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Rh that England was to continue alone. Its essential defect was what might be called insecurity of tenure. Without any

efficient means of self-protection and coercion at its disposal, it had to interfere with the power, privileges and perquisites of a class which had long misgoverned the country. This class, so far as its civilian members were concerned, was not very formidable, because these were not likely to go beyond the bounds of intrigue and passive resistance; but it contained a military element who had more courage, and who had learned their power when Ismail employed them for overturning his constitutional ministry.

Among the mutinous soldiers on that occasion was a fellah officer calling himself Ahmed Arabi the Egyptian. He was not a man of exceptional intelligence or remarkable powers of organization, but he was a fluent speaker, and could exercise some influence over the masses by a rude kind of native eloquence. Behind him were a group of men, much abler than himself, who put him forward as the figurehead of a party professing to aim at protecting the Egyptians from the grasping tyranny of their Turkish and European oppressors. The movement began among the Arab officers, who complained of the preference shown to the officers of Turkish origin; it then expanded into an attack on the privileged position and predominant influence of foreigners, many of whom, it must be confessed, were of a by no means respectable type; finally, it was directed against all Christians, foreign and native. The government, being too weak to suppress the agitation and disorder, had to make concessions, and each concession produced fresh demands. Arabi was first promoted, then made under-secretary for war, and ultimately a member of the cabinet. The danger of a serious rising brought the British and French fleets in May 1882 to Alexandria, and after a massacre (11th of June) had been perpetrated by the Arab mob in that city, the British admiral bombarded the forts (11th of July 1882). The leaders of the national movement prepared to resist further aggression by force. A conference of ambassadors was held in Constantinople, and the sultan was invited to quell the revolt; but he hesitated to employ his troops against Mussulmans who were professing merely to oppose Christian aggression.

(3) Egypt occupied by the British.—At last the British government determined to employ armed force, and invited France to co-operate. The French government declined, and a similar invitation to Italy met with a similar refusal. England therefore, having to act alone, landed troops at Ismailia under Sir Garnet Wolseley, and suppressed the revolt by the battle of Tell-el-Kebir on the 13th of September 1882. The khedive, who had taken refuge in Alexandria, returned to Cairo, and a ministry was formed under Sherif Pasha, with Riaz Pasha as one of its leading members. On assuming office, the first thing it had to do was to bring to trial the chiefs of the rebellion. Had the khedive and Riaz been allowed a free hand, Arabi and his colleagues would have found little mercy. Thanks to the intervention of the British government, their lives were spared. Arabi pleaded guilty, was sentenced to death, the sentence being commuted by the khedive to banishment; and Riaz resigned in disgust. This solution of the difficulty was brought about by Lord Dufferin, then British ambassador at Constantinople, who had been sent to Egypt as high commissioner to adjust affairs and report on the situation. One of his first acts, after preventing the application of capital punishment to the ringleaders of the revolt, was to veto the project of protecting the khedive and his government by means of a Praetorian guard recruited from Asia Minor, Epirus, Austria and Switzerland, and to insist on the principle that Egypt must be governed in a truly liberal spirit. Passing in review all the departments of the administration, he laid down the general lines on which the country was to be restored to order and prosperity, and endowed, if possible, with the elements of self-government for future use.

The laborious task of putting these general indications into a practical shape fell to Sir Evelyn Baring (Lord Cromer), who arrived as consul-general and diplomatic agent, in succession to Sir Edward Malet, in January 1884.

At that moment the situation was singularly like that which had existed on two previous occasions: firstly, when Ismail was deposed; and secondly, when the Dual Control had undermined the existing authority without having any power to enforce its own. For the third time in little more than three years the existing authority had been destroyed and a new one had to be created. But there was one essential difference: the power that had now to reorganize the country possessed in the British army of occupation a support sufficient to command respect. Without that support Sir Evelyn Baring could have done little or nothing; with it he did perhaps more than any other single man could have done. His method may be illustrated by an old story long current in Cairo. Mehemet Ali was said to have appointed as mudir or governor in a turbulent district a young and inexperienced Turk, who asked, “But how am I to govern these people?” “Listen,” replied the pasha; “buy the biggest and heaviest kurbash you can find; hang it up in the centre of the mudirieh, well within your reach, and you will very seldom require to use it.” The British army of occupation was Sir Evelyn’s kurbash; it was well within his reach, as all the world knew, and its simple presence sufficed to prevent disorder and enforce obedience. He had one other advantage over previous English reformers in Egypt: his position towards France was more independent. The Dual Control had been abolished by a khedivial decree of 18th January 1883, and replaced by an English financial adviser. France naturally objected; but having refused to co-operate with England in suppressing the revolt, she could not reasonably complain that her offer of co-operation in the work of reorganization was declined. But though Dual Control was at an end, the Caisse de la Dette remained, and this body was to prove a constant clog on the financial measures of the Egyptian government.

At first the intention of the British government was simply to restore the power of the khedive, to keep his highness for some time in the right path by friendly advice, and to withdraw the British troops as soon as possible. As

Lord Granville explained in a circular to the powers, the position of England in Egypt imposed on her “the duty of giving advice with the object of securing that the order of things to be established shall be of a satisfactory character and possess the elements of stability and progress.” But there was to be no embarking on a general scheme of reforms, which would increase unnecessarily the responsibilities of the protecting power and necessitate the indefinite prolongation of the military occupation. So far, therefore, as the British government had a definite policy in Egypt, it was a politique de replâtrage. Even this policy was not strictly adhered to. Mr Gladstone’s cabinet was as unstable as the public opinion it sought to conciliate. It had its hot fits and its cold fits, and it gave orders now to advance and now to retreat. In the long run circumstances proved too strong for it, and it had to undertake a great deal more than it originally intended. Each little change in the administration engendered a multitude of others, so that the modest attempts at reform were found to be like the letting out of water. A tiny rill gradually became a boisterous stream, and the boisterous stream grew into a great river, which spread to all sections of the administration and ended by inundating the whole country.

Of the numerous questions awaiting solution, the first to claim immediate attention was that of the Sudan. The British government had begun by excluding it from the problem, and by declaring that for events in these

outlying territories it must not be held responsible. In that sphere of activity, therefore, the Egyptian government might do as it thought fit. The principle of limited liability which this attitude assumed was soon found to be utterly untenable. The Sudan was an integral part of the khedive’s dominions, and caused, even in ordinary times, a deficit of