Page:EB1911 - Volume 12.djvu/886

Rh And, since intensity of sensation is a function of the intensity of the underlying neural excitement, we may not assume that sensory vividness is also the expression in consciousness of that intensity of excitement. If Wundt’s view were true a progressive diminution of the intensity of a sensory stimulus should bring the sensation to a point in the scale of diminishing intensity at which it ceases to be sensation, ceases to have sensory vividness and becomes an image merely. But this is not the case; with diminishing intensity of stimulation, the sensation declines to a minimal intensity and then disappears from consciousness. This objection applies not only to Wundt’s view of hallucinations, but also to H. Taine’s explanation of them by the aid of his doctrine of “reductives,” for this too identifies sensory vividness with intensity. (H. Taine, De l’intelligence, tome i. p. 108.)

Another widely current explanation is based on the view that the representation and the percept have their anatomical bases in different element-groups or “centres” of the brain, the “centre” of the representation being assigned to a higher level of the brain than that of the percept (the latter being sometimes assigned to the basal ganglia of the brain, the former to the cortex). It is then assumed that while the lower perceptual centre is normally excited only through the sense-organ, it may occasionally be excited by impulses playing down upon it from the corresponding centre of representation, when hallucination results.

This view also is far from satisfactory, because the great additions recently made to our knowledge of the brain tend very strongly to show that both sensations and memory-images have their anatomical bases in the same sensory areas of the cerebral cortex; and many considerations converge to show that their anatomical bases must be, in part at least, identical.

The views based on the assumptions of complete identity, and of complete separateness, of the anatomical bases of the percept and of the representation are then alike untenable; and the alternative—that their anatomical bases are in part identical, in part different, which is indicated by this conclusion—renders possible a far more satisfactory doctrine. We have good reason to believe that the neural correlate of sensation is the transmission of the nervous impulse through a sensori-motor arc of the cortex, made up of a chain of neurones; and the view suggests itself that the neural correlate of the corresponding memory-image is the transmission of the impulse through a part only of this chain of cortical elements, either the efferent motor part of this chain or the afferent sensory part of it. Professor W. James’s theory of hallucinations is based on the latter assumption. He suggests that the sensory vividness of sensation and of the percept is due to the discharge of the excitement of the chain of elements in the forward or motor direction; and that, in the case of the image and of the representation, the discharge takes place, not in this direction through the efferent channel of the centre, but laterally into other centres of the cortex. Hallucination may then be conceived as caused by obstruction, or abnormally increased resistance, of the paths connecting such a cortical centre with others, so that, when it becomes excited in any way, the tension or potential of its charge rises, until discharge takes place in the motor direction through the efferent limbs of the sensori-motor arcs which constitute the centre.

It is a serious objection to this view that, as James himself, in common with most modern authors, maintains, every idea has its motor tendency which commonly, perhaps always, finds expression in some change of tension of muscles, and in many cases issues in actual movements. Now if we accept James’s theory of hallucination, we should expect to find that whenever a representation issues in bodily action it should assume the sensory vividness of an hallucination; and this, of course, is not the case.

The alternative form of the view that assumes partial identity of the anatomical bases of the percept and the representation of an object, would regard the neural correlate of the sensation as the transmission of the nervous impulse throughout the length of the sensori-motor arc of the cortex, from sensory inlet to motor outlet; and that of the image as its transmission through the efferent part of this arc only; that is to say, in the case of the image, it would regard the excitement of the arc as being initiated at some point between its afferent inlet and its motor outlet, and as spreading, in accordance with the law of forward conduction, towards the motor outlet only, so that only the part of the arc distal or efferent to this point becomes excited.

This view of the neural basis of sensory vividness, which correlates the difference between the sensation and the image with the only known difference between their physiological conditions, namely the peripheral initiation of the one and the central initiation of the other, enables us to formulate a satisfactory theory of the physiology of hallucinations.

The anatomical basis of the perception and of the representation of any object is a functional system of nervous elements, comprising a number of sensori-motor arcs, whose excitement by impulses ascending to them by the sensory paths from the sense-organs determines sensations, and whose excitement in their efferent parts only determines the corresponding images. In the case of perception, some of these arcs are excited by impulses ascending from the sense-organs, others only by the spread of the excitement through the system from these peripherally excited arcs; while, in the case of the representation, all alike are excited by impulses that reach the system from other parts of the cortex and spread throughout its efferent parts only to its motor outlets.

If then impulses enter this system by any of the afferent limbs of its sensori-motor arcs, the presentation that accompanies its excitement will have sensory vividness and will be a true perception, an illusion, or an hallucination, according as these impulses have followed the normal course from the sense-organ, or have been diverted, to a lesser or greater degree, from their normal paths. If any such neural system becomes abnormally excitable, or becomes excited in any way with abnormal intensity, it is thereby rendered a path of exceptionally low-resistance capable of diverting to itself, from their normal path, any streams of impulses ascending from the sense-organ; which ascending impulses, entering the system by its afferent inlets, excite sensations that impart to the presentation the character of sensory vividness; the presentation thus acquires the character of a percept in spite of the absence of the appropriate impression on the sense-organ, and we call it an hallucination.

This view renders intelligible the modus operandi of many of the predisposing causes of hallucination; e.g. the pre-occupation with certain representations of the ecstatic, or of the sufferer from delusions of persecution; the intense expectation of a particular sense impression, the generally increased excitability of the cortex in states of delirium; in all these conditions the abnormally intense excitement of the cortical systems may be supposed to give them an undue directive and attractive influence upon the streams of impulses ascending from the sense-organs, so that sensory impulses may be diverted from their normal paths. Again, it renders intelligible the part played by chronic irritation of a sense-organ, as when chronic irritation of the internal ear leads on to hallucinations of hearing; perhaps also the chronic irritation of sensory nerves that must accompany the states of visceral disease, shown by Head to be so frequently accompanied by a liability to hallucinations; for any such chronic irritation supplies a stream of disorderly impulses rising constantly from the sense-organ, for the reception of which the brain has no appropriate system, and which, therefore, readily enters any organized cortical system that at any moment constitutes a path of low-resistance. A similar explanation applies to the influence of fixed gazing upon a crystal, or the placing of a shell over the ear, in inducing visual and auditory hallucinations. The “recurrent sensations” experienced after prolonged occupation with some one kind of sensory object may be regarded as due to an abnormal excitability of the cortical system concerned, resulting from its unduly prolonged exercise. The hypothesis renders intelligible also the liability to hallucination of persons in the hysterical and hypnotic states, in whose brains