Page:EB1911 - Volume 08.djvu/987

 Preached and practised by Pestalozzi (1746–1827) in Switzerland, the general education of the poor was first made a reality by Prussia after the crushing defeat of Jena. In France and England it remained for nearly three-quarters of the century the work of the Church and other voluntary agencies, though aided by the state. Finally a state system of schools has been more or less fully set up in every state of western Europe and in America, and subjected to more or less state regulation and control. Equally marked has been the growing care for the scholastic education of girls as well as boys, though only in America are the two regarded as practically identical in form and content.

Thus the 19th century saw the final working out of the idea that the state should be substituted for the Church as the official agent of education, an idea which had its roots in the Renaissance conception of the right of man to direct his life apart from theological determinations. The more direct outcome of the same idea is apparent in the absolute liberty with which the presuppositions of knowledge are questioned, and the maxim of Descartes—to prove everything by the reason and to accept nothing which fails to stand the test—is acted upon. No greater contrast is possible than that between the medieval student and the modern searcher after truth.

The influence of the same spirit has wrought an equally momentous change in the methods of instruction. The impetus given by the exaggerated doctrine of Rousseau to the view that the nature of the child should determine the means of education, led to more thorough-going attempts than had hitherto been made to base educational method on a knowledge of child psychology. Pestalozzi and Froebel (1782–1852), by their insistence on the need of educating a child through his own activity, and by their widespread influence, made the new view of method an actuality. The influence of Rousseau has, thus, passed into modern educational practice in a form that, in its essence, is true, though in practice it has shown itself apt to run into the same excess of emphasis on impulse and feeling which vitiated the teaching of Rousseau himself. The influence of Herbart (1776–1841) has tended to counteract this. The essence of Herbartianism is that mental life consists of presentations, or reactions of the mind on the environment, and that will springs from the circle of thought thus developed. The emphasis is therefore placed on intellect and instruction while in Froebelianism it is placed on spontaneous activity and on the arrangement of the environment. Each exaggerates the function of the one factor in concrete experience which it makes the centre of interest, and each is tinged with the individualistic conception of life which characterized the 18th and early 19th century.

The most marked change in the outward aspect of education has been the modification of the curriculum of school and university by the introduction of various branches of natural science. Conjointly with this has been much increase of specialization, and that not only in the university but in the school. There is no longer a universally recognized circle of knowledge constituting a liberal education preparatory to specialist studies, as there was in the middle ages. Nor is there general agreement as to what such educational institutions as schools and universities should attempt to do, or even as to the end that should be sought by education as a whole. Nor can agreement on such points be expected while men differ widely as to the meaning and purpose of life. The work of the organization of the material means of education has largely been accomplished by the civilized world: that of determining the true theory and practice of the educative process itself is still incomplete. To that, both discussion of the philosophy of life and of the relative values in life, of various kinds of experience and experiment in the light of the conclusions reached, are needed. The problem will never be absolutely solved, for that would imply an absolutely best education irrespective of conditions, but its practical solution will be reached when a true adjustment is made between the process of education and the life for which that education is intended to be a preparation.

A statement of the principles commonly recognized by modern communities as governing the action of the state in relation to education may facilitate at the outset a clearer understanding of the problems which the organization of public education presents. The cardinal doctrine of state interference in the educational domain is universally accepted by all the great nations of the modern world; and in regard to its extent and limits a large measure of agreement has now been reached.

In the first place, it is recognized as the duty of the state to insist upon a certain minimum of education for every future citizen. This does not necessitate a monopoly of education on the part of the state, such as was claimed by the Napoleonic despotism under the traditional influence (it would seem) of the old authoritative Gallo-Roman tradition, transformed in its outward manifestation but not in its inward spirit by the French Revolution. Such a monopoly would be plainly repugnant to the spirit of Anglo-Saxon individualism, and it is interesting to note that attempts to reassert it have in recent times been repudiated in republican France by some of the best exponents of modern free thought, as an infringement of personal liberty not calculated to justify itself by any corresponding public gain. Nevertheless, the recognition of this primary duty of the state plainly implies a state system of at least elementary education. The masses of the industrial population cannot afford the necessary minimum of instruction which the public interest demands, and private and voluntary effort cannot efficiently supply the want resulting from the unequal distribution of wealth. But it is in the nature of things that, so far as private effort attempts anything in this direction, it should be motived in the main by religion and associated with the great historical religious organizations; thus it comes about that the moment the state steps in to make good the deficiency of voluntary effort a fruitful and embittering source of difficulty and friction is disclosed. Hence, in England, the history of public elementary education since the beginning of the 19th century has been very largely the history of what is called the religious difficulty. Here we find ourselves in the region of acute controversy in which it is useless to do more than note empirically the various solutions adopted by different states. Perhaps all that can safely be indicated as commanding universal acceptance is the principle that the state must not impose upon an individual citizen in the person of his child any form of religious instruction to which he conscientiously objects. Modern controversies show the difficulty of applying even this rudimentary principle to the complicated circumstances of a free community split up into a number of groups differing profoundly in religious sentiment, and zealous each for the recognition of its own ideal within the common system. So far, however, as secular instruction (i.e. the teaching of other subjects than religion) is concerned it is now generally accepted that the elementary minimum must be both compulsory and free for every individual child whose parents will not or cannot (as the case may be) provide such instruction for it efficiently elsewhere than in the state-supported schools.

Next, the action of the modern state cannot stop short at elementary education. The principle of “the career open to talent” is no longer a matter of abstract humanitarian theory, a fantastical aspiration of revolutionary dreamers; for the great industrial communities of the modern world it is a cogent practical necessity imposed by the fierce international competition which prevails in the arts and industries of life. The nation that is not to fail in the struggle for commercial success, with all that this implies for national life and civilization, must needs see that its industries are fed with a constant supply of workers adequately equipped in respect both of general intelligence and technical training.

On political grounds too, the increasing democratization of