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Rh the Kroumir tribe was reported to have attacked a French force on the Algerian border, and on the 9th of April Roustan informed the bey of Tunis that France would chastise the assailants. The bey issued futile protests to the powers. On the 26th of April the island of Tabarca was occupied by the French, Bizerta was seized on the 2nd of May, and on the 12th of May the bey signed the treaty of Bardo accepting the French protectorate. France undertook the maintenance of order in the Regency, and assumed the representation of Tunisia in all dealings with other countries.

Italian indignation at the French coup de main was the deeper on account of the apparent duplicity of the government of the Republic. On the 11th of May the French foreign minister, Barthélémy Saint Hilaire, had officially assured the Italian ambassador in Paris that France “had no thought of occupying Tunisia or any part of Tunisian territory, beyond some points of the Kroumir country.” This assurance, dictated by Jules Ferry to Barthélémy Saint Hilaire in the presence of the Italian ambassador, and by him telegraphed en clair to Rome, was considered a binding pledge that France would not materially alter the status quo in Tunisia. Documents subsequently published have somewhat attenuated the responsibility of Ferry and Saint Hilaire for this breach of faith, and have shown that the French forces in Tunisia acted upon secret instructions from General Farre, minister of war in the Ferry cabinet, who pursued a policy diametrically opposed to the official declarations made by the premier and the foreign minister. Even had this circumstance been known at the time, it could scarcely have mitigated the intense resentment of the whole Italian nation at an event which was considered tantamount not only to the destruction of Italian aspirations to Tunisia, but to the ruin of the interests of the numerous Italian colony and to a constant menace against the security of the Sicilian and south Italian coasts.

Had the blow thus struck at Italian influence in the Mediterranean induced politicians to sink for a while their personal differences and to unite in presenting a firm front to foreign nations, the crisis in regard to Tunisia might not have been wholly unproductive of good. Unfortunately, on this, as on other critical occasions, deputies proved themselves incapable of common effort to promote general welfare. While excitement over Tunisia was at its height, but before the situation was irretrievably compromised to the disadvantage of Italy, Cairoli had been compelled to resign by a vote of want of confidence in the Chamber. The only politician capable of dealing adequately with the situation was Sella, leader of the Right, and to him the crown appealed. The faction leaders of the Left, though divided by personal jealousies and mutually incompatible ambitions, agreed that the worst evil which could befall Italy would be the return of the Right to power, and conspired to preclude the possibility of a Sella cabinet. An attempt by Depretis to recompose the Cairoli ministry proved fruitless, and after eleven precious days had been lost, King Humbert was obliged, on the 19th of April 1881, to refuse Cairoli’s resignation. The conclusion of the treaty of Bardo on the 12th of May, however, compelled Cairoli to sacrifice himself to popular indignation. Again Sella was called upon, but again the dog-in-the-manger policy of Depretis, Cairoli, Nicotera and Baccarini, in conjunction with the intolerant attitude of some extreme Conservatives, proved fatal to his endeavours. Depretis then succeeded in recomposing the Cairoli cabinet without Cairoli, Mancini being placed at the foreign office. Except in regard to an increase of the army estimates, urgently demanded by public opinion, the new ministry had practically no programme. Public opinion was further irritated against France by the massacre of some Italian workmen at Marseilles on the occasion of the return of the French expedition from Tunisia, and Depretis, in response to public feeling, found himself obliged to mobilize a part of the militia for military exercises. In this condition of home and foreign affairs occurred disorders at Rome in connexion with the transfer of the remains of Pius IX. from St Peter’s to the basilica of San Lorenzo. Most of the responsibility lay with the Vatican, which had arranged the procession in the way best calculated to irritate Italian feeling, but little excuse can be offered for the failure of the Italian authorities to maintain public order. In conjunction with the occupation of Tunisia, the effect of these disorders was to exhibit Italy as a country powerless to defend its interests abroad or to keep peace at home. The scandal and the pressure of foreign Catholic opinion compelled Depretis to pursue a more energetic policy, and to publish a formal declaration of the intangibility of the Law of Guarantees.

Meanwhile a conviction was spreading that the only way of escape from the dangerous isolation of Italy lay in closer agreement with Austria and Germany. Depretis tardily recognized the need for such agreement, if only to remove the “coldness and invincible diffidence” which,

by subsequent confession of Mancini, then characterized the attitude of the central powers; but he was opposed to any formal alliance, lest it might arouse French resentment, while the new Franco-Italian treaty was still unconcluded, and the foreign loan for the abolition of the forced currency had still to be floated. He, indeed, was not disposed to concede to public opinion anything beyond an increase of the army, a measure insistently demanded by Garibaldi and the Left. The Right likewise desired to strengthen both army and navy, but advocated cordial relations with Berlin and Vienna as a guarantee against French domineering, and as a pledge that Italy would be vouchsafed time to effect her armaments without disturbing financial equilibrium. The Right also hoped that closer accord with Germany and Austria would compel Italy to conform her home policy more nearly to the principles of order prevailing in those empires. More resolute than Right or Left was the Centre, a small group led by Sidney Sonnino, a young politician of unusual fibre, which sought in the press and in parliament to spread a conviction that the only sound basis for Italian policy would be close alliance with the central powers and a friendly understanding with Great Britain in regard to Mediterranean affairs. The principal Italian public men were divided in opinion on the subject of an alliance. Peruzzi, Lanza and Bonghi pleaded for equal friendship with all powers, and especially with France; Crispi, Minghetti, Cadorna and others, including Blanc, secretary-general to the foreign office, openly favoured a pro-Austrian policy. Austria and Germany, however, scarcely reciprocated these dispositions. The Irredentist agitation had left profound traces at Berlin as well as at Vienna, and had given rise to a distrust of Depretis which nothing had yet occurred to allay. Nor, in view of the comparative weakness of Italian armaments, could eagerness to find an ally be deemed conclusive proof of the value of Italian friendship. Count di Robilant, Italian ambassador at Vienna, warned his government not to yield too readily to pro-Austrian pressure, lest the dignity of Italy be compromised, or her desire for an alliance be granted on onerous terms. Mancini, foreign minister, who was as anxious as Depretis for the conclusion of the Franco-Italian commercial treaty, gladly followed this advice, and limited his efforts to the maintenance of correct diplomatic relations with the central powers. Except in regard to the Roman question, the advantages and disadvantages of an Italian alliance with Austria and Germany counterbalanced each other. A rapprochement with France and a continuance of the Irredentist movement could not fail to arouse Austro-German hostility; but, on the other hand, to draw near to the central powers would inevitably accentuate the diffidence of France. In the one hypothesis, as in the other, Italy could count upon the moral support of Great Britain, but could not make of British friendship the keystone of a Continental policy. Apart from resentment against France on account of Tunisia there remained the question of the temporal power of the pope to turn the scale in favour of Austria and Germany. Danger of foreign interference in the relations between Italy and the papacy had never been so great since the Italian occupation of Rome, as when, in the summer of 1881, the disorders during the transfer of the remains of Pius IX. had lent an unwonted ring of plausibility to the papal complaint concerning the “miserable” position of the Holy See. Bismarck at that moment had entered upon his “pilgrimage to Canossa,” and was anxious to obtain from the