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Rh the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years’ War, Hawke was almost always on active service. From 1748 till 1752 he was in command at home, and he rehoisted his flag in 1755 as admiral in command of the Western Squadron. Although war was not declared for some time, England and France were on very hostile terms, and conflicts between the officers of the two powers in America had already taken place. Neither government was scrupulous in abstaining from the use of force while peace was still nominally unbroken. Hawke was sent to sea to intercept a French squadron which had been cruising near Gibraltar, but a restriction was put on the limits within which he might cruise, and he failed to meet the French. The fleet was much weakened by ill-health. In June 1756 the news of John Byng’s retreat from Minorca reached England and aroused the utmost indignation. Hawke was at once sent out to relieve him in the Mediterranean command, and to send him home for trial. He sailed in the “Antelope,” carrying, as the wits of the day put it, “a cargo of courage” to supply deficiencies in that respect among the officers then in the Mediterranean. Minorca had fallen, from want of resources rather than the attacks of the French, before he could do anything for the assistance of the garrison of Fort St Philip. In winter he was recalled to England, and he reached home on the 14th of January 1757. On the 24th of February following he was promoted full admiral.

It is said, but on no very good authority, that he was not on good terms with Pitt (afterwards earl of Chatham), and it is certain that when Pitt’s great ministry was formed in June 1757, he was not included in the Board of Admiralty. Yet as he was continued in command of important forces in the Channel, it is obvious that his great capacity was fully recognized. In the late summer of 1757 he was entrusted with the naval side of an expedition to the coast of France. These operations, which were scoffingly described at the time as breaking windows with guineas, were a favourite device of Pitt’s for weakening the French and raising the confidence of the country. The expedition of 1757 was directed against Rochefort, and it effected nothing. Hawke, who probably expected very little good from it, did his own work as admiral punctually, but he cannot be said to have shown zeal, or any wish to inspirit the military officers into making greater efforts than they were disposed naturally to make. The expedition returned to Spithead by the 6th of October. No part of the disappointment of the public, which was acute, was visited on Hawke. During the end of 1757 and the beginning of 1758 he continued cruising in the Channel in search of the French naval forces, without any striking success. In May of that year he was ordered to detach a squadron under the command of Howe to carry out further combined operations. Hawke considered himself as treated with a want of due respect, and was at the time in bad humour with the Admiralty. He somewhat pettishly threw up his command, but was induced to resume it by the board, which knew his value, and was not wanting in flattery. He retired in June for a time on the ground of health, but happily for his own glory and the service of the country he was able to hoist his flag in May 1759, the “wonderful year” of Garrick’s song.

France was then elaborating a scheme of invasion which bears much resemblance to the plan afterwards formed by Napoleon. An army of invasion was collected at the Morbihan in Brittany, and the intention was to transport it under the protection of a powerful fleet which was to be made up by uniting the squadron at Brest with the ships at Toulon. The plan, like Napoleon’s, had slight chance of success, since the naval part of the invading force must necessarily be brought together from distant points at the risk of interruption by the British squadrons. The naval forces of England were amply sufficient to provide whatever was needed to upset the plans of the French government. But the country was not so confident in the capacity of the navy to serve as a defence as it was taught to be in later generations. It had been seized by a most shameful panic at the beginning of the war in face of a mere threat of invasion. Therefore the anxiety of Pitt to baffle the schemes of the French decisively was great, and the country looked on at the development of the naval campaign with nervous attention. The proposed combination of the French fleet was defeated by the annihilation of the Toulon squadron on the coast of Portugal by Boscawen in May, but the Brest fleet was still untouched and the troops were still at Morbihan. It was the duty of Hawke to prevent attack from this quarter. The manner in which he discharged his task marks an epoch in the history of the navy. Until his time, or very nearly so, it was still believed that there was rashness in keeping the great ships out after September. Hawke maintained his blockade of Brest till far into November. Long cruises had always entailed much bad health on the crews, but by the care he took to obtain fresh food, and the energy he showed in pressing the Admiralty for stores, he was able to keep his men healthy. Early in November a series of severe gales forced him off the French coast, and he was compelled to anchor in Torbay. His absence was brief, but it allowed the French admiral, M. de Conflans (1690?–1777), time to put to sea, and to steer for the Morbihan. Hawke, who had left Torbay on the 13th of November, learnt of the departure of the French at sea on the 17th from a look-out ship, and as the French admiral could have done nothing but steer for the Morbihan, he followed him thither. The news that M. de Conflans had got to sea spread a panic through the country, and for some days Hawke was the object of abuse of the most irrational kind. There was in fact no danger, for behind Hawke’s fleet there were ample reserves in the straits of Dover, and in the North Sea. Following his enemy as fast as the bad weather, a mixture of calms and head winds would allow, the admiral sighted the French about 40 m. to the west of Belleisle on the morning of the 20th of November. The British fleet was of twenty-one sail, the French of twenty. There was also a small squadron of British ships engaged in watching the Morbihan as an inshore squadron, which was in danger of being cut off. M. de Conflans had a sufficient force to fight in the open sea without rashness, but after making a motion to give battle, he changed his mind and gave the signal to his fleet to steer for the anchorage at Quiberon. He did not believe that the British admiral would dare to follow him, for the coast is one of the most dangerous in the world, and the wind was blowing hard from the west and rising to a storm. Hawke, however, pursued without hesitation, though it was well on in the afternoon before he caught up the rear of the French fleet, and dark by the time the two fleets were in the bay. The action, which was more a test of seamanship than of gunnery, or capacity to manœuvre in order, ended in the destruction of the French. Five ships only were taken or destroyed, but others ran ashore, and the French navy as a whole lost all confidence. Two British vessels were lost, but the price was little to pay for such a victory. No more fighting remained to be done. The fleet in Quiberon Bay suffered from want of food, and its distress is recorded in the lines:— Hawke returned to England in January 1760 and had no further service at sea. He was not made a peer till the 20th of May 1776, and then only as Baron Hawke of Towton. From 1766 to 1771 he was first lord of the Admiralty. His administration was much criticized, perhaps more from party spirit than because of its real defects. Whatever his relations with Lord Chatham may have been he was no favourite with Chatham’s partizans. It is very credible that, having spent all his life at sea, his faculty did not show in the uncongenial life of the shore. As an admiral at sea and on his own element Hawke has had no superior. It is true that he was not put to the test of having to meet opponents of equal strength and efficiency, but then neither has any other British admiral since the Dutch wars of the 17th century. On his death on the 17th of October 1781 his title passed to his son, Martin Bladen (1744–1805), and it is