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Rh fallen into the hands of Garibaldi and his volunteers. Ricasoli wished to go on with the war, rather than accept Venetia as a gift from France; but the king and La Marmora saw that peace must be made, as the whole Austrian army of 350,000 men was now free to fall on Italy. An armistice was accordingly signed at Cormons on the 12th of August; Austria

handed Venetia over to General Leboeuf, representing Napoleon; and on the 3rd of October peace between Austria and Italy was concluded at Vienna. On the 19th Leboeuf handed Venetia over to the Venetian representatives, and at the plebiscite held on the 21st and 22nd, 647,246 votes were returned in favour of union with Italy, only 69 against it. When this result was announced to the king by a deputation from Venice he said: “This is the finest day of my life; Italy is made, but it is not complete.” Rome was still wanting.

Custozza and Lissa were not Italy’s only misfortunes in 1866. There had been considerable discontent in Sicily, where the government had made itself unpopular. The priesthood and the remnants of the Bourbon party fomented an agitation, which in September culminated in an

attack on Palermo by 3000 armed insurgents, and in similar outbreaks elsewhere. The revolt was put down owing to the energy of the mayor of Palermo, Marquis A. Di Rudini, and the arrival of reinforcements. The Ricasoli cabinet fell over the law against the religious houses, and was succeeded by that of Rattazzi, who with the support of the Left was apparently more fortunate. The French regular troops were withdrawn from Rome in December 1866; but the pontifical forces were largely recruited in France and commanded by officers of the imperial army, and service under the pope was considered by the French war office as equivalent to service in France. This was a violation of the letter as well as of the spirit of the September convention, and a stronger and more straightforward statesman than Rattazzi would have declared Italy absolved from its provisions. Mazzini now wanted to promote an insurrection in Roman territory, whereas Garibaldi advocated an invasion from without. He delivered a series of violent speeches against the papacy, and made open preparations for a raid, which were not interfered with by the government; but on the 23rd of September 1867 Rattazzi had him suddenly arrested and confined to Caprera. In spite of the

vigilance of the warships he escaped on the 14th of October and landed in Tuscany. Armed bands had already entered papal territory, but achieved nothing in particular. Their presence, however, was a sufficient excuse for Napoleon, under pressure of the clerical party, to send another expedition to Rome (26th of October). Rattazzi, after ordering a body of troops to enter papal territory with no

definite object, now resigned, and was succeeded by Menabrea. Garibaldi joined the bands on the 23rd, but his ill-armed and ill-disciplined force was very inferior to his volunteers of ’49, ’60 and ’66. On the 24th he captured Monte Rotondo, but did not enter Rome as the expected insurrection had not broken out. On the 29th a French force, under de Failly, arrived, and on the 3rd of November a battle took place at Mentana between 4000 or 5000 red-shirts and a somewhat superior force of French and pontificals. The Garibaldians, mowed down by the new French chassepôt rifles, fought until their last cartridges were exhausted, and retreated the next day towards the Italian frontier, leaving 800 prisoners.

The affair of Mentana caused considerable excitement throughout Europe, and the Roman question entered on an acute stage. Napoleon suggested his favourite expedient of a congress but the proposal broke down owing to Great Britain’s refusal to participate; and Rouher, the French premier, declared in the Chamber (5th of December 1867) that France could never permit the Italians to occupy Rome. The attitude of France strengthened that anti-French feeling in Italy which had begun with Villafranca; and Bismarck was not slow to make use of this hostility, with a view to preventing Italy from taking sides with France against Germany in the struggle between the two powers which he saw to be inevitable. At the same time Napoleon was making overtures both to Austria and to Italy, overtures which were favourably received. Victor Emmanuel was sincerely anxious to assist Napoleon, for in spite of Nice and Savoy and Mentana he felt a chivalrous desire to help the man who had fought for Italy. But with the French at Civitavecchia (they had left Rome very soon after Mentana) a war for France was not to be thought of, and Napoleon would not promise more than the literal observance of the September convention. Austria would not join France unless Italy did the same, and she realized that that was impossible unless Napoleon gave way about Rome. Consequently the negotiations were suspended.

A scandal concerning the tobacco monopoly led to the fall of Menabrea, who was succeeded in December 1869 by Giovanni Lanza, with Visconti-Venosta at the foreign office and Q. Sella as finance minister. The latter introduced a sounder financial policy, which was maintained until the fall of the Right in 1876. Mazzini, now openly hostile to the monarchy, was seized with a perfect monomania for insurrections, and promoted various small risings, the only effect of which was to show how completely his influence was gone.

In December 1869 the XXI. oecumenical council began its sittings in Rome, and on the 18th of July 1870 proclaimed the infallibility of the pope (see ). Two days previously Napoleon had declared war on Prussia, and immediately afterwards he withdrew his troops from Civitavecchia; but he persuaded Lanza to promise to abide by the September convention, and it was not until after Worth and Gravelotte that he offered to give Italy a free hand to occupy Rome. Then it was too late; Victor Emmanuel asked Thiers if he could give his word of honour that with 100,000 Italian troops France could be saved, but Thiers remained silent. Austria replied like Italy: “It is too late.” On the 9th of August Italy made a declaration of neutrality, and three weeks later Visconti-Venosta informed the powers that Italy was about to occupy Rome. On the 3rd of September the news of Sédan reached Florence, and with the fall of Napoleon’s empire the September convention ceased to have any value. The powers having engaged to abstain from intervention in Italian affairs, Victor Emmanuel addressed a letter to Pius IX. asking him in the name of religion and peace to accept Italian protection instead of the

temporal power, to which the pope replied that he would only yield to force. On the 11th of September General Cadorna at the head of 60,000 men entered papal territory. The garrison of Civitavecchia surrendered to Bixio, but the 10,000 men in Rome, mostly French, Belgians, Swiss and Bavarians, under Kanzler, were ready to fight. Cardinal Antonelli would have come to terms, but the pope decided on making a sufficient show of resistance to prove that he was yielding to force. On the 20th the Italians began the attack, and General Mazé de la Roche’s division having effected a breach in the Porta Pia, the pope ordered the garrison to cease fire and the Italians poured into the Eternal City followed by thousands of Roman exiles. By noon the whole city on the left of the Tiber was occupied and the garrison laid down their arms; the next day, at the pope’s request, the Leonine City on the right bank was also occupied. It had been intended to leave that part of Rome to the pope, but by the earnest desire of the inhabitants it too was included in the Italian kingdom. At the plebiscite there were 133,681 votes for union and 1507 against it. In July 1872 King Victor Emmanuel made his solemn entry into Rome, which was then declared the capital of Italy. Thus, after a struggle of more than half a century, in spite of apparently insuperable obstacles, the liberation and the unity of Italy were accomplished.

—A vast amount of material on the Risorgimento has been published both in Italy and abroad as well as numerous works of a literary and critical nature. The most detailed Italian history of the period is Carlo Tivaroni’s Storia critica del Risorgimento Italiano in 9 vols. (Turin, 1888–1897), based on a diligent study of the original authorities and containing a large amount of information; the author is a Mazzinian, which fact should be taken into