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 various parts of the land.” In spite of Edwards’s able pamphlet, the impression had become widespread that “bodily effects” were recognized by the promoters of the Great Awakening as the true tests of conversion. To offset this feeling Edwards preached at Northampton during the years 1742 and 1743 a series of sermons published under the title of Religious Affections (1746), a restatement in a more philosophical and general tone of his ideas as to “distinguishing marks.” In 1747 he joined the movement started in Scotland called the “concert in prayer,” and in the same year published An Humble Attempt to Promote Explicit Agreement and Visible Union of God’s People in Extraordinary Prayer for the Revival of Religion and the Advancement of Christ’s Kingdom on Earth. In 1749 he published a memoir of David Brainerd; the latter had lived in his family for several months, had been constantly attended by Edwards’s daughter Jerusha, to whom he had been engaged to be married, and had died at Northampton on the 7th of October 1747; and he had been a case in point for the theories of conversion held by Edwards, who had made elaborate notes of Brainerd’s conversations and confessions.

In 1748 there had come a crisis in his relations with his congregation. The Half-Way Covenant adopted by the synods of 1657 and 1662 had made baptism alone the condition to the civil privileges of church membership, but not of participation in the sacrament of the Supper. Edwards’s grandfather and predecessor, Solomon Stoddard, had been even more liberal, holding that the Supper was a converting ordinance and that baptism was a sufficient title to all the privileges of the church. As early as 1744 Edwards, in his sermons on the Religious Affections, had plainly intimated his dislike of this practice. In the same year he had published in a church meeting the names of certain young people, members of the church, who were suspected of reading improper books, and also the names of those who were to be called as witnesses in the case. But witnesses and accused were not distinguished on this list, and the congregation was in an uproar. A great many, fearing a scandal, now opposed an investigation which all had previously favoured. Edwards’s preaching became unpopular; for four years no candidate presented himself for admission to the church; and when one did in 1748, and was met with Edwards’s formal but mild and gentle tests, as expressed in the Distinguishing Marks and later in Qualifications for Full Communion (1749) the candidate refused to submit to them; the church backed him and the break was complete. Even permission to discuss his views in the pulpit was refused him. The ecclesiastical council voted by 10 to 9 that the pastoral relation be dissolved. The church by a vote of more than 200 to 23 ratified the action of the council, and finally a town meeting voted that Edwards should not be allowed to occupy the Northampton pulpit, though he did this on occasion as late as May 1755. He evinced no rancour or spite; his “Farewell Sermon” was dignified and temperate; nor is it to be ascribed to chagrin that in a letter to Scotland after his dismissal he expresses his preference for Presbyterian to Congregational church government. His position at the time was not unpopular throughout New England, and it is needless to say that his doctrine that the Lord’s Supper is not a cause of regeneration and that communicants should be professing Christians has since (very largely through the efforts of his pupil Joseph Bellamy) become a standard of New England Congregationalism.

Edwards with his large family was now thrown upon the world, but offers of aid quickly came to him. A parish in Scotland could have been procured, and he was called to a Virginia church. He declined both, to become in 1750 pastor of the church in Stockbridge and a missionary to the Housatonic Indians. To the Indians he preached through an interpreter, and their interests he boldly and successfully defended by attacking the whites who were using their official position among them to increase their private fortunes. In Stockbridge he wrote the Humble Relation, also called Reply to Williams (1752), which was an answer to Solomon Williams (1700–1776), a relative and a bitter opponent of Edwards as to the qualifications for full communion; and he there composed the treatises on which his reputation as a philosophical theologian chiefly rests, the essay on Original Sin, the Dissertation concerning the Nature of True Virtue, the Dissertation concerning the End for which God created the World, and the great work on the Will, written in four months and a half, and published in 1754 under the title, An Inquiry into the Modern Prevailing Notions Respecting that Freedom of the Will which is supposed to be Essential to Moral Agency.

In 1757, on the death of President Burr, who five years before had married Edwards’s daughter Esther, he reluctantly accepted the presidency of the College of New Jersey (now Princeton University), where he was installed on the 16th of February 1758. Almost immediately afterwards he was inoculated for smallpox, which was raging in Princeton and vicinity, and, always feeble, he died of the inoculation on the 28th of March 1758. He was buried in the old cemetery at Princeton. He was slender and fully six feet tall, and with his oval, gentle, almost feminine face looked the scholar and the mystic.

The Edwardean System.—It is difficult to separate Edwards’s philosophy from his theology, except as the former is contained in the early notes on the Mind, where he says that matter exists only in idea; that space is God; that minds only are real; that in metaphysical strictness there is no being but God; that entity is the greatest and only good; and that God as infinite entity, wherein the agreement of being with being is absolute, is the supreme excellency, the supreme good. It seems certain that these conclusions were independent of Berkeley and Malebranche, and were not drawn from Arthur Collier’s Clavis universalis (1713), with which they have much in common, but were suggested, in part at least, by Locke’s doctrine of ideas, Newton’s theory of colours, and Cudworth’s Platonism, with all of which Edwards was early familiar. But they were never developed systematically, and the conception of the material universe here contended for does not again explicitly reappear in any of his writings. The fundamental metaphysical postulate that being and God are ultimately identical remained, however, the philosophical basis of all his thinking, and reverence for this being as the supreme good remained the fundamental disposition of his mind. That he did not interpret this idea in a Spinozistic sense was due to his more spiritual conception of “being” and to the reaction on his philosophy of his theology. The theological interest, indeed, came in the end to predominate, and philosophy to appear as an instrument for the defence of Calvinism. Perhaps the best criticism of Edwards’s philosophy as a whole is that, instead of being elaborated on purely rational principles, it is mixed up with a system of theological conceptions with which it is never thoroughly combined, and that it is exposed to all the disturbing effects of theological controversy. Moreover, of one of his most central convictions, that of the sovereignty of God in election, he confesses that he could give no account.

Edwards’s reputation as a thinker is chiefly associated with his treatise on the Will, which is still sometimes called “the one large contribution that America has made to the deeper philosophic thought of the world.” The aim of this treatise was to refute the doctrine of free-will, since he considered it the logical, as distinguished from the sentimental, ground of most of the Arminian objections to Calvinism. He defines the will as that by which the “mind chooses anything.” To act voluntarily, he says, is to act electively. So far he and his opponents are agreed. But choice, he holds, is not arbitrary; it is determined in every case by “that motive which as it stands in the view of the mind is the strongest,” and that motive is strongest which presents in the immediate object of volition the “greatest apparent good,” that is, the greatest degree of agreeableness or pleasure. What this is in a given case depends on a multitude of circumstances, external and internal, all contributing to form the “cause” of which the voluntary act and its consequences are the “effect.” Edwards contends that the connexion between cause and effect here is as “sure and perfect” as in the realm of physical nature and constitutes a “moral necessity.” He reduces the opposite doctrine to three assumptions, all of which he shows to be untenable: (1) “a self-determining power in the will”; (2) “indifference, that the mind previous to the act of volition (is) in equilibrio”; (3) “contingence as opposed to  any fixed and certain connexion (of the volition) with some previous ground or reason for its existence.” Although he denies liberty to the will in this sense—indeed, strictly speaking, neither liberty nor necessity, he says, is properly applied to the will, “for the will itself is not an agent that has a will”—he nevertheless insists that the subject willing is a free moral agent, and argues that without the 