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THE RISORGIMENTO] in office until Rattazzi could form a new ministry; and while officially recalling the royal commissioners according to the preliminaries of Villafranca, he privately encouraged them to remain and organize resistance to the return of the despots, if necessary by force (see ). Farini, who in August was elected dictator of Parma as well as Modena, and Ricasoli, who since, on the withdrawal of the Sardinian commissioner Boncompagni, had become supreme in Tuscany, were now the men who by their energy and determination achieved the annexation of central Italy to Piedmont, in spite of the strenuous opposition of the French emperor and the weakness of many Italian Liberals. In August Marco Minghetti succeeded in forming a military league and a customs union between Tuscany, Romagna and the duchies, and in procuring the adoption of the Piedmontese codes; and envoys were sent to Paris to mollify Napoleon. Constituent assemblies met and voted for unity under Victor Emmanuel, but the king could not openly accept the proposal owing to the emperor’s opposition, backed by the presence of French armies in Lombardy; at a word from Napoleon there might have been an Austrian, and perhaps a Franco-Austrian, invasion of central Italy. But to Napoleon’s statement that he could not agree to the unification of Italy, as he was bound by his promises to Austria at Villafranca, Victor Emmanuel replied that he himself, after Magenta and Solferino, was bound in honour to link his fate with that of the Italian people; and General Manfredo Fanti was sent by the Turin government to organize the army of the Central League, with Garibaldi under him.

The terms of the treaty of peace signed at Zürich on the 10th of November were practically identical with those of the preliminaries of Villafranca. It was soon evident, however, that the Italian question was far from being settled. Central Italy refused to be bound by the treaty, and

offered the dictatorship to Prince Carignano, who, himself unable to accept owing to Napoleon’s opposition, suggested Boncompagni, who was accordingly elected. Napoleon now realized that it would be impossible, without running serious risks, to oppose the movement in favour of unity. He suggested an international congress on the question; inspired a pamphlet, Le Pape et le Congrès, which proposed a reduction of the papal territory, and wrote to the pope advising him to cede Romagna in order to obtain better guarantees for the rest of his dominions. The proposed congress fell through, and Napoleon thereupon raised the question of the cession of Nice and Savoy as the price of his consent to the union of the central provinces with the Italian kingdom. In January 1866 the Rattazzi ministry fell, after completing the fusion of Lombardy with Piedmont, and Cavour was again summoned by the king to the head of affairs.

Cavour well knew the unpopularity that would fall upon him by consenting to the cession of Nice, the birthplace of Garibaldi, and Savoy, the cradle of the royal house; but he realized the necessity of the sacrifice, if central Italy was to be won. The negotiations were long drawn out; for Cavour struggled to save Nice and Napoleon was anxious to make conditions, especially as regards Tuscany. At last, on the 24th of March, the treaty was signed whereby the cession was agreed upon, but subject to the vote of the populations concerned and ratification by the Italian parliament. The king having formally accepted the voluntary annexation of the duchies, Tuscany and Romagna, appointed the prince of Carignano viceroy with Ricasoli as governor-general (22nd of March), and was immediately afterwards excommunicated by the pope. On the 2nd of April 1860 the new Italian parliament, including members from central Italy, assembled at Turin. Three weeks later the treaty of Turin ceding Savoy and Nice to France was ratified, though not without much opposition, and Cavour was fiercely reviled for his share in the transaction, especially by Garibaldi, who even contemplated an expedition to Nice, but was induced to desist by the king.

In May 1859 Ferdinand of Naples was succeeded by his son Francis II., who gave no signs of any intention to change his father’s policy, and, in spite of Napoleon’s advice, refused to grant a constitution or to enter into an alliance with Sardinia. The result was a revolutionary agitation which in Sicily, stirred

up by Mazzini’s agents, Rosalino Pilo and Francesco Crispi, culminated, on the 5th of April 1860, in open revolt. An invitation had been sent Garibaldi to put himself at the head of the movement; at first he had refused, but reports of the progress of the insurrection soon determined him to risk all on a bold stroke, and on the 5th of May he embarked at Quarto, near Genoa, with Bixio, the Hungarian Türr and some 1000 picked followers, on two steamers. The preparations for the expedition, openly made, were viewed by Cavour with mixed feelings. With its object he sympathized; yet he could not give official sanction to an armed attack on a friendly power, nor on the other hand could he forbid an action enthusiastically approved by public opinion. He accordingly directed the Sardinian admiral Persano only to arrest the expedition should it touch at a Sardinian port; while in reply to the indignant protests of the continental powers he disclaimed all knowledge of the affair. On the 11th Garibaldi landed at Marsala, without opposition, defeated the Neapolitan forces at Calatafimi on the 15th, and on the 27th entered Palermo in triumph, where he proclaimed himself, in King Victor Emmanuel’s name, dictator of Sicily. By the end of July, after the hard-won victory of Milazzo, the whole island, with the exception of the citadel of Messina and a few unimportant ports, was in his hands.

From Cavour’s point of view, the situation was now one of extreme anxiety. It was certain that, his work in Sicily done, Garibaldi would turn his attention to the Neapolitan dominions on the mainland; and beyond these lay Umbria and the Marches and—Rome. It was all-important that whatever victories Garibaldi might win should be won for the Italian kingdom, and, above all, that no ill-timed attack on the Papal States should provoke an intervention of the powers. La Farina was accordingly sent to Palermo to urge the immediate annexation of Sicily to Piedmont. But Garibaldi, who wished to keep a free hand, distrusted Cavour and scorned all counsels of expediency, refused to agree; Sicily was the necessary base for his projected invasion of Naples; it would be time enough to announce its union with Piedmont when Victor Emmanuel had been proclaimed king of United Italy in Rome. Foiled by the dictator’s stubbornness, Cavour had once more to take to underhand methods; and, while continuing futile negotiations with King Francis, sent his agents into Naples to stir up disaffection and create a sentiment in favour of national unity strong enough, in any event, to force Garibaldi’s hand.

On the 8th of August, in spite of the protests and threats of most of the powers, the Garibaldians began to cross the Straits, and in a short time 20,000 of them were on the mainland. The Bourbonists in Calabria, utterly disorganized, broke before the invincible red-shirts, and

the 40,000 men defending the Salerno-Avellino line made no better resistance, being eventually ordered to fall back on the Volturno. On the 6th of September King Francis, with his family and several of the ministers, sailed for Gaeta, and the next day Garibaldi entered Naples alone in advance of the army, and was enthusiastically welcomed. He proclaimed himself dictator of the kingdom, with Bertani as secretary of state, but as a proof of his loyalty he consigned the Neapolitan fleet to Persano.

His rapid success, meanwhile, inspired both the French emperor and the government of Turin with misgivings. There was a danger that Garibaldi’s entourage, composed of ex-Mazzinians, might induce him to proclaim a republic and march on Rome; which would have meant

French intervention and the undoing of all Cavour’s work. King Victor Emmanuel and Cavour both wrote to Garibaldi urging him not to spoil all by aiming at too much. But Garibaldi poured scorn on all suggestions of compromise; and Cavour saw that the situation could only be saved by the armed participation of Piedmont in the liberation of south Italy.