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Rh That a commerce which scarcely doubled itself in the first fifteen years should have grown nearly tenfold in the next twenty is a fact inviting attention. There are two principal causes: one general, the other special. The general cause was that several years necessarily elapsed before the nation’s material condition began to respond perceptibly to the improvements effected by the Meiji government in matters of administration, taxation and transport facilities. Fiscal burdens had been reduced and security of life and property obtained, but railway building and road-making, harbour construction, the growth of posts, telegraphs, exchanges and banks, and the development of a mercantile marine did not exercise a sensible influence on the nation’s prosperity until 1884 or 1885. From that time the country entered a period of steadily growing prosperity, and from that time private enterprise may be said to have finally started upon a career of independent activity. The special cause which, from 1885, contributed to a marked growth of trade was the resumption of specie payments. Up to that time the treasury’s fiat notes had suffered such marked fluctuations of specie value that sound or successful commerce became very difficult. Against the importing merchant the currency trouble worked with double potency. Not only did the gold with which he purchased goods appreciate constantly in terms of the silver for which he sold them, but the silver itself appreciated sharply and rapidly in terms of the fiat notes paid by Japanese consumers. Cursory reflection may suggest that these factors should have stimulated exports as much as they depressed imports. But such was not altogether the case in practice. For the exporter’s transactions were hampered by the possibility that a delay of a week or even a day might increase the purchasing power of his silver in Japanese markets by bringing about a further depreciation of paper, so that he worked timidly and hesitatingly, dividing his operations as minutely as possible in order to take advantage of the downward tendency of the fiat notes. Not till this element of pernicious disturbance was removed did the trade recover a healthy tone and grow so lustily as to tread closely on the heels of the foreign commerce of China, with her 300 million inhabitants and long-established international relations.

Japan’s trade with the outer world was built up chiefly by the energy and enterprise of the foreign middleman. He acted the part of an almost ideal agent. As an exporter, his command of cheap capital, his experience, his

knowledge of foreign markets, and his connexions enabled him to secure sales such as must have been beyond reach of the Japanese working independently. Moreover, he paid to native consumers ready cash for their staples, taking upon his own shoulders all the risks of finding markets abroad. As an importer, he enjoyed, in centres of supply, credit which the Japanese lacked, and he offered to native consumers foreign produce brought to their doors with a minimum of responsibility on their part. Finally, whether as exporters or importers, foreign middlemen always competed with each other so keenly that their Japanese clients obtained the best possible terms from them. Yet the ambition of the Japanese to oust them cannot be regarded as unnatural. Every nation must desire to carry on its own commerce independently of alien assistance; and moreover, the foreign middleman’s residence during many years within Japanese territory, but without the pale of Japanese sovereignty, invested him with an aggressive character which the anti-Oriental exclusiveness of certain Occidental nations helped to accentuate. Thus from the point of view of the average Japanese there are several reasons for wishing to dispense with alien middlemen, and it is plain that these reasons are operative; for whereas, in 1888, native merchants carried on only 12% of the country’s over-sea trade without the intervention of the foreign middlemen, their share rose to 35% in 1899 and has since been slowly increasing.

Analysis of Japan’s foreign trade during the Meiji era shows that during the 35-year period ending in 1907, imports exceeded exports in 21 years and exports exceeded imports in 14 years. This does not suggest a very badly balanced

trade. But closer examination accentuates the difference, for when the figures are added, it is found that the excesses of exports aggregated only 11 millions sterling, whereas the excesses of imports totalled 71 millions, there being thus a so-called “unfavourable balance” of 60 millions over all. The movements of specie do not throw much light upon this subject, for they are complicated by large imports of gold resulting from war indemnities and foreign loans. Undoubtedly the balance is materially redressed by the expenditures of the foreign communities in the former settlements, of foreign tourists visiting Japan and of foreign vessels engaged in the carrying trade, as well as by the earnings of Japanese vessels and the interest on investments made by foreigners. Nevertheless there remains an appreciable margin against Japan, and it is probably to be accounted for by the consideration that she is still engaged equipping herself for the industrial career evidently lying before her.

The manner in which Japan’s over-sea trade was divided in 1907 among the seven foreign countries principally engaged in it may be seen from the following table:—

Among the 33 open ports of Japan, the first place belongs to Yokohama in the matter of foreign trade, and Kobe ranks second. The former far outstrips the latter in exports, but the case is reversed when imports are considered. As to the percentages of the whole trade standing to the credit of the five principal ports, the following figures may be consulted:—Yokohama, 40%; Kobe, 35.6; Osaka, 10; Moji, 5; and Nagasaki, 2.

 

Emperor and Princes.—At the head of the Japanese State stands the emperor, generally spoken of by foreigners as the mikado (honourable gate ), a title comparable with sublime porte and by his own subjects as tenshi (son of heaven) or tennō (heavenly king). The emperor (q.v.) was the 121st of his line, according to Japanese history, which reckons from 660, when Jimmu ascended the throne. But as written records do not carry us back farther than 712, the reigns and periods of the very early monarchs are more or less apocryphal. Still the fact remains that Japan has been ruled by an unbroken dynasty ever since the dawn of her history, in which respect she is unique among all the nations in the world. There are four families of princes of the blood, from any one of which a successor to the throne may be taken in default of a direct heir: Princes Arisugawa, Fushimi, Kanin and Higashi Fushimi. These families are all direct descendants of emperors, and their heads have the title of shinnō (prince of the blood), whereas the other imperial princes, of whom there are ten, have only the second syllable of shinnō (pronounced wō when separated from shin). Second and younger sons of a shinnō are all wō, and eldest sons lose the title shin and become wō from the fifth generation.

The Peerage.—In former times there were no Japanese titles of nobility, as the term is understood in the Occident. Nobles there were, however, namely, kuge, or court nobles, descendants of younger sons of emperors, and daimyō (great name), some of whom could trace their lineage to mikados; but all owed their exalted position as feudal chiefs to military prowess. The Meiji restoration of 1867 led to the abolition of the daimyōs as feudal chiefs, and they, together with the kuge, were merged into one class called kwazoku (flower families), a term corresponding to aristocracy, all inferior persons being heimin (ordinary folk). In 1884, however, the five Chinese titles of ki (prince), kō (marquis), haku (count), shi (viscount) and dan (baron) were introduced, and patents were not only granted to the ancient nobility but also conferred on men who had rendered conspicuous public service. The titles are all hereditary, but they descend to the firstborn only, younger children having no distinguishing appellation. The first list in 1884 showed 11 princes, 24 marquises, 76 counts, 324 viscounts and 74 barons. After the war with China (1894–95) the total grew to 716, and the war with