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Rh prevent open war. At Redstone Old Fort (Brownsville) on the 29th of August 1794, before the “Committee of Sixty” who were appointed to represent the disaffected people, he opposed with vigorous eloquence the use of force against the government, and refused to be intimidated by an excited band of riflemen who happened to be in the vicinity and represented the radical element. He effectively checked the excitement, and when a month later an overwhelming Federal force began moving upon the western counties, the insurrection collapsed without bloodshed. Of all the men who took part in the opposition to the excise, Gallatin alone came out with credit. He was at once elected to the national house of representatives, and took his seat in December 1795. There, by sheer force of ability and industry, he wrested from all competitors the leadership of the Republicans, and became the most dangerous opponent whom the Federalists had ever encountered in congress. Inflamed with a hatred of France just then rising to the dignity of a party principle, they found in Gallatin an enemy who was both by origin and opinion peculiarly obnoxious to them. They attacked him unsparingly, but in vain. His perfect command of temper, his moderation of speech and action, in a bitterly personal age, never failed, and were his most effective weapons; but he made his power felt in other ways. His clear mind and industrious habits drew him to questions of finance. He became the financier of his party, preached unceasingly his cardinal doctrines of simplicity and economy, and was an effective critic of the measures of government. Cool and temperate, Gallatin, when following his own theories, was usually in the right, although accused by his followers of trimming. Thus, in regard to the Jay treaty, he defended the constitutional right of the house to consider the treaty, but he did not urge rejection in this specific case. On the other hand, when following a purely party policy he generally erred. He resisted the navy, the mainspring of Washington’s foreign policy; he opposed commercial treaties and diplomatic intercourse in a similar fashion. On these points he was grievously wrong, and on all he changed his views after a good deal of bitter experience.

The greatest period of Gallatin’s career in congress was in 1798, after the publication of the famous X.Y.Z. despatches. The insults of Talleyrand, and his shameless attempts to extort bribes from the American commissioners, roused the deep anger of the people against France. The Federalists swept all before them, and the members of the opposition either retired from Philadelphia or went over to the government. Alone and single-handed, Gallatin carried on the fight in congress. The Federalists bore down on him unmercifully, and even attempted (1798) a constitutional amendment in regard to citizenship, partly, it appears, in order to drive him from office. Still he held on, making a national struggle in the national legislature, and relying very little upon the rights of States so eagerly grasped by Jefferson and Madison. But even then the tide was turning. The strong measures of the Federalists shocked the country; the leaders of the dominant party quarrelled fiercely among themselves; and the Republicans carried the elections of 1800. In the exciting contest for the presidency in the house of representatives between Jefferson and Burr, it was Gallatin who led the Republicans.

When, after this contest, Jefferson became president (1801), there were two men whose commanding abilities marked them for the first places in the cabinet. James Madison became secretary of state, and Albert Gallatin secretary of the treasury. Wise, prudent and conservative, Gallatin made few changes in Hamilton’s arrangements, and for twelve years administered the national finances with the greatest skill. He and Jefferson were both imbued with the idea that government could be carried on upon a priori principles resting on the assumed perfectness of human nature, and the chief burden of carrying out this theory fell upon Gallatin. His guiding principles were still simplicity of administration and speedy extinction of all debt, and everything bent to these objects. Fighting or bribing the Barbary pirates was a mere question of expense. It was cheaper to seize Louisiana than to await the settlement of doubtful points. Commercial warfare was to be avoided because of the cost. All wars were bad, but if they could not be evaded it was less extravagant to be ready than to rush to arms unprepared. Amid many difficulties, and thwarted even by Jefferson himself in the matter of the navy, Gallatin pushed on; and after six years the public debt was decreased (in spite of the Louisiana purchase) by $14,260,000, a large surplus was on hand, a comprehensive and beneficent scheme of internal improvements was ready for execution, and the promised land seemed in sight. Then came the stress of war in Europe, a wretched neutrality at home, fierce outbreaks of human passions, and the fair structure of government by a priori theories based on the goodness of unoppressed humanity came to the ground. Gallatin was thrown helplessly back upon the rejected Federalist doctrine of government according to circumstances. He uttered no vain regrets, but the position was a trying one. The sworn foe of strong government, he was compelled, in pursuance of Jefferson’s policy, to put into execution the Embargo and other radical and stringent measures. He did his best, but all was in vain. Commercial warfare failed, the Embargo was repealed, and Jefferson, having entangled foreign relations and brought the country to the verge of civil war, retired to private life, leaving to his successor Madison, and to Gallatin, the task of extricating the nation from its difficulties. From 1809 the new administration, drifting steadily towards war, struggled on from one abortive and exasperating negotiation to another. It was a period of sore trial to Gallatin. The peace policy had failed, and nothing else replaced it. He had lost his hold upon Pennsylvania and his support in the house, while a cabal in the senate, bitterly and personally hostile to the treasury, crippled the administration and reduced every government measure to mere inanity. At last, however, in June 1812, congress on Madison’s recommendation declared war against England.

Gallatin never wasted time in futile complaints. His cherished schemes were shattered. War and extravagant expenditure had come, and he believed both to be fatal to the prosperity and progress of America. He therefore put the finances in the best order he could, and set himself to mitigate the evil effects of the war by obtaining an early peace. With this end in view he grasped eagerly at the proffered mediation of Russia, and without resigning the treasury sailed for Europe in May 1813.

Russian mediation proved barren, but Gallatin persevered, catching at every opportunity for negotiation. In the midst of his labours came the news that the senate had refused to confirm his appointment as peace commissioner. He still toiled on unofficially until, the objection of the senate having been met by the appointment of a new secretary of the treasury, his second nomination was approved, and he was able to proceed with direct negotiations. The English and American commissioners finally met at Ghent, and in the tedious and irritating discussions which ensued Gallatin took the leading part. His great difficulty lay in managing his colleagues, who were, especially Henry Clay and John Quincy Adams, able men of strong wills and jarring tempers. He succeeded in preserving harmony, and thus established his own reputation as an able diplomatist. Peace was his reward; on the 24th of December 1814 the treaty was signed; and after visiting Geneva for the first time since his boyhood, and assisting in negotiating a commercial convention (1815) with England by which all discriminating duties were abolished, Gallatin in July 1815 returned to America.

While still in Europe he had been asked by Madison to become minister to France; this appointment he accepted in January 1816, and adhered to his acceptance in spite of his being asked in April 1816 to serve once more as secretary of the treasury. He remained in France for the next seven years. He passed his time in thoroughly congenial society, seeing everybody of note or merit in Europe. He did not neglect the duties of his official position, but strove assiduously and with his wonted patience to settle the commercial relations of his adopted country with the nations of Europe, and in 1818 assisted Richard Rush, then United States minister in London, in negotiating a commercial convention with Great Britain to take the place of that negotiated in 1815.