revolution, and she betrayed to Mercy and Fersen the plans of the French generals (Arneth, p. 259; Fersen, ii. 220, 289, 308, 325, 327). She was now certain that the life of the king was threatened, and the events of the 20th of June added to her terrors. She considered their only hope to lie in the intervention of the powers and in the appeal to force, and endorsed the suggestion of a threatening manifesto which should hold the National Assembly and Paris responsible for the safety of the king and royal family. Immediately after Brunswick’s manifesto followed the storming of the Tuileries and the removal of the royal family to the Temple (Aug. 10). During all these events and the captivity in the Temple Marie Antoinette showed an unvarying courage and dignity, in spite of her failing health and the illness of her son. After the execution of the king (Jan. 17, 1793) several unsuccessful attempts were made by her friends to rescue her and her children, among others by Jarjayes, Toulan and Lepître, and the “baron de Batz,” and negotiations for her release or exchange were even opened with Danton; but as the allied armies approached her trial and condemnation became a certainty. She had already been separated from her son, the sight of whose ill-treatment added terribly to her sufferings; she was now parted from her daughter and Madame Elizabeth, and removed on the 1st of August 1793 to the Conciergerie. Even here, where she was under the closest guard and subjected to the most offensive espionnage, attempts were made to rescue her, among others Michonis’ “Conspiration de l’oeillet.”

On the 14th of October began her trial, her defence being entrusted to Chauveau-Lagarde and Tronson-Ducourdray. Her noble attitude, even in the face of the atrocious accusations of Fouquier-Tinville, commanded the admiration even of her enemies, and her answers during her long examination were clear and skilful. The following were the questions finally put to the jury:—

(1) Is it established that manœuvres and communications have existed with foreign powers and other external enemies of the republic, the said manœuvres, &c., tending to furnish them with assistance in money, give them an entry into French territory, and facilitate the progress of their armies?

(2) Is Marie Antoinette of Austria, the widow Capet, convicted of having co-operated in these manœuvres and maintained these communications?

(3) Is it established that a plot and conspiracy has existed tending to kindle civil war within the republic, by arming the citizens against one another?

(4) Is Marie Antoinette, the widow Capet, convicted of having participated in this plot and conspiracy?

The jury decided unanimously in the affirmative, and on the 16th of October 1793 Marie Antoinette was led to the guillotine, leaving behind her a touching letter to Madame Elizabeth, known as her “Testament.”

As to the justice of these charges, we have seen how the queen was actually guilty of betraying her country, though it was only natural for her to identify the cause of the monarchy with that of France. To civil war she was consistently opposed, and never ceased to dissociate herself from the plans of the émigrés, but here again her very position made her an enemy of the republic. In any case, all her actions had as their aim—firstly, the safeguarding of the monarchy and the king’s position, and later, when she saw this to be impossible, that of securing the safety of her husband and her son.