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 answered that he knew nothing about it. Selecting candidates secretly from among those nominated by the other parties, and giving them no public endorsement, the Know Nothings, as soon as they gained the balance of power, could shatter at will Whig and Democratic calculations. Their power was evident by 1852—from which time, accordingly, “Know Nothingism” is most properly dated. The charges they brought against naturalization abuses were only too well founded; and those against election frauds not less so—though, unfortunately, the Know Nothings themselves followed scandalous election methods in some cities. The proposed proscription of the foreign-born knew no exceptions: many wished never to concede to them all the rights of natives, nor to their children unless educated in the public schools. As for Catholics, the real animus of Know Nothingism was against political Romanism; therefore, secondarily, against papal allegiance and episcopal church administration (in place of administration by lay trustees, as was earlier common practice in the United States); and, primarily, against public aid to Catholic schools, and the alleged greed (i.e. the power and success) of the Irish in politics. The times were propitious for the success of an aggressive third party; for the Whigs were broken by the death of Clay and Webster and the crushing defeat of 1852, and both the Whig and Democratic parties were disintegrating on the slavery issue. But the Know Nothings lacked aggression. In entering national politics the party abandoned its mysteries, without making compensatory gains; when it was compelled to publish a platform of principles, factions arose in its ranks; moreover, to draw recruits the faster from Whigs and Democrats, it “straddled” the slavery question, and this, although a temporary success, ultimately meant ruin. In 1854, however, Know Nothing gains were remarkable. Thereafter the organization spread like wildfire in the South, in which section there were almost no aliens, and the Whig dissolution was far advanced. The Virginia election of May 1855 proved conclusively, however, that Know Nothingism was no stronger against the Democrats than was the Whig party it had absorbed; it was the same organization under a new name. In the North it was even clearer that slavery must be faced. Know Nothing evasion probably helped the South, but neither Republicans nor Democrats would endure the evasion; Douglas and Seward, and later (1855–1856) their parties, denounced it. In the North-West the Know Nothings were swept into the anti-slavery movement in 1854 without retaining their organization. In the state campaigns of 1855 professions were measured to the latitude. The national platform of 1856 (adopted by a secret grand council), besides including anti-alien and anti-Catholic planks, offered sops to the North, the South and the “doughfaces” on the slavery issue. Millard Fillmore was nominated for the presidency. The anti-slavery delegates of eight Northern states bolted the convention, and eight months later the Republican wave swept the Know Nothings out of the North. The national field being thus lost, the state councils became supreme, and local opportunism fostered variation and weakness. By 1859 the party was confined almost entirely to the border states. The Constitutional Union—the “Do Nothing”—Party of 1860 was mainly composed of Know Nothing remnants. The year 1860 practically marked, also, the disappearance of the party as a local power.

Except in city politics nativism had no vitality; in state and national politics it really had no excuse. Race antipathies gave it local cohesive power in the North; various causes, already mentioned, advanced it in the South; and as a device to win offices it was of wide-spread attraction. Its only real contribution to government was the proof that nativism is not Americanism. Public opinion has never accepted its estimate of the alien nor of Catholic citizens. Some of its anti-Church principles, however—as the non-support of denominational schools—have been generally accepted; others—as the refusal to exclude the (Protestant) Bible from public schools—have been generally rejected; others—as the taxation of all Church property—remain disputed.

See L. D. Scisco, Political Nativism in New York State (doctoral thesis, Columbia University, New York, 1901); L. F. Schmeckebier, Know Nothing Party in Maryland (Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, 1899); G. H. Haynes, “A Know Nothing Legislature” (Mass., 1855), in ''American Historical Assoc. Report'', pt. 1 (1896); J. B. McMaster, With the Fathers, including “The Riotous Career of the Know Nothings” (New York, 1896); H. F. Desmond, The Know Nothing Party (Washington, 1905).

KNOX, HENRY (1750–1806), American general, was born in Boston, Massachusetts, of Scottish-Irish parentage, on the 25th of July 1750. He was prominent in the colonial militia and tried to keep the Boston crowd and the British soldiers from the clash known as the Boston massacre (1770). In 1771 he opened the “London Book-Store” in Boston. He had read much of tactics and strategy, joined the American army at the outbreak of the War of Independence, and fought at Bunker Hill, planned the defences of the camps of the army before Boston, and brought from Lake George and border forts much-needed artillery. At Trenton he crossed the river before the main body, and in the attack rendered such good service that he was made brigadier-general and chief of artillery in the Continental army on the following day. He was present at Princeton; was chiefly responsible for the mistake in attacking the “Chew House” at Germantown; urged New York as the objective of the campaign of 1778; served with efficiency at Monmouth and at Yorktown; and after the surrender of Cornwallis was promoted major-general, and served as a commissioner on the exchange of prisoners. His services throughout the war were of great value to the American cause; he was one of General Washington’s most trusted advisers, and he brought the artillery to a high degree of efficiency. From December 1783 until June 1784 he was the senior officer of the United States army. In April 1783 he had drafted a scheme of a society to be formed by the American officers and the French officers who had served in America during the war, and to be called the “Cincinnati”; of this society he was the first secretary-general (1783–1799) and in 1805 became vice-president-general. In 1785–1794 Knox was secretary of war, being the first man to hold this position after the organization of the Federal government in 1789. He urged ineffectually a national militia system, to enroll all citizens over 18 and under 60 in the “advanced corps,” the “main corps” or the “reserve,” and for this and his close friendship with Washington was bitterly assailed by the Republicans. In 1793 he had begun to build his house, Montpelier, at Thomaston, Maine, where he speculated unsuccessfully in the holdings of the Eastern Land Association; and he lived there until his death on the 25th of October 1806.

See F. S. Drake, Memoir of General Henry Knox (Boston, 1873); and Noah Brooks, Henry Knox (New York, 1900) in the “American Men of Energy” series.

KNOX, JOHN (c. 1505–1572), Scottish reformer and historian. Of his early life very little is certainly known, in spite of the fact that his History of the Reformation and his private letters, especially the latter, are often vividly autobiographical. Even the year of his birth, usually given as 1505, is matter of dispute. Beza, in his Icones, published in 1580, makes it 1515; Sir Peter Young (tutor to James VI. of Scotland), writing to Beza from Edinburgh in 1579, says 1513; and a strong case has been made out for holding that the generally accepted date is due to an error in transcription (see Dr Hay Fleming in the Bookman, Sept. 1905). But Knox seems to have been reticent about his early life, even to his contemporaries. What is known is that he