Page:EB1911 - Volume 13.djvu/908

 corrupt and polluted, but “the present evil phenomena are rectified in other regions and in some future period of existence.” Such a view satisfies neither of his interlocutors. Cleanthes, pointing out that from a nature thoroughly evil we can never prove the existence of an infinitely powerful and benevolent Creator, hazards the conjecture that the deity, though all-benevolent, is not all-powerful. Philo, however, pushing his principles to their full consequences, shows that unless we assumed (or knew) beforehand that the system of nature was the work of a benevolent but limited deity, we certainly could not, from the facts of nature, infer the benevolence of its creator. Cleanthes’s view is, therefore, an hypothesis, and in no sense an inference.

The Dialogues ought here to conclude. There is, however, appended one of those perplexing statements of personal opinion (for Hume declares Cleanthes to be his mouthpiece) not uncommon among writers of this period. Cleanthes and Philo come to an agreement, in admitting a certain illogical force in the a posteriori argument, or, at least, in expressing a conviction as to God’s existence, which may not perhaps be altogether devoid of foundation. The precise value of such a declaration must be matter of conjecture. Probably the true statement of Hume’s attitude regarding the problem is the somewhat melancholy utterance with which the Dialogues close.

It is apparent, even from the brief summary just given, that the importance of Hume in the history of philosophy consists in the vigour and logical exactness with which he develops a particular metaphysical view. Inconsistencies, no doubt, are to be detected in his system, but they arise from the limitations of the view itself, and not, as in the case of Locke and Berkeley, from imperfect grasp of the principle, and endeavour to unite with it others radically incompatible. In Hume’s theory of knowledge we have the final expression of what may be called psychological individualism or atomism, while his ethics and doctrine of religion are but the logical consequences of this theory. So far as metaphysic is concerned, Hume has given the final word of the empirical school, and all additions, whether from the specifically psychological side or from the general history of human culture, are subordinate in character, and affect in no way the nature of his results. It is no exaggeration to say that the later English school of philosophy represented by J. S. Mill made in theory no advance beyond Hume. In the logic of Mill, e.g., we find much of a special character that has no counterpart in Hume, much that is introduced ab extra, from general considerations of scientific procedure, but, so far as the groundwork is concerned, the System of Logic is a mere reproduction of Hume’s doctrine of knowledge. It is impossible for any reader of Mill’s remarkable posthumous essay on theism to avoid the reflection that in substance the treatment is identical with that of the Dialogues on Natural Religion, while on the whole the superiority in critical force must be assigned to the earlier work.

2. Hume’s eminence in the fields of philosophy and history must not be allowed to obscure his importance as a political economist. Berkeley had already, in the Querist, attacked the mercantile theory of the nature of national wealth and the functions of money, and Locke had, in a partial manner, shown that

political economy could with advantage be viewed in relation to the modern system of critical philosophy. But Hume was the first to apply to economics the scientific methods of his philosophy. His services to economics may be summed up in two heads: (1) he established the relation between economic facts and the fundamental phenomena of social life, and (2) he introduced into the study of these facts the new historical method. Thus, though he gave no special name to it, he yet describes the subject-matter, and indicates the true method, of economic science. His economic essays were published in the volumes entitled Political Discourses (1752) and Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects (1753); the most important are those on Commerce, on Money, on Interest and on the Balance of Trade, but, notwithstanding the disconnected form of the essays in general, the other less important essays combine to make a complete economic system. We have said that Berkeley and Locke had already begun the general work for which Hume is most important; in details also Hume had been anticipated to some extent. Nicholas Barbon and Sir Dudley North had already attacked the mercantile theory as to the precious metals and the balance of trade; Joseph Massie and Barbon had anticipated his theory of interest. Yet when we compare Hume with Adam Smith, the advance which Hume had made on his predecessors in lucidity of exposition and subtlety of intellect becomes clear, and modern criticism is agreed that the main errors of Adam Smith are to be found in those deductions which deviate from the results of the Political Discourses. A very few examples must suffice to illustrate his services to economics.

In dealing with money, he refutes the Mercantile School, which had tended to confound it with wealth. “Money,” said Hume, “is none of the wheels of trade; it is the oil which renders the motion of the wheels more smooth and easy.” “Money and commodities are the real strength of any community.” From

the internal, as distinct from the international, aspect, the absolute quantity of money, supposed as of fixed amount, in a country, is of no consequence, while a quantity larger than is required for the interchange of commodities is injurious, as tending to raise prices and to drive foreigners from the home markets. It is only during the period of acquisition of money, and before the rise in prices, that the accumulation of precious metals is advantageous. This principle is perhaps Hume’s most important economic discovery (cf. F. A. Walker’s Money in its Relations to Trade and Industry, London, 1880, p. 84 sqq.). He goes on to show that the variations of prices are due solely to money and commodities in circulation. Further, it is a misconception to regard as injurious the passage of money into foreign countries. “A government,” he says, “has great reason to preserve with care its people and its manufactures; its money it may safely trust to the course of human affairs without fear or jealousy.”

Dealing with the phenomena of interest, he exposes the old fallacy that the rate depends upon the amount of money in a country; low interest does not follow on abundance of money. The reduction in the rate of interest must, in general, result from “the increase of industry and frugality, of arts and commerce.” In connexion with this he emphasizes a too generally neglected factor in economic phenomena, “the constant and insatiable desire of the mind for exercise and employment.” “Interest,” he says in general, “is the barometer of the state, and its lowness an almost infallible sign of prosperity,” arising, as it does, from increased trade, frugality in the merchant class, and the consequent rise of new lenders: low interest and low profits mutually forward each other. In the matter

of free trade and protection he compromises. He says on the one hand, “not only as a man, but as a British subject I pray for the flourishing commerce of Germany, Spain, Italy and even France itself,” and condemns “the numerous bars, obstructions and imposts which all nations of Europe, and none more than England, have put upon trade.” On the other hand, he approves of a protective tax on German linen in favour of home manufactures, and of a tax on brandy as encouraging the sale of rum and so supporting our southern colonies. Indeed it has been fairly observed that Hume retains an attitude of refined mercantilism. With regard to taxation he takes very definite views. The best taxes,

he says, are those levied on consumption, especially on luxuries, for these are least heavily felt. He denies that all taxes fall finally on the land. Superior frugality and industry on the part of the artisan will enable him to pay taxes without mechanically raising the price of labour. Here, as in other points, he differs entirely from the physiocrats, and his criticism of contemporary French views are, as a whole, in accordance with received modern opinion. For the modern expedient of raising money for national emergencies by way of loan he has a profound distrust. He was convinced that what is bad for the individual credit must be bad for the state also. A national debt, he maintains, enriches the capital at the expense of the provinces; further, it creates a leisured class of stockholders, and possesses all the disadvantages of paper credit. “Either the nation must destroy public credit, or public credit will destroy the nation.” To sum up, it may be said that Hume enunciated the principle that “everything in the world is purchased by labour, and our passions are the only causes of labour”; and further, that, in analysing the complex phenomena of commerce, he is superior sometimes to Adam Smith in that he never forgets that the ultimate causes of economic change are the “customs and manners” of the people, and that the solution of problems is to be sought in the elementary factors of industry.

—1. Life.—J. H. Burton’s Life and Correspondence of David Hume (2 vols., 1846); Dr G. Birkbeck Hill, Letters of Hume to William Strahan; C. J. W. Francke, David Hume (Haarlem, 1907).

2. Works.—Until 1874 the standard edition was that of 1826 (reprinted 1854), in 4 vols. The best modern edition is that in 4 vols. by T. H. Green and T. H. Grose (containing a valuable introduction and excellent bibliographical matter); the Enquiry and the Treatise (1894 and 1896, Oxford), edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge.

3. Philosophic (the more important only can be quoted).—Huxley’s Hume (a popular reproduction of Hume’s views in “English Men of Letters” series); Sir L. Stephen’s English Thought in the XVIIIth Century (1876, especially ch. vi.); J. Orr, David Hume and his Influence on Philosophy and Theology (1903, especially ch. ix. on “Moral Theory of Hume”); H. Calderwood, David Hume (1898, especially ch. vii. on Hume’s attitude to religion); A. Seth, Scottish and German Answers to Hume; F. Jodl, Leben und Philosophie D. Humes (1872); E. Pfleiderer, Empirismus und Skepsis in D. Humes Philosophie (1874); G. Spicker, Kant, Hume und Berkeley (1875); G. Compayré, La Philosophie de D. Hume (1873); A. Meinong, Hume-Studien (1877, especially Hume’s nominalism); G. von Gižycki (a thorough exposition of Hume’s utilitarianism), Die Ethik D. Humes (1878); G. Lechartier, D. Hume, moraliste et sociologue (1900); M. Klemme, Die volkswirtschaftlichen Anchauungen D. Humes (1900); E. Marcus, Kants Revolutionsprinzip. Eine exakte Lösung des Kant-Hume’schen Erkenntnisproblems (1902); C. Hedvall, Humes Erkenntnistheorie (1906); R. Hönigswald, Über die Lehre Humes von der Realität der Aussendinge (1904); O. Quast, Der Begriff des Belief bei David Hume (1903). Hume’s relation to the society of his time is described in the Rev. H. G. Graham’s Social Life in Scotland and Scottish Men of Letters; “Jupiter” in Carlyle’s Autobiography. J. MacCosh published a short pamphlet (1884) containing interesting but perhaps not conclusive arguments on the Agnosticism of Hume and Huxley.

4. Economic.—J. Bonar, Philosophy and Political Economy (London, 1893), chapter on Hume; notes to W. G. F. Roscher’s