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 were most needed, and each fresh general as he arrived took a new view of the combat and issued new orders. On the other side, Frossard, knowing the strength of his position, called on his neighbours for support, and determined to hold his ground. Victory seemed certain. There were sufficient troops within easy reach to have ensured a crushing numerical superiority. But the other generals had not been trained to mutual support, and thought only of their own immediate security, and their staffs were too inexperienced to act upon even good intentions; and, finding himself in the course of the afternoon left to his own devices, Frossard began gradually to withdraw, even before the pressure of the 13th German division on his left flank (about 8 P.M.) compelled his retirement. When darkness ended the battle the Prussians were scarcely aware of their victory. Steinmetz, who had reached the field about 6 P.M., rode back to his headquarters without issuing any orders, while the troops bivouacked where they stood, the units of three army corps being mixed up in almost inextricable confusion. But whereas out of 42,900 Prussians with 120 guns, who in the morning lay within striking distance of the enemy, no fewer than 27,000, with 78 guns were actually engaged; of the French, out of 64,000 with 210 guns only 24,000 with 90 guns took part in the action.

Meanwhile on the German left wing the III. army had begun its advance. Early on the 4th of August it crossed the frontier and fell upon a French detachment under Abel Douay, which had been placed near Weissenburg, partly to cover the Pigeonnier pass, but principally to consume the supplies accumulated in the little dismantled fortress, as these could not easily be moved. Against this force of under 4000 men of all arms, the Germans brought into action successively portions of three corps, in all over 25,000 men with 90 guns. After six hours’ fighting, in which the Germans lost some 1500 men, the gallant remnant of the French withdrew deliberately and in good order, notwithstanding the death of their leader at the critical moment. The Germans were so elated by their victory over the enemy, whose strength they naturally overestimated, that they forgot to send cavalry in pursuit, and thus entirely lost touch with the enemy.

Next day the advance was resumed, the two Bavarian corps moving via Mattstall through the foothills of the Vosges, the V. corps on their left towards Preuschdorf, and the XI. farther to the left again, through the wooded plain of the Rhine valley. The 4th cavalry division scouted in advance, and army headquarters moved to Sulz. About noon the advanced patrols discovered MacMahon’s corps in position on the left bank of the Sauer (see : Battle of). As his army was dispersed over a wide area, the crown prince determined to devote the 6th to concentrating the troops, and, probably to avoid alarming the enemy, ordered the cavalry to stand fast.

At night the outposts of the I. Bavarians and V. corps on the Sauer saw the fires of the French encampment and heard the noise of railway traffic, and rightly conjectured the approach of reinforcements. MacMahon had in fact determined to stand in the very formidable position he had selected, and he counted on receiving support both from the 7th corps (two divisions of which were being railed up from Colmar) and from the 5th corps, which lay around Bitche. It was also quite possible, and the soundest strategy, to withdraw the bulk of the troops then facing the German I. and II. armies to his support, and these would reach him by the 8th. He was therefore justified in accepting battle, though it was to his interest to delay it as long as possible.

At dawn on the 6th of August the commander of the V. corps outposts noticed certain movements in the French lines, and to clear up the situation brought his guns into action. As at Spicheren, the sound of the guns set the whole machinery of battle in motion. The French artillery immediately accepted the Prussian challenge. The I. Bavarians, having been ordered to be ready to move if they heard artillery fire, immediately advanced against the French left, encountering presently such a stubborn resistance that parts of their line began to give way. The Prussians of the V. corps felt that they could not abandon their allies, and von Kirchbach, calling on the XI. corps for support, attacked with the troops at hand. When the crown prince tried to break off the fight it was too late. Both sides were feeding troops into the firing line, as and where they could lay hands on them. Up to 2 P.M. the French fairly held their own, but shortly afterwards their right yielded to the overwhelming pressure of the XI. corps, and by 3.30 it was in full retreat. The centre held on for another hour, but in its turn was compelled to yield, and by 4.30 all organized resistance was at an end. The débris of the French army was hotly pursued by the German divisional squadrons towards Reichshofen, where serious panic showed itself. When at this stage the supports sent by de Failly from Bitche came on the ground they saw the hopelessness of intervention, and retired whence they had come. Fortunately for the French, the German 4th cavalry division, on which the pursuit should have devolved, had been forgotten by the German staff, and did not reach the front before darkness fell. Out of a total of 82,000 within reach of the battlefield, the Germans succeeded in bringing into action 77,500. The French, who might have had 50,000 on the field, deployed only 37,000, and these suffered a collective loss of no less than 20,100; some regiments losing up to 90% and still retaining some semblance of discipline and order.

Under cover of darkness the remnants of the French army escaped. When at length the 4th cavalry division had succeeded in forcing a way through the confusion of the battlefield, all touch with the enemy had been lost, and being without firearms the troopers were checked by the French stragglers in the woods and the villages, and thus failed to establish the true line of retreat of the French. Ultimately the latter, having gained the railway near Lunéville, disappeared from the German front altogether, and all trace of them was lost until they were discovered, about the 26th of August, forming part of the army of Châlons, whither they had been conveyed by rail via Paris. This is a remarkable example of the strategical value of railways to an army operating in its own country.

In the absence of all resistance, the III. army now proceeded to carry out the original programme of marches laid down in Moltke’s memorandum of the 6th of May, and marching on a broad front through a fertile district it reached the line of the Moselle in excellent order about the 17th of August, where it halted to await the result of the great battle of Gravelotte-St Privat.

We return now to the I. army at Saarbrücken. Its position on the morning of the 7th of August gave cause for the gravest anxiety. At daylight a dense fog lay over the country, and through the mist sounds of heavy firing came from the direction of Forbach, where French stragglers had rallied during the night. The confusion on the battlefield was appalling, and the troops in no condition to go forward. Except the 3rd, 5th and 6th cavalry divisions no closed troops were within a day’s march; hence Steinmetz decided to spend the day in reorganizing his infantry, under cover of his available cavalry. But the German cavalry and staff were quite new to their task. The 6th cavalry division, which had bivouacked on the battlefield, sent on only one brigade towards Forbach, retaining the remainder in reserve. The 5th, thinking that the 6th had already undertaken all that was necessary, withdrew behind the Saar, and the 3rd, also behind the Saar, reported that the country in its front was unsuited to cavalry movements, and only sent out a few officers’ patrols. These were well led, but were too few in number, and their reports were consequently unconvincing.

In the course of the day Steinmetz became very uneasy, and ultimately he decided to concentrate his army by retiring the VII. and VIII. corps behind the river on to the I. (which had arrived near Saarlouis), thus clearing the Saarbrücken-Metz road for the use of the II. army. But at this moment Prince Frederick Charles suddenly modified his views. During the 6th of August his scouts had reported considerable French forces near Bitche (these were the 5th, de Failly’s corps), and early in the morning of the 7th he received a telegram from Moltke