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 in which that adjudication is expressed; (3) the opinions of the judges expressed in a review of the facts and law applicable to the controversy leading up to the adjudication expressed in the formal document. When the judgment has been passed and entered and recorded it binds the parties: the controversy comes to an end (transit in rem judicatam), and the person in whose favour the judgment is entered is entitled to enforce it by the appropriate method of “execution.” There has been much controversy among lawyers as to the meaning of the expressions “final” and “interlocutory” as applied to judgments, and as to the distinction between a “judgment,” a “decree,” and an “order.” These disputes arise upon the wording of statutes or rules of court and with reference to the appropriate times or modes of appeal or of execution.

The judgments of one country are not as a rule directly enforceable in another country. In Europe, by treaty or arrangement, foreign judgments are in certain cases and on compliance with certain formalities made executory in various states. A similar provision is made as between England, Scotland and Ireland, for the registry and execution in each country of certain classes of judgments given in the others. But as regards the rest of the king’s dominions and foreign states, a “foreign” judgment is in England recognized only as constituting a cause of action which may be sued upon in England. If given by a court of competent jurisdiction it is treated as creating a legal obligation to pay the sum adjudged to be due. Summary judgment may be entered in an English action based on a foreign judgment unless the defendant can show that the foreign court had not jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter of the action, or that there was fraud on the part of the foreign court or the successful party, or that the foreign proceedings were contrary to natural justice, e.g. concluded without due notice to the parties affected. English courts will not enforce foreign judgments as to foreign criminal or penal or revenue laws.

JUDGMENT DEBTOR, in English law, a person against whom a judgment ordering him to pay a sum of money has been obtained and remains unsatisfied. Such a person may be examined as to whether any and what debts are owing to him, and if the judgment debt is of the necessary amount he may be made bankrupt if he fails to comply with a bankruptcy notice served on him by the judgment creditors, or he may be committed to prison or have a receiving order made against him in a judgment summons under the Debtors Act 1869.

 JUDGMENT SUMMONS, in English law, a summons issued under the Debtors Act 1869, on the application of a creditor who has obtained a judgment for the payment of a sum of money by instalments or otherwise, where the order for payment has not been complied with. The judgment summons cites the defendant to appear personally in court, and be examined on oath as to the means he has, or has had, since the date of the order or judgment made against him, to pay the same, and to show cause why he should not be committed to prison for his default. An order of commitment obtained in a judgment summons remains in force for a year only, and the extreme term of imprisonment is six weeks, dating from the time of lodging in prison. When a debtor has once been imprisoned, although for a period of less than six weeks, no second order of commitment can be made against him in respect of the same debt. But if the judgment be for payment by instalments a power of committal arises on default of payment for each instalment. If an order of commitment has never been executed, or becomes inoperative through lapse of time, a fresh commitment may be made. Imprisonment does not operate as a satisfaction or extinguishment of a debt, or deprive a person of a right of execution against the land or goods of the person imprisoned in the same manner as if there had been no imprisonment.

JUDICATURE ACTS, an important series of English statutes having for their object the simplification of the system of judicature in its higher branches. They are the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. c. 66) and the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 77), with various amending acts, the twelfth of these being in 1899. By the act of 1873 the court of chancery, the court of queen’s (king’s) bench, the court of common pleas, the court of exchequer, the high court of admiralty, the court of probate and the court of divorce and matrimonial causes were consolidated into one Supreme Court of Judicature (sec. 3), divided into two permanent divisions, called “the high court,” with (speaking broadly) original jurisdiction, and “the court of appeal” (sec. 4). The objects of the act were threefold—first, to reduce the historically independent courts of common law and equity into one supreme court; secondly, to establish for all divisions of the court a uniform system of pleading and procedure; and thirdly, to provide for the enforcement of the same rule of law in those cases where chancery and common law recognized different rules. It can be seen at once how bold and revolutionary was this new enactment. By one section the august king’s bench, the common pleas, in which serjeants only had formerly the right of audience, and the exchequer, which had its origin in the reign of Henry I., and all their jurisdiction, criminal, legal and equitable, were vested in the new court. It must be understood, however, that law and equity were not fused in the sense in which that phrase has generally been employed. The chancery division still remains distinct from the common law division, having a certain range of legal questions under its exclusive control, and possessing to a certain extent a peculiar machinery of its own for carrying its decrees into execution. But all actions may now be brought in the high court of justice, and, subject to such special assignments of business as that alluded to, may be tried in any division thereof.

There were originally three common law divisions of the High Court corresponding with the three former courts of common law. But after the death of Lord Chief Baron Kelly on the 17th of September 1880, and of Lord Chief Justice Cockburn on the 20th of November 1880, the common pleas and exchequer divisions were (by order in council, 10th December 1880) consolidated with the king’s bench division into one division under the presidency of the lord chief justice of England, to whom, by the 25th section of the Judicature Act 1881, all the statutory jurisdiction of the chief baron and the chief justice of the common pleas was transferred. The high court, therefore, now consists of the chancery division, the common law division, under the name of the king’s bench division; and the probate, divorce and admiralty division. To the king’s bench division is also attached, by order of the lord chancellor (Jan. 1, 1884), the business of the London court of bankruptcy.

The keystone of the structure created by the Judicature Acts was a strong court of appeal. The House of Lords remained the last court of appeal, as before the acts, but its judicial functions were virtually transferred to an appeal committee, consisting of the lord chancellor and other peers who have held high judicial office, and certain lords of appeal in ordinary created by the act of 1873 (see ).

The practice and procedure of the Supreme Court are regulated by rules made by a committee of judges, to which have been added the president of the incorporated law society and a practising barrister and one other person nominated by the lord chancellor. The rules now in force are those of 1883, with some subsequent amendments. With the appendices they fill a moderate-sized volume. Complaints are made that they go into too much detail, and place a burden on the time and temper of the busy practitioner which he can ill afford to bear. It is possible that the authors of the rules attempted too much, and it might have been better to provide a simpler and more elastic code of procedure. Rules have sometimes been made to meet individual cases of hardship, and rules of procedure have been piled up from time to time, sometimes embodying a new experiment, and not always consistent with former rules. 