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 Still, it was clear that he must be disposed of as quickly as possible, and Fairfax requested the Houses to take other measures against the king (June 26). This they did by paying up the arrears due to Leven’s army and bringing it to the Severn valley. On the 8th of July Leven reached Alcester, bringing with him a Parliamentarian force from Derbyshire under Sir John Gell. The design was to besiege Hereford.

38. Langport.—By that time Fairfax and Goring were at close quarters. The Royalist general’s line of defence faced west along the Yeo and the Parrett between Yeovil and Bridgwater, and thus barred the direct route to Taunton. Fairfax, however, marched from Lechlade via Marlborough and Blandford—hindered only by Clubmen—to the friendly posts of Dorchester and Lyme, and with these as his centre of operations he was able to turn the headwaters of Goring’s river-line via Beaminster and Crewkerne. The Royalists at once abandoned the south and west side of the rivers—the siege of Taunton had already been given up—and passed over to the north and east bank. Bridgwater was the right of this second line as it had been the left of the first; the new left was at Ilchester. Goring could thus remain in touch with Charles in south Wales through Bristol, and the siege of Taunton having been given up there was no longer any incentive for remaining on the wrong side of the water-line. But his army was thoroughly demoralized by its own licence and indiscipline, and the swift, handy and resolute regiments of the New Model made short work of its strong positions. On the 7th of July, demonstrating against the points of passage between Ilchester and Langport, Fairfax secretly occupied Yeovil. The post at that place, which had been the right of Goring’s first position, had, perhaps rightly, been withdrawn to Ilchester when the second position was taken up, and Fairfax repaired the bridge without interruption. Goring showed himself unequal to the new situation. He might, if sober, make a good plan when the enemy was not present to disturb him, and he certainly led cavalry charges with boldness and skill. But of strategy in front of the enemy he was incapable. On the news from Yeovil he abandoned the line of the Yeo as far as Langport without striking a blow, and Fairfax, having nothing to gain by continuing his détour through Yeovil, came back and quietly crossed at Long Sutton, west of Ilchester (July 9). Goring had by now formed a new plan. A strong rearguard was posted at Langport and on high ground east and north-east of it to hold Fairfax, and he himself with the cavalry rode off early on the 8th to try and surprise Taunton. This place was no longer protected by Massey’s little army, which Fairfax had called up to assist his own. But Fairfax, who was not yet across Long Sutton bridge, heard of Goring’s raid in good time, and sent Massey after him with a body of horse. Massey surprised a large party of the Royalists at Ilminster on the 9th, wounded Goring himself, and pursued the fugitives up to the south-eastern edge of Langport. On the 10th Fairfax’s advanced guard, led by Major Bethel of Cromwell’s own regiment, brilliantly stormed the position of Goring’s rearguard east of Langport, and the cavalry of the New Model, led by Cromwell himself, swept in pursuit right up to the gates of Bridgwater, where Goring’s army, dismayed and on the point of collapse, was more or less rallied. Thence Goring himself retired to Barnstaple. His army, under the regimental officers, defended itself in Bridgwater resolutely till the 23rd of July, when it capitulated. The fall of Bridgwater gave Fairfax complete control of Somerset and Dorset from Lyme to the Bristol channel. Even in the unlikely event of Goring’s raising a fresh army, he would now have to break through towards Bristol by open force, and a battle between Goring and Fairfax could only have one result. Thus Charles had perforce to give up his intention of joining Goring—his recruiting operations in south Wales had not been so successful as he hoped, owing to the apathy of the people and the vigour of the local Parliamentary leaders—and to resume the northern enterprise begun in the spring.

39. Schemes of Lord Digby.—This time Rupert would not be with him. The prince, now despairing of success and hoping only for a peace on the best terms procurable, listlessly returned to his governorship of Bristol and prepared to meet Fairfax’s impending attack. The influence of Rupert was supplanted by that of Lord Digby. As sanguine as Charles and far more energetic, he was for the rest of the campaign the guiding spirit of the Royalists, but being a civilian he proved incapable of judging the military factors in the situation from a military standpoint, and not only did he offend the officers by constituting himself a sort of confidential military secretary to the king, but he was distrusted by all sections of Royalists for his reckless optimism. The resumption of the northern enterprise, opposed by Rupert and directly inspired by Digby, led to nothing. Charles marched by Bridgnorth, Lichfield and Ashbourne to Doncaster, where on the 18th of August he was met by great numbers of Yorkshire gentlemen with promises of fresh recruits. For a moment the outlook was bright, for the Derbyshire men with Gell were far away at Worcester with Leven, the Yorkshire Parliamentarians engaged in besieging Scarborough Castle, Pontefract and other posts. But two days later he heard that David Leslie with the cavalry of Leven’s army was coming up behind him, and that, the Yorkshire sieges being now ended, Major-General Poyntz’s force lay in his front. It was now impossible to wait for the new levies, and reluctantly the king turned back to Oxford, raiding Huntingdonshire and other parts of the hated Eastern Association en route.

40. Montrose’s Last Victories.—David Leslie did not pursue him. Montrose, though the king did not yet know it, had won two more battles, and was practically master of all Scotland. After Auldearn he had turned to meet Baillie’s army in Strathspey, and by superior mobility and skill forced that commander to keep at a respectful distance. He then turned upon a new army which Lindsay, titular earl of Crawford, was forming in Forfarshire, but that commander betook himself to a safe distance, and Montrose withdrew into the Highlands to find recruits (June). The victors of Auldearn had mostly dispersed on the usual errand, and he was now deserted by most of the Gordons, who were recalled by the chief of their clan, the marquess of Huntly, in spite of the indignant remonstrances of Huntly’s heir, Lord Gordon, who was Montrose’s warmest admirer. Baillie now approached again, but he was weakened by having to find trained troops to stiffen Lindsay’s levies, and a strong force of the Gordons had now been persuaded to rejoin Montrose. The two armies met in battle near Alford on the Don; little can be said of the engagement save that Montrose had to fight cautiously and tentatively as at Aberdeen, not in the decision-forcing spirit of Auldearn, and that in the end Baillie’s cavalry gave way and his infantry was cut down as it stood. Lord Gordon was amongst the Royalist dead (July 2). The plunder was put away in the glens before any attempt was made to go forward, and thus the Covenanters had leisure to form a numerous, if not very coherent, army on the nucleus of Lindsay’s troops. Baillie, much against his will, was continued in the command, with a council of war (chiefly of nobles whom Montrose had already defeated, such as Argyll, Elcho and Balfour) to direct his every movement. Montrose, when rejoined by the Highlanders, moved to meet him, and in the last week of July and the early part of August there were manœuvres and minor engagements round Perth. About the 7th of August Montrose suddenly slipped away into the Lowlands, heading for Glasgow. Thereupon another Covenanting army began to assemble in Clydesdale. But it was clear that Montrose could beat mere levies, and Baillie, though without authority and despairing of success, hurried after him. Montrose then, having drawn Baillie’s Fifeshire militia far enough from home to ensure their being discontented, turned upon them on the 14th of August near Kilsyth. Baillie protested against fighting, but his aristocratic masters of the council of war decided to cut off Montrose from the hills by turning his left wing. The Royalist general seized the opportunity, and his advance caught them in the very act of making a flank march (August 15). The head of the Covenanters’ column was met and stopped by the furious attack of the Gordon infantry, and Alastair Macdonald led the men of his own name and the Macleans against its flank. A breach was made in the centre of Baillie’s army at the first rush, and then 