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 stuffing of the ballot boxes or other forms of corruption, when they exist, are owing in large measure to temporary or local causes; and that the tendency of recent years has been towards a decrease in all forms of corruption.

The expenses connected with elections, such as the renting and preparing of the polling-places, the payment of the clerks and other officers who conduct the elections and count the vote, are borne by the community. A candidate therefore is not, as far as the law is concerned, liable to any expense whatever. As a matter of fact he does commonly contribute to the party treasury, though in the case of certain candidates, particularly those for the presidency and for judicial offices, financial contributions are not general. The amount of a candidate’s contribution varies greatly, according to the office sought, the state in which he lives, and his private wealth. On one occasion, in a district in New York, a candidate for Congress is credibly believed to have spent at one election $50,000. On the other hand, in a Congressional election in a certain district in Massachusetts, the only expenditure of one of the candidates was for the two-cent stamp placed on his letter of acceptance. No estimate of the average amount expended can be made. It is, however, the conclusion of Mr Bryce, in his American Commonwealth, that as a rule a seat in Congress costs the candidate less than a seat for a county division in the House of Commons. (See also .)

 ELECTION, in English law, the obligation imposed upon a party by courts of equity to choose between two inconsistent or alternative rights or claims in cases where there is a clear intention of the person from whom he derives one that he should not enjoy both. Thus a testator died seized of property in fee simple and in fee tail—he had two daughters, and devised the fee simple property to one and the entailed property to the other; the first one claimed to have her share of the entailed property as coparcener and also to retain the benefit she took under the will. It was held that she was put to her election whether she would take under the will and renounce her claim to the entailed property or take against the will, in which case she must renounce the benefits she took under the will in so far as was necessary to compensate her sister. As the essence of the doctrine is compensation, a person electing against a document does not lose all his rights under it, but the court will sequester so much only of the benefit intended for him as will compensate the persons disappointed by his election. For the same reason it is necessary that there should be a free and disposable fund passing by the instrument from which compensation can be made in the event of election against the will. If, therefore, a man having a special power of appointment appoint the fund equally between two persons, one being an object of the power and the other not an object, no question of election arises, but the appointment to the person not an object is bad.

Election, though generally arising in cases of wills, may also arise in the case of a deed. There is, however, a distinction to be observed. In the case of a will a clear intention on the part of the testator that he meant to dispose of property not his own must be shown, and parol evidence is not admissible as to this. In the case of a deed, however, no such intention need be shown, for if a deed confers a benefit and imposes a liability on the same person he cannot be allowed to accept the one and reject the other, but this must be distinguished from cases where two separate gifts are given to a person, one beneficial and the other onerous. In such a case no question of election arises and he may take the one and reject the other, unless, indeed, there are words used which make the one conditional on the acceptance of the other.

Election is either express, e.g. by deed, or implied; in the latter case it is often a question of considerable difficulty whether there has in fact been an election or not; each case must depend upon the particular circumstances, but quite generally it may be said that the person who has elected must have been capable of electing, aware of the existence of the doctrine of election, and have had the opportunity of satisfying himself of the relative value of the properties between which he has elected. In the case of infants the court will sometimes elect after an inquiry as to which course is the most advantageous, or if there is no immediate urgency, will allow the matter to stand over till the infant attains his majority. In the cases of married women and lunatics the courts will exercise the right for them. It sometimes happens that the parties have so dealt with the property that it would be inequitable to disturb it; in such cases the court will not interfere in order to allow of election.

 ELECTORAL COMMISSION, in United States history, a commission created to settle the disputed presidential election of 1876. In this election Samuel J. Tilden, the Democratic candidate, received 184 uncontested electoral votes, and Rutherford B. Hayes, the Republican candidate, 163. The states of Florida, Louisiana, Oregon and South Carolina, with a total of 22 votes, each sent in two sets of electoral ballots, and from each of these states except Oregon one set gave the whole vote to Tilden and the other gave the whole vote to Hayes. From Oregon one set of ballots gave the three electoral votes of the state to Hayes; the other gave two votes to Hayes and one to Tilden.

The election of a president is a complex proceeding, the method being indicated partly in the Constitution, and being partly left to Congress and partly to the states. The manner of selecting the electors is left to state law; the electoral ballots are sent to the president of the Senate, who “shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all certificates, and the votes shall then be counted.” Concerning this provision many questions of vital importance arose in 1876: Did the president of the Senate count the votes, the houses being mere witnesses; or did the houses count them, the president’s duties being merely ministerial? Did counting imply the determination of what should be counted, or was it a mere arithmetical process; that is, did the Constitution itself afford a method of settling disputed returns, or was this left to legislation by Congress? Might Congress or an officer of the Senate go behind a state’s certificate and review the acts of its certifying officials? Might it go further and examine into the choice of electors? And if it had such powers, might it delegate them to a commission? As regards the procedure of Congress, it seems that, although in early years the president of the Senate not only performed or overlooked the electoral count but also exercised discretion in some matters very important in 1876, Congress early began to assert power, and, at least from 1821 onward, controlled the count, claiming complete power. The fact, however, that the Senate in 1876 was controlled by the Republicans and the House by the Democrats, lessened the chances of any harmonious settlement of these questions by Congress. The country seemed on the verge of civil war. Hence it was that by an act of the 29th of January 1877, Congress created the Electoral Commission to pass upon the contested returns, giving it “the same powers, if any” possessed by itself in the premises, the decisions to stand unless rejected by the two houses separately. The commission was composed of five Democratic and five Republican Congressmen, two justices of the Supreme Court of either party, and a fifth justice chosen by these four. As its members of the commission the Senate chose G. F. Edmunds of Vermont, O. P. Morton of Indiana, and F. T. Frelinghuysen of New Jersey (Republicans); and A. G. Thurman of Ohio and T. F. Bayard of Delaware (Democrats). The House chose Henry B. Payne of Ohio, Eppa Hunton of Virginia, and Josiah G. Abbott of Massachusetts (Democrats); and George F. Hoar of Massachusetts and James A. Garfield of Ohio (Republicans). The Republican judges were William Strong and Samuel F. Miller; the Democratic, Nathan Clifford and Stephen J. Field. These four chose as the fifteenth member Justice Joseph P. Bradley,