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Rh other. By the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union adopted by the Continental Congress in 1777, and in effect in 1781–1789, the states bound themselves in a league of common defence. By the written Constitution, drafted in 1787 and in operation since 1789, a stronger and more centralized union was established—in theory a federal republic formed by the voluntary combination of sovereign states. A common citizenship was recognized for the whole union; but the federal government was to exercise only such powers as were expressly delegated to it (Amendment of 1791). The powers of the central government are entrusted to three distinct authorities—executive, legislative and judicial. The president, elected for a term of four years by electors chosen for that purpose by each state, is the executive head of the republic. The vice-president, ex officio president of the Senate, assumes the presidency in case of resignation or death. Legislative power is vested in a Congress, consisting of two Houses: a Senate, composed of two members elected by each state for a term of six years; and a House of Representatives, consisting of representatives in numbers proportionate to the population of each state, holding their seats for two years. The supreme judicial authority is vested in a Supreme Court, which consists of a chief justice and eight associate justices, all appointed for life by the president, subject to confirmation by the Senate.

The extension of responsible constitutional government by Great Britain to her chief colonies, under a governor or viceregal representative of the crown, has been followed in British North America by the union of the Canadian, maritime and Pacific provinces under a federal government—with a senate, the members of which are nominated by the crown, and a house of commons elected by the different provinces according to their relative population. The governor-general is appointed by the crown for a term of five years, and represents the sovereign in all matters of federal government. The lieutenant-governors of the provinces are nominated by him; and all local legislation is carried on by the provincial parliaments. The remarkable federation of the Dominion of Canada which was thus originated presented the unique feature of a federal union of provinces practically exercising sovereign rights in relation to all local self-government, and sustaining a constitutional autonomy, while cherishing the colonial relationship to Great Britain.

The Commonwealth of (q.v.), proclaimed in 1901, is another interesting example of self-governing states federating into a united whole. There is, however, a striking difference to be observed in the powers of the federal governments of Canada and Australia. The federal parliament of Canada has jurisdiction over all matters not specially assigned to the local legislatures, while the federal parliament of Australia has only such jurisdiction as is expressly vested in it or is not expressly withdrawn from the local legislatures. This jurisdiction is undoubtedly extensive, comprising among others, power to legislate concerning trade and industry, criminal law, taxation, quarantine, marriage and divorce, weights and measures, legal tender, copyrights and patents, and naturalization and aliens. There was also an early attempt to federate the South African colonies, and an act was passed for that purpose (South African Act 1877), but it expired on the 18th of August 1882, without having been brought into effect by the sovereign in council; in 1908, however, the Closer Union movement (see ) ripened, and in 1909 a federating Act was successfully passed.

See also Bluntschli, The Theory of the State; W. Wilson, The State; Wheaton, International Law.

FEDERALIST PARTY, in American politics, the party that organized the national government of the United States under the constitution of 1787. It may be regarded as, in various important respects, the lineal predecessor of the American Whig and Republican parties. The name Federalists (see ) was first given to those who championed the adoption of the Constitution. They brought to the support of that instrument “the areas of intercourse and wealth” (Libby), the influence of the commercial towns, the greater planters, the army officers, creditors and property-holders generally,—in short, of interests that had felt the evils of the weak government of the Confederation,—and also of some few true nationalists (few, because there was as yet no general national feeling), actuated by political principles of centralization independently of motives of expediency and self-interest. Most of the Federalists of 1787–1788 became members of the later Federalist Party.

The Federalist Party, which may be regarded as definitely organized practically from 1791, was led, leaving Washington aside, by (q.v.) and John Adams. A nationalization of the new central government to the full extent warranted by a broad construction of the powers granted to it by the constitution, and a correspondingly strict construction of the powers reserved to the states and the citizens, were the basic principles of Hamilton’s policy. The friends of individual liberty and local government naturally found in the assumption by the central government of even the minimum of its granted powers constant stimulus to their fears (see ); while the financial measures of Hamilton—whose wish for extreme centralization was nowise satisfied by the government actually created in 1787—were calculated to force an immediate and firm assumption by that government, to the limit, of every power it could be held to possess. To the Republicans (Democratic Republicans) they seemed intended to cause a usurpation of powers ungranted. Hence these measures became the issues on which the first American parties were formed. Their effect was supplemented by the division into French and British sympathizers; the Republicans approving the aims and condoning the excesses of the French Revolution, the Federalists siding with British reaction against French democracy. The Federalists controlled the government until 1801. They, having the great opportunity of initiative, organized it in all its branches, giving it an administrative machinery that in the main endures to-day; established the doctrine of national neutrality toward European conflicts (although the variance of Federalist and Republican opinion on this point was largely factitious); and fixed the practice of a liberal construction of the Constitution, —not only by Congress, but above all by the United States Supreme Court, which, under the lead of John Marshall (who had been appointed chief-justice by Pres. John Adams), impressed enduringly on the national system large portions of the Federalist doctrine. These are the great claims of the party to memory. After 1801 it never regained power. In attempts to do so, alike in national and in state politics, it impaired its morale by internal dissension, by intrigues, and by inconsistent factious opposition to Democratic measures on grounds of ultra-strict construction. It took up, too, the Democratic weapon of states’ rights, and in New England carried sectionalism dangerously near secession in 1808, and in 1812–1814, during the movement, in opposition to the war of 1812, which culminated in the Hartford Convention (see ). It lost, more and more, its influence and usefulness, and by 1817 was practically dead as a national party, although in Massachusetts it lingered in power until 1823. It is sometimes said that Federalism died because the Republicans took over its principles of nationality. Rather it fell because its great leaders, John Adams and Alexander Hamilton, became bitter enemies; because neither was even distantly comparable to Jefferson as a party leader; because the party could not hold the support of its original commercial, manufacturing and general business elements; because the party opposed sectionalism to a growing nationalism on the issues that ended in the war of 1812; and, above all, because the principles of the party’s leaders (e.g. of Hamilton) were out of harmony, in various respects, with American ideals. Their conservatism became increasingly a reactionary fear of democracy; indeed, it is not a strained construction of the times to regard the entire Federalist period from the American point of view as reactionary—a reaction against the doctrines of natural rights, individualism, and states’ rights, and the financial looseness of the period of the War of Independence and the succeeding years of the Confederation. The Federalists were charged by the Republicans with being aristocrats and monarchists, and it is certain that their leaders