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Rh up to that time from the introduction of British rule. Despite unparalleled importations of grain by sea and rail, despite the most strenuous exertions of the government, which incurred a total expenditure on this account of 11 millions sterling, the loss of life from actual starvation and its attendant train of diseases was lamentable. In the autumn of 1878 the affairs of Afghanistan again forced themselves into notice. Shere Ali, the amir, who had been hospitably entertained by Lord Mayo, was found to be favouring Russian intrigues. A British envoy was refused admittance to the country, while a Russian mission was received with honour. This led to a declaration of war. British armies advanced by three routes—the Khyber, the Kurram and the Bolan—and without much opposition occupied the inner entrances of the passes. Shere Ali fled to Afghan Turkestan, and there died. A treaty was entered into with his son, Yakub Khan, at Gandamak, by which the British frontier was advanced to the crests or farther sides of the passes and a British officer was admitted to reside at Kabul. Within a few months the British resident, Sir Louis Cavagnari, was treacherously attacked and massacred, together with his escort, and a second war became necessary. Yakub Khan abdicated, and was deported to India, while Kabul was occupied in force.

At this crisis of affairs a general election in England resulted in a change of government. Lord Lytton resigned with the Conservative ministry, and the marquis of Ripon was nominated as his successor in 1880. Shortly afterwards a British brigade was defeated at Maiwand by

the Herati army of Ayub Khan, a defeat promptly and completely retrieved by the brilliant march of General Sir Frederick Roberts from Kabul to Kandahar, and by the total rout of Ayub Khan’s army on the 1st of September 1880. Abdur Rahman Khan, the eldest male representative of the stock of Dost Mahommed, was then recognized as amir of Kabul. Lord Ripon was sent out to India by the Liberal ministry of 1880 for the purpose of reversing Lord Lytton’s policy in Afghanistan, and of introducing a more sympathetic system into the administration of India. The disaster at Maiwand, and the Russian advance east of the Caspian, prevented the proposed withdrawal from Quetta; but Kandahar was evacuated, Abdur Rahman was left in complete control of his country and was given an annual subsidy of twelve lakhs of rupees in 1883. In the second purpose of his administration Lord Ripon’s well-meant efforts only succeeded in setting Europeans and natives against each other. His term of office was chiefly notable for the agitation against the Ilbert Bill, which proposed to subject European offenders to trial by native magistrates. The measure aroused a storm of indignation amongst the European community which finally resulted in the bill being shorn of its most objectionable features. Lord Ripon’s good intentions and personal sympathy were recognized by the natives, and on leaving Bombay he received the greatest ovation ever accorded to an Indian viceroy.

After the arrival of Lord Dufferin as governor-general the incident known as the Panjdeh Scare brought Britain to the verge of war with Russia. During the preceding decades Russia had gradually advanced her power from the Caspian across the Turkoman steppes to

the border of Afghanistan, and Russian intrigue was largely responsible for the second Afghan war. In February 1884 Russia annexed Merv. This action led to an arrangement in August of the same year for a joint Anglo-Russian commission to delimit the Afghan frontier. In March 1885, while the commission was at work, Lord Dufferin was entertaining the amir Abdur Rahman at a durbar at Rawalpindi. The durbar was interrupted by the news that a Russian general had attacked and routed the Afghan force holding the bridge across the river Kushk, and the incident might possibly have resulted in war between Britain and Russia but for the slight importance that Abdur Rahman attributed to what he termed a border scuffle.

The incident, however, led to military measures being taken by the government of Lord Dufferin, which had far-reaching effects on Indian finance. The total strength of the army was raised by 10,000 British and 20,000 native troops, at an annual cost of about two millions sterling; and the frontier

post of Quetta, in the neighbourhood of Kandahar, was connected with the Indian railway system by a line that involved very expensive tunnelling.

The Panjdeh incident was likewise the cause of the establishment of Imperial Service troops in India. At the moment when war seemed imminent, the leading native princes made offers of pecuniary aid. These offers were declined, but it was intimated to them at a later date

that, if they would place a small military force in each state at the disposal of the British government, to be commanded by state officers, but drilled, disciplined and armed under the supervision of British officers and on British lines, the government would undertake to find the necessary supervising officer, arms and organization. The proposal was widely accepted, and the Imperial Service troops, as they are called, amount at present to some 20,000 cavalry, infantry and transport, whose efficiency is very highly thought of. They have rendered good service in the wars on the north-west frontier, and also in China and Somaliland. Later in the same year (1885) occurred the third Burmese war. For the causes of the dispute with King Thebaw, and a description of the military operations which ensued before the country was finally pacified, see.

From 1885 onwards the attention of the Indian government was increasingly devoted to the north-west frontier. Between the years 1885 and 1895 there were delimited at various times by joint commissions the Russo-Afghan frontier between the Oxus and Sarakhs on the Persian frontier, the Russo-Afghan frontier from Lake Victoria to the frontier of China and the Afghan-Indian frontier from the Kunar river to a point in the neighbourhood of the Nawa Kotal. To the westward, after various disagreements and two military expeditions, the territories comprising the Zhob, Barhan and Bori valleys, occupied by Pathan tribes, were in 1890 finally incorporated in the general system of the Trans-Indus protectorate. About the same time in the extreme north the post of British resident in Gilgit was re-established, and the supremacy of Kashmir over the adjoining petty chiefships of Hunza-Nagar was enforced (1891–1892). In 1893 the frontiers of Afghanistan and British India were defined by a joint agreement between the two governments, known as the Durand agreement. There followed on the part of the British authorities, interference in Chitral, ending in an expedition in 1895 and the ejection of the local chiefs in favour of candidates amenable to British influence. A more formidable hostile combination, however, awaited the government of India. By the agreement of 1893 with the amir most of the Waziri clan and also the Afridis had been left outside the limits of the amir’s influence and transferred to the British zone. Soon after that date the establishment by the British military authorities of posts within the Waziri country led to apprehension on the part of the local tribesmen. In 1895 the occupation of points within the Swat territory for the safety of the road from India to Chitral similarly roused the suspicion of the Swatis. The Waziris and Swatis successively rose in arms, in June and July 1897, and their example was followed by the Mohmands. Finally, in August the powerful Afridi tribe joined the combination and closed the Khyber Pass, which runs through their territory, and which was held by them, on conditions, in trust for the government of India. This led to the military operations known as the Tirah campaign, which proved very costly both in men and money.

Meanwhile considerable difficulties had been experienced with the Indian currency, which was on a purely silver basis. Before 1873 the fluctuations in the value of silver as compared with gold had been comparatively small, and the exchange value of the rupee was rarely less

than two shillings. But after 1873, in consequence of changes in the monetary systems of France and Germany, and the increased production of silver, this stability of exchange no longer continued, and the rupee sank steadily in value, till it was worth