Page:EB1911 - Volume 15.djvu/72

Rh On the 1st of January 1859, Napoleon astounded the diplomatic world by remarking to Baron Hübner, the Austrian ambassador, at the New Year’s reception at the Tuileries, that he regretted that relations between France and Austria were “not so good as they had been”; and at the opening of the Piedmontese parliament on the 10th Victor Emmanuel pronounced the memorable words that he could not be insensible to the cry of pain (il grido di dolore) which reached him from all parts of Italy. Yet after these warlike declarations and after the signing of a military convention at Turin, the king agreeing to all the conditions proposed by Napoleon, the latter suddenly became pacific again, and adopted the Russian suggestion that Italian affairs should be settled by a congress. Austria agreed on condition that Piedmont should disarm and should not be admitted to the congress. Lord Malmesbury urged the Sardinian government to yield; but Cavour refused to disarm, or to accept the principle of a congress, unless Piedmont were admitted to it on equal terms with the other Powers. As neither the Sardinian nor the Austrian government seemed disposed to yield, the idea of a congress had to be abandoned. Lord Malmesbury now proposed that all three Powers should disarm simultaneously and that, as suggested by Austria, the precedent of Laibach should be followed and all the Italian states invited to plead their cause at the bar of the Great Powers. To this course Napoleon consented, to the despair of King Victor Emmanuel and Cavour, who saw in this a proof that he wished to back out of his engagement and make war impossible. When war seemed imminent volunteers from all parts of Italy, especially from Lombardy, had come pouring into Piedmont to enrol themselves in the army or in the specially raised volunteer corps (the command of which was given to Garibaldi), and “to go to Piedmont” became a test of patriotism throughout the country. Urged by a peremptory message from Napoleon, Cavour saw the necessity of bowing to the will of Europe, of disbanding the volunteers and reducing the army to a peace footing. The situation, however, was saved by a false move on the part of Austria. At Vienna the war party was in the ascendant; the convention for disarmament had been signed, but so far from its being carried out, the reserves were actually called out on the 12th of April; and on the 23rd, before Cavour’s decision was known at Vienna, an Austrian ultimatum reached Turin, summoning Piedmont to disarm within three days on pain of invasion. Cavour was filled with joy at the turn affairs had taken, for

Austria now appeared as the aggressor. On the 29th Francis Joseph declared war, and the next day his troops crossed the Ticino, a move which was followed, as Napoleon had stated it would be, by a French declaration of war. The military events of the Italian war of 1859 are described under. The actions of Montebello (May 20), Palestro (May 31) and Melegnano (June 8) and the battles of Magenta (June 4) and Solferino (June 24) all went against the Austrians. Garibaldi’s volunteers raised the standard of insurrection and held the field in the region of the Italian lakes. After Solferino the allies prepared to besiege the Quadrilateral. Then Napoleon suddenly drew back, unwilling, for many reasons, to continue the campaign. Firstly, he doubted whether the allies were strong enough to attack the Quadrilateral, for he saw the defects of his own army’s organization; secondly, he began to fear intervention by Prussia, whose attitude appeared menacing; thirdly, although really anxious to expel the Austrians from Italy, he did not wish to create a too powerful Italian state at the foot of the Alps, which, besides constituting a potential danger to France, might threaten the pope’s temporal power, and Napoleon believed that he could not stand without the clerical vote; fourthly, the war had been declared against the wishes of the great majority of Frenchmen and was even now far from popular. Consequently, to the surprise of all Europe, while the allied forces were drawn up ready for battle, Napoleon, without consulting Victor Emmanuel, sent General Fleury on the 6th of July to Francis Joseph to ask for an armistice, which was agreed to. The king was now informed, and on the 8th Generals Vaillant, Della Rocca and Hess met at Villafranca and arranged an armistice until the 15th of August. But the king and Cavour were terribly upset by

this move, which meant peace without Venetia; Cavour hurried to the king’s headquarters at Monzambano and in excited, almost disrespectful, language implored him not to agree to peace and to continue the war alone, relying on the Piedmontese army and a general Italian revolution. But Victor Emmanuel on this occasion proved the greater statesman of the two; he understood that, hard as it was, he must content himself with Lombardy for the present, lest all be lost. On the 11th the two emperors met at Villafranca, where they agreed that Lombardy should be ceded to Piedmont, and Venetia retained by Austria but governed by Liberal methods; that the rulers of Tuscany, Parma and Modena, who had been again deposed, should be restored, the Papal States reformed, the Legations given a separate administration and the pope made president of an Italian confederation including Austria as mistress of Venetia. It was a revival of the old impossible federal idea, which would have left Italy divided and dominated by Austria and France. Victor Emmanuel regretfully signed the peace preliminaries, adding, however, pour ce qui me concerne (which meant that he made no undertaking with regard to central Italy), and Cavour resigned office.

The Lombard campaign had produced important effects throughout the rest of Italy. The Sardinian government had formally invited that of Tuscany to participate in the war of liberation, and on the grand-duke rejecting the proposal, moderates and democrats combined to

present an ultimatum to Leopold demanding that he should abdicate in favour of his son, grant a constitution and take part in the campaign. On his refusal Florence rose as one man, and he, feeling that he could not rely on his troops, abandoned Tuscany on the 27th of April 1859. A provisional government was formed, led by Ubaldino Peruzzi, and was strengthened on the 8th of May by the inclusion of Baron Bettino Ricasoli, a man of great force of character, who became the real head of the administration, and all through the ensuing critical period aimed unswervingly at Italian unity. Victor Emmanuel, at the request of the people, assumed the protectorate over Tuscany, where he was represented by the Sardinian minister Boncompagni. On the 23rd of May Prince Napoleon, with a French army corps, landed at Leghorn, his avowed object being to threaten the Austrian flank; and in June these troops, together with a Tuscan contingent, departed for Lombardy. In the duchy of Modena an insurrection had broken out, and after Magenta Duke Francis joined the Austrian army in Lombardy, leaving a regency in charge. But on the 14th of June the municipality formed a provisional government and proclaimed annexation to Piedmont; L. C. Farini was chosen dictator, and 4000 Modenese joined the allies. The duchess-regent of Parma also withdrew to Austrian territory, and on the 11th of June annexation to Piedmont was proclaimed. At the same time the Austrians evacuated the Legations and Cardinal Milesi, the papal representative, departed. The municipality of Bologna formed a Giunta, to which Romagna and the Marches adhered, and invoked the dictatorship of Victor Emmanuel; at Perugia, too, a provisional government was constituted under F. Guardabassi. But the Marches were soon reoccupied by pontifical troops, and Perugia fell, its capture being followed by an indiscriminate massacre of men, women and children. In July the marquis D’Azeglio arrived at Bologna as royal commissioner.

After the meetings at Villafranca Napoleon returned to France. The question of the cession of Nice and Savoy had not been raised; for the emperor had not fulfilled his part of the bargain, that he would drive the Austrians out of Italy, since Venice was yet to be freed. At the same time he was resolutely opposed to the Piedmontese annexations in central Italy. But here Cavour intervened, for he was determined to maintain the annexations, at all costs. Although he had resigned, he remained