Page:EB1911 - Volume 09.djvu/49

 Reports on the Finances of Egypt, by the British agent, yearly from 1888; Convention relative to the Finance of Egypt, signed at London, March 18, 1885; Khedivial decree of the 28th November 1904; Compte général de l’administration des finances, issued yearly at Cairo. Consult also the works of Lord Cromer, Lord Milner, and Sir A. Colvin cited under § History, last section.

The Egyptian Army.

The fellah soldier has been aptly likened to a bicycle, which although incapable of standing up alone, is very useful while under the control of a skilful master. It is generally believed that the successes gained in the time of the Pharaohs were due to foreign legions; and from

Cambyses to Alexander, from the Ptolemies to Antony (Cleopatra), from Augustus to the 7th century, throughout the Arab period, and from Saladin’s dynasty down to the middle of the 13th century, the military power of Egypt was dependent on mercenaries. The Mamelukes (slaves), imported from the eastern borders of the Black Sea and then trained as soldiers, usurped the government of Egypt, and held it till 1517, when the Ottomans began to rule. This form of government, speaking generally, endured till the French invasion at the end of the 18th century. British and Turkish troops drove the French out after an occupation of two years, the British troops remaining till 1803. Then Mehemet Ali, a small tobacconist of Kavala, Macedonia, coming with Albanian mercenaries, made himself governor, and later (1811), by massacring the Mamelukes, became the actual master of the country, and after seven years’ war brought Arabia under Egypt’s rule. He subdued Nubia and Sennar in 1820–22; and then, requiring a larger army, he obtained instructors from France. To them were handed over 1000 Turks and Circassians to be trained as officers, who later took command of 30,000 Sudanese. These died so rapidly in Egypt from pneumonia that Mehemet Ali conscripted over 250,000 fellahin, and in so arbitrary a fashion that many peasants mutilated themselves to avoid the much-dreaded service. The common practice was to place a small piece of nitrate of silver into the eye, which was then kept tightly bandaged till the sight was destroyed. Battalions were then formed of one-eyed men, and of soldiers who, having cut off their right-hand fingers, were made to shoot from the left shoulder. Every man who could not purchase exemption, with the exception of those living in Cairo, Alexandria and Suez, on becoming 19 years old was liable nominally to 12 years’ service; but many men were kept for 30 or 40 years, in spite of constant appeals. Nevertheless the experiment succeeded. The docile, yet robust and hardy peasants, under their foreign leaders, gained an unbroken series of successes in the first Syrian War; and after the bloody battle of Konia (1832), where the raw Turkish army was routed and the grand vizier taken prisoner, it was only European intervention which prevented the Egyptian general, Ibrahim Pasha, from marching unopposed to the Bosphorus. The defeat of the Turkish army at Nizib (Nezeeb or Nisib), in the second Syrian War (1839), showed that it was possible to obtain favourable military results with Egyptians when stiffened by foreigners and well commanded. Ibrahim, the hero of Konia, declared, however, that no native Egyptian ought to rise higher than the rank of sergeant; and in the Syrian campaigns nearly all the officers were Turks or Circassians, as were several non-commissioned officers. In the cavalry and artillery many of the privates were foreigners, numbers of the janissaries who escaped the massacre at Stamboul (1832) having joined Mehemet Ali’s army.

In the reign of Abbas, who succeeded Mehemet Ali, the Egyptian troops were driven from Nejd, and the Wahhabi state recovered its independence. The next viceroy, Said, began as an ardent soldier, but took to agriculture, and at his death (1863) 3000 men only were retained under arms. Ismail, on succeeding, immediately added 27,000 men, and in seven years was able to put 100,000 men, well equipped, in the field. He sent 10,000 men to help to suppress a rebellion in Crete, and conquered the greater part of the (Nile) Sudan; but an expedition of 11,000 men, sent to Abyssinia under Prince Hasan and Rateb Pasha, well equipped with guns and all essentials, was, in two successive disasters (1875 and 1876), practically destroyed. The education of Egyptians in continental cities had not produced the class of leaders who led the fellahin to victory at Konia.

Ismail’s exactions from the Egyptian peasantry reacted on the army, causing discontent; and when he was tottering on the throne he instigated military demonstrations against his own government, and, by thus sapping the foundations of discipline, assisted Arabi’s revolution; the result was the battle of Tell el-Kebir, the British occupation, and the disbandment of the army, which at that time in Egypt proper consisted of 18,000 men. Ismail had collected 500 field-guns, 200 Armstrong cannon, and had created factories of warlike and other stores. These latter were conducted extravagantly, and badly administered.

In January 1883, Major-General Sir Evelyn Wood, V.C., was given £200,000, and directed to spend it in raising a fellahin force of 6000 men for the defence of Egypt. He was assisted at first by 26 officers, amongst whom were two who later became successively sirdars—Colonel

F. Grenfell, commanding a brigade, and Lieutenant H. Kitchener, R.E., second in command of the cavalry regiment. There were four batteries, eight battalions, and a camel company. Each battalion of the 1st infantry brigade had three British mounted officers, Turks and Egyptians holding the corresponding positions in the battalions of the 2nd Brigade. The sirdar selected these native officers from those of Arabi’s followers who had been the least prominent in the recent mutiny; non-commissioned officers who had been drill-instructors in the old army were recalled temporarily, but all the privates were conscripted from their villages. The earlier merciless practice had been in theory abolished by a decree based on the German system, published in 1880; but owing to defective organization, and internal disturbances induced by Khedive Ismail’s follies, the law had not been applied, and the 6000 recruits collected at Cairo in January 1883 represented the biggest and strongest peasants who could not purchase exemption by bribing the officials concerned. The difficulties experienced in applying the 1880 decree were great, but the perseverance of British officers gave the oppressed peasants, in 1885, an equitable law, which has been since improved by the decree of 1900. General considerations later caused the sirdar to allow exemption by payment of (Badalia) £20 before ballot. This tax, which is popular amongst the peasantry, produced in 1906 £E.150,000, and over £250,000 in 1908. This is a marked indication of the increasing prosperity of the fellahin. A portion of the badalia is expended in the betterment of the soldier’s position. He is no longer drafted into the police on completing his army service, but goes free at the end of five years with a gift of £E.20. The sirdar is allowed, moreover, to use £20,000 per annum of the badalia for the improvement of the education of the rank and file. As an experiment the police is now a voluntary service, except in Alexandria and Cairo, for which cities peasants are conscripted for the police under army conditions. The recruiting superintending committee, travelling through districts, supervise every ballot, and work under stringent rules which render systematic bribery difficult. The recruits who draw unlucky numbers at 19 years of age are seldom called up till they are 23, when they are summoned by name and escorted by a policeman to Cairo. To prevent substitution on the journey each recruit wears a string girdle sealed in lead. The periods of service are: with the colours, 5 years; in the reserve, 5 years, during which time they may be called up for police service, manœuvres, &c. The pay is £E.3, 14s. per annum for all services, and the liberal scale of rations of meat, bread and rice remains as before in theory, but in practice the value of pay and food received is greatly enhanced. So also with the pension and promotion regulations. They were in 1882 sufficiently liberal on paper, but had never been carried into effect.