Page:EB1911 - Volume 13.djvu/353

Rh would actually have happened, nothing would appear. As it is we shall find a continuous molecule manifesting attractive and repulsive forces; attraction corresponding to the tendency of the self-preservations to become perfect, repulsion to the frustration of this. Motion, even more evidently than space, implicates the contradictory conception of continuity, and cannot, therefore, be a real predicate, though valid as an intelligible form and necessary to the comprehension of the objective semblance. For we have to think of the reals as absolutely independent and yet as entering into connexions. This we can only do by conceiving them as originally moving through intelligible space in rectilinear paths and with uniform velocities. For such motion no cause need be supposed; motion, in fact, is no more a state of the moving real than rest is, both alike being but relations, with which, therefore, the real has no concern. The changes in this motion, however, for which we should require a cause, would be the objective semblance of the self-preservations that actually occur when reals meet. Further, by means of such motion these actual occurrences, which are in themselves timeless, fall for an observer in a definite time—a time which becomes continuous through the partial coincidence of events.

But in all this it has been assumed that we are spectators of the objective semblance; it remains to make good this assumption, or, in other words, to show the possibility of knowledge; this is the problem of what Herbart terms Eidolology, and forms the transition from metaphysic to psychology. Here, again, a contradictory conception blocks the way, that, viz. of the Ego as the identity of knowing and being, and as such the stronghold of idealism. The contradiction becomes more evident when the ego is defined to be a subject (and so a real) that is its own object. As real and not merely formal, this conception of the ego is amenable to the method of relations. The solution this method furnishes is summarily that there are several objects which mutually modify each other, and so constitute that ego we take for the presented real. But to explain this modification is the business of psychology; it is enough now to see that the subject like all reals is necessarily unknown, and that, therefore, the idealist’s theory of knowledge is unsound. But though the simple quality of the subject or soul is beyond knowledge, we know what actually happens when it is in connexion with other’s reals, for its self-preservations then are what we call sensations. And these sensations are the sole material of our knowledge; but they are not given to us as a chaos but in definite groups and series, whence we come to know the relations of those reals, which, though themselves unknown, our sensations compel us to posit absolutely.

In his Psychology Herbart rejects altogether the doctrine of mental faculties as one refuted by his metaphysics, and tries to show that all psychical phenomena whatever result from the action and interaction of elementary ideas or presentations (Vorstellungen). The soul being one and simple, its separate acts of self-preservation or primary presentations must be simple too, and its several presentations must become united together. And this they can do at once and completely when, as is the case, for example, with the several attributes of an object, they are not of opposite quality. But otherwise there ensues a conflict in which the opposed presentations comport themselves like forces and mutually suppress or obscure each other. The act of presentation (Vorstellen) then becomes partly transformed into an effort, and its product, the idea, becomes in the same proportion less and less intense till a position of equilibrium is reached; and then at length the remainders coalesce. We have thus a statics and a mechanics of mind which investigate respectively the conditions of equilibrium and of movement among presentations. In the statics two magnitudes have to be determined: (1) the amount of the suppression or inhibition (Hemmungssumme), and (2) the ratio in which this is shared among the opposing presentations. The first must obviously be as small as possible; thus for two totally-opposed presentations a and b, of which a is the greater, the inhibendum = b. For a given degree of opposition this burden will be shared between the conflicting presentations in the inverse ratio of their strength. When its remainder after inhibition = 0, a presentation is said to be on the threshold of consciousness, for on a small diminution of the inhibition the “effort” will become actual presentation in the same proportion. Such total exclusion from consciousness is, however, manifestly impossible with only two presentations, though with three or a greater number the residual value of one may even be negative. The first and simplest law in psychological mechanics relates to the “sinking” of inhibited presentations. As the presentations yield to the pressure, the pressure itself diminishes, so that the velocity of sinking decreases, i.e. we have the equation (S−) dt = d, where S is the total inhibendum, and the intensity actually inhibited after the time t. Hence $$t = \log{\frac{S}{S-\sigma}}$$, and = S(1−e−t). From this law it follows, for example, that equilibrium is never quite obtained for those presentations which continue above the threshold of consciousness, while the rest which cannot so continue are very speedily driven beyond the threshold. More important is the law according to which a presentation freed from inhibition and rising anew into consciousness tends to raise the other presentations with which it is combined. Suppose two presentations p and united by the residua r and ; then the amount of p’s “help” to is r, the portion of which appropriated by is given by the ratio  : ; and thus the initial help is $$\frac{r\rho}{\pi}$$.

But after a time t, when a portion of represented by  has been actually brought into consciousness, the help afforded in the next instant will be found by the equation

$\frac{r\rho}{\pi}\cdot\frac{\rho - \omega}{\rho}dt = d\omega$

from which by integration we have the value of.

$\omega = \rho\left(1 - e^{-\frac{rt}{\pi}}\right)$.|undefined

So that if there are several s connected with p by smaller and smaller parts, there will be a definite “serial” order in which they will be revived by p; and on this fact Herbart rests all the phenomena of the so-called faculty of memory, the development of spatial and temporal forms and much besides. Emotions and volitions, he holds, are not directly self-preservations of the soul, as our presentations are, but variable states of such presentations resulting from their interaction when above the threshold of consciousness. Thus when some presentations tend to force a presentation into consciousness, and others at the same time tend to drive it out, that presentation is the seat of painful feeling; when, on the other hand, its entrance is favoured by all, pleasure results. Desires are presentations struggling into consciousness against hindrances, and when accompanied by the supposition of success become volitions. Transcendental freedom of will in Kant’s sense is an impossibility. Self-consciousness is the result of an interaction essentially the same in kind as that which takes place when a comparatively simple presentation finds the field of consciousness occupied by a long-formed and well-consolidated “mass” of presentations—as, e.g. one’s business or garden, the theatre, &c., which promptly inhibit the isolated presentation if incongruent, and unite it to themselves if not. What we call Self is, above all, such a central mass, and Herbart seeks to show with great ingenuity and detail how this position is occupied at first chiefly by the body, then by the seat of ideas and desires, and finally by that first-personal Self which recollects the past and resolves concerning the future. But at any stage the actual constituents of this “complexion” are variable; the concrete presentation of Self is never twice the same. And, therefore, finding on reflection any particular concrete factor contingent, we abstract the position from that which occupies it, and so reach the speculative notion of the pure Ego.

Aesthetics elaborates the “ideas” involved in the expression of taste called forth by those relations of object which acquire for them the attribution of beauty or the reverse. The beautiful ( ) is to be carefully distinguished from the allied conceptions of the useful and the pleasant, which vary with time, place and person; whereas beauty is predicated absolutely and involuntarily by all who have attained the right standpoint. Ethics, which is but one branch of aesthetics, although the chief, deals with such relations among volitions (Willensverhältnisse) as thus unconditionally please or displease. These relations Herbart finds to be reducible to five, which do not admit of further simplification; and corresponding to them are as many moral ideas (Musterbegriffe), viz.: (1) Internal Freedom, the underlying relation being that of the individual’s will to his judgment of it; (2) Perfection, the relation being that of his several volitions to each other in respect of intensity, variety and concentration; (3) Benevolence, the relation being that between his own will and the thought of another’s; (4) Right, in case of actual conflict with another; and (5) Retribution or Equity, for intended good or evil done. The ideas of a final society, a system of rewards and punishments, a system of administration, a system of culture and a “unanimated society,” corresponding to the ideas of law, equity, benevolence, perfection and internal freedom respectively, result when we take account of a number of individuals. Virtue is the perfect conformity of the will with the moral ideas; of this the single virtues are but special expressions. The conception of duty arises from the existence of hindrances to the attainment of virtue. A general scheme of principles of conduct is possible, but the subsumption of special cases under these must remain matter of tact. The application of ethics to things as they are with a view to the realization of the moral ideas is moral technology (Tugendlehre), of which the chief divisions are Paedagogy and Politics.

In Theology Herbart held the argument from design to be as valid for divine activity as for human, and to justify the belief in a supersensible real, concerning which, however, exact knowledge is neither attainable nor on practical grounds desirable.

Among the post-Kantian philosophers Herbart doubtless ranks next to Hegel in importance, and this without taking into account his very great contributions to the science of education. His disciples speak of theirs as the “exact philosophy,” and the term well expresses their master’s chief excellence and the character of