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 The efforts of 48 American officers, who under Gen. C. P. Stone zealously served Ismail, had entirely failed to overcome Egyptian venality and intrigue; and in spite of the military schools, with a comprehensive syllabus, the only perceptible difference between the Egyptian officer and private in 1879 consisted, according to one of the Americans, in the fact that the first was the product of the harem, and the second of the field. Marshal Marmont, writing in 1839, mentions the capacity of the Egyptians for endurance; and it was tested in 1883, especially in the 2nd Brigade, since its officers (Turks and Egyptians), anxious to excel as drill-masters, worked their men not only from morn till eve, but also by lamplight in the corridors of the barracks. On the 31st March 1883, ten weeks after the arrival of the first draft of recruits, about 5600 men went through the ceremonial parade movements as practised by the British guards in Hyde Park, with unusual precision. The British officers had acquired the words of command in Turkish, as used in the old army, an attempt to substitute Egyptian words having failed owing to lack of crisp, sharp-sounding words. As the Egyptian brigadier, who had spent some years in Berlin, spoke German fluently, and it was also understood by the senior British officers, that language was used for all commands given by the sirdar on that special parade. The British drill-book, minus about one-third of the least serviceable movements, was translated by an English officer, and by 1900 every necessary British official book had been published in English and Arabic, except the new Recruiting Law (1885) and a manufacturing manual, for which French and Arabic editions are in use. The discipline of the old army had been regulated by a translation of part of the Code Napoleon, which was inadequate for an Eastern army, and the sirdar replaced it by the British Army Act of 1881, slightly modified, and printed in Arabic.

The task undertaken by the small body of British officers was difficult. There was not one point in the former administration of the army acceptable to English gentlemen. That there had been no adequate auxiliary departments, without which an army cannot move or be efficient, was comparatively a minor difficulty. To succeed, it was essential that the fellah should be taught that discipline might be strict without being oppressive, that pay and rations would be fairly distributed, that brutal usage by superiors would be checked, that complaints would be thoroughly investigated, and impartial justice meted out to soldiers of all ranks. An epidemic of cholera in the summer of 1883 gave the British officers their first chance of acquiring the esteem and confidence of their men, and the opportunity was nobly utilized. While the patient fellah, resigned to the decrees of the Almighty, saw the ruling Egyptian class hurry away from Cairo, he saw also those of his comrades who were stricken tenderly nursed, soothed in death’s struggles, and in many cases actually washed, laid out and interred by their new self-sacrificing and determined masters. The regeneration of the fellahin army dates from that epidemic.

When the Egyptian Army of the Delta was dispersed at Tell el-Kebir, the khedive had 40,000 troops in the Sudan, scattered from Massawa on the Red Sea to 1200 m. towards the west, and from Wadi Halfa, 1500 m. southward to Wadelai, near Albert Nyanza. These were composed of Turks, Albanians, Circassians and some Sudanese. Ten thousand fellahin, collected in March 1883, mainly from Arabi’s former forces, set out from Duem, 100 m. south of Khartum, in September 1883, under Hicks Pasha, a dauntless retired Indian Army officer, to vanquish the Mahdi. They disappeared in the deserts of Kordofan, where they were destroyed by the Mahdists about 50 m. south of El Obeid. In the wave of successful rebellion, except at Khartum, few of the Egyptian garrisons were killed when the posts fell, long residence and local family ties rendering easy their assimilation in the ranks of the Mahdists.

Baker Pasha, with about 4000 constabulary, who were old soldiers, attempted to relieve Tokar in February 1884. He was attacked by 1200 tribesmen and utterly routed, losing 4 Krupp guns, 2 machine guns and 3000 rifles. Only 1400 Egyptians escaped the slaughter.

The sirdar made an attempt to raise a battalion of Albanians, but the few men obtained mutinied when ordered to proceed to the Sudan, and it was deemed advisable, after the ringleaders had been executed, to abandon the idea, and rely on blacks to stiffen the fellahin. Then the 9th (Sudanese) Battalion was created for service at Suakin, and four others having been successively added, these (with one exception—at Gedaref) have since borne the brunt of all the fighting which has been done by the khedivial troops. The Egyptian troops in the operations near Suakin behaved well; and there were many instances of personal gallantry by individual soldiers. In the autumn of 1884, when a British expedition went up the Nile to endeavour to relieve the heroic Gordon, besieged in Khartum, the Egyptians did remarkably good work on the line of communication from Assiut to Korti, a distance of 800 m., and the training and experience thus gained were of great value in all subsequent operations. The honesty and discipline of the fellah were shown to be undoubtedly of a high order. When the crews of the whale-boats were conveying stores, the forwarding officers tried to keep brandy and such like medical comforts from the European crews, coffee and tea from Canadian voyageurs and sugar from Kroo boys. The only immaculate carrier was the Egyptian. A large sum of specie having failed under British escort to reach Dongola, an equivalent sum was handed to an Egyptian lieutenant of six months’ service, with 10 men, and duly reached its destination.

Twelve years later the standard of honesty was unimpaired, and the British officers had imparted energy and activity into Egyptians of all ranks. The intelligent professional knowledge of the native officers, taught under British gentlemen, and the constant hard work cheerfully rendered by the fellah soldiers, were the main factors of the success achieved at Omdurman on the 2nd of September 1898. The large depots of stores at Assuan, Halfa and Dongola could only be cursorily supervised by British officers, and yet when the stores were received at the advance depot the losses were infinitesimal.

By nature the fellah is unwarlike. Born in the valley of a great river, he resembles in many respects the Bengali, who exists under similar conditions; but the Egyptian has proved capable of greater improvement. He is stronger in frame, and can undergo greater exertion.

Singularly unemotional, he stood steady at Tell el-Kebir after Arabi Pasha and all his officers, from general to subaltern, had fled, and gave way only when decimated by the British field artillery firing case shot. At El Teb, however, in 1884 he allowed himself to be slaughtered by tribesmen formerly despised, and only about one-fourth of the force under General Valentine Baker escaped. Baker Pasha’s force was termed constabulary, yet his men were all old soldiers, though new to their gallant leader and to the small band of their brave but strange British officers. Since that fatal day, however, many of the fellahin have shown they are capable of devoted conduct, and much has been done to raise in the soldiers a sense of self-respect, and, in spite of centuries of oppression, of veracity. The barrack-square drill was smart under the old system, but there was no fire discipline, and all individuality was crushed. Now both are encouraged, and the men, receiving their full rations, are unsurpassable in endurance at work and in marching. All the troops present in the surprise fight when the Dervish force was destroyed at Firket in June 1896 had covered long distances, and one battalion (the 10th Sudanese) accomplished 90 m. within 72 hours, including the march back to railhead immediately after the action. The troops under Colonel Parsons, Royal Artillery, who beat the Dervishes at Gedaref, were so short of British officers that all orders were necessarily given in Arabic and carried to commanders of units by Arabs. While an Egyptian battalion was attacking in line, it was halted to repel a rush from the rear, and front and rear ranks were simultaneously engaged, firing in opposite directions—yet the fellahin were absolutely steady; they shot well and showed no signs of trepidation. On the other hand, neither was there any exultation after their victory. It has been aptly said “the fellah would