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 success does not attend wisdom, knowledge and skill; men are like fish taken in a net or birds caught in a snare.

3. Human life, Koheleth declares, is unsatisfying. He inquired, he says, into everything that is done by men under the sun (i. 12-16): God has inflicted on men a restless desire for movement and work, yet life is but a catalogue of fruitless struggles. He gives a number of illustrations. In his character of king he tried all the bodily pleasures of life (ii. 1-11): he had houses, vineyards, gardens, parks, ponds, forests, servants, flocks and herds, treasures of gold and silver, singers, wives; all these he set himself to enjoy in a rational way—indeed, he found a certain pleasure in carrying out his designs, but, when all was done, he surveyed it only to see that it was weary and unprofitable. Dropping the rôle of Solomon and speaking as an observer of life, the author declares (iv. 4) that the struggle for success is the result of rivalry among men, which has no worthy outcome. The securing of riches is a fallacious achievement, for often wealth perishes by some accident (v. 13 f.), or its possessor is unable to enjoy it (vi. 1-3a), or he has no one to whom to leave it, and he cannot keep it—naked man comes into the world, naked he goes out. He does not consider the possibility of deriving enjoyment from wealth by helping the poor or encouraging learning (this latter, indeed, he looks on as vanity), and in general he recognizes no obligation on the part of a man to his fellows. A noteworthy survival of an old belief is found in vi. 3: though a man have the great good fortune to live long and to have many children, yet, if he have not proper burial the blank darkness of an untimely birth is better than he: this latter is merely the negation of existence; the former, it appears to be held, is positive misfortune, the loss of a desirable place in Sheol, though elsewhere (ix. 5) existence in Sheol is represented as the negation of real life. It is not necessary to suppose that the writer has here any particular case in mind.

If wealth be thus a vain thing, yet a sage might be supposed to find satisfaction in wisdom, that is, practical good sense and sagacity; but this also the author puts aside as bringing no lasting advantage, since a wise man must finally give up the fruit of his wisdom to someone else, who may be a fool, and in any case the final result for both fools and wise men is the same—both are forgotten (ii. 12-23). A particular instance is mentioned (ix. 13-15) of a beleaguered city saved by a wise man; but the man happened to be poor, and no one remembered him. The whole constitution of society, in fact, seems to the sage a lamentable thing: the poor are oppressed, the earth is full of their cries, and there is no helper (iv. 1); strange social upheavals may be seen: the poor set in high places, the rich cast down, slaves on horseback, princes on foot (x. 5-7). He permits himself a sweeping generalization (vii. 25-28): human beings as a rule are bad: one may occasionally find a good man, never a good woman—woman is a snare and a curse. He (or an editor) adds (vii. 29) that this condition of things is due to social development: man was created upright (Gen. i. 27; Enoch lxix. 11), but in the course of history has introduced corrupting complications into life.

4. The natural outcome of these experiences of the author is that he cannot recognize a moral government of the world. He finds, like Job, that there are good men who die prematurely notwithstanding their goodness, and bad men who live long notwithstanding their badness (vii. 15), though long life, it is assumed, is one of the great blessings of man’s lot; and in general there is no moral discrimination in the fortunes of men (viii. 14, ix. 2).

5. There is no sacredness or dignity in man or in human life: man has no pre-eminence over beasts, seeing that he and they have the same final fate, die and pass into the dust, and no one knows what becomes of the spirit, whether in man’s case it goes up to heaven, and in the case of beasts goes down into Sheol—death is practically the end-all; and so poor a thing is life that the dead are to be considered more fortunate than the living, and more to be envied than either class is he who never came into existence (iv. 2, 3). It is a special grievance that the wicked when they die are buried with pomp and ceremony, while men who have acted well are forgotten in the city (viii. 10).

6. That the author does not believe in a happy or active future life appears in the passage (iv. 2, 3) quoted above. The old Hebrew view of the future excluded from Sheol the common activities of life and also the worship of the national god (Isa. xxxviii. 18); he goes even beyond this in his conception of the blankness of existence in the underworld. The living, he says, at least know that they shall die, but the dead know nothing—the memory of them, their love, hate and envy, perishes, they have no reward, no part in earthly life (ix. 5, 6); there is absolutely no knowledge and no work in Sheol (ix. 10). His conclusion is that men should do now with all their might what they have to do; the future of man’s vital part, the spirit, is wholly uncertain.

7. His conception of God is in accord with these views. God for him is the creator and ruler of the world, but hardly more; he is the master of a vast machine that grinds out human destinies without sympathy with man and without visible regard for what man deems justice—a being to be acknowledged as lord, not one to be loved. There can thus be no social contact between man and God, no communion of soul, no enthusiasm of service. Moral conduct is to be regulated not by divine law (of this nothing is said) but by human experience. The author’s theism is cold, spiritless, without influence on life.

If now the question be asked what purpose or aim a man can have, seeing that there is nothing of permanent value in human work, an answer is given which recurs, like a refrain, from the beginning to the end of the book, and appears to be from the hand of the original author: after every description of the vanity of things comes the injunction to enjoy such pleasures as may fall to one’s lot (ii. 24, 25, iii. 12, 13, 22, v. 18, 19, viii. 15, ix. 7-10, xi. 7-xii. 7). Elsewhere (ii.), it is true, it is said that there is no lasting satisfaction in pleasure; but the sage may mean to point out that, though there is no permanent outcome to life, it is the part of common-sense to enjoy what one has. The opportunity and the power to enjoy are represented as being the gift of God; but this statement is not out of accord with the author’s general position, which is distinctly theistic. All the passages just cited, except the last (xi. 7-xii. 7), are simple and plain, but the bearing of the last is obscured by interpolations. Obviously the purpose of the paragraph is to point out the wisdom of enjoying life in the time of youth while the physical powers are fresh and strong, and the impotency of old age has not yet crept in. Omitting xi. 8c, 9b, 10b, xii. 1a, the passage will read: “Life is pleasant in the bright sunshine—however long a man may live, he must be cheerful always, only remembering that dark days will come. Let the young man enjoy all the pleasures of youth, putting away everything painful, before the time comes when his bodily powers decay and he can enjoy nothing.” To relieve the apparent Epicureanism of this passage, an editor has inserted reminders of the vanity of youthful pleasures, and admonitions to remember God and His judgment. The author, however, does not recommend dissipation, and does not mean to introduce a religious motive—he offers simply a counsel of prudence. The exhortation to remember the Creator in the days of youth, though it is to be retained in the margin as a pious editorial addition, here interrupts the line of thought. In xii. 1a some critics propose to substitute for “remember thy Creator” the expression of xi. 9, “let thy heart cheer thee”; but the repetition is improbable. Others would read: “remember thy cistern” (Bickell), or “thy well” (Haupt), that is, thy wife. The wife is so called in Prov. v. 15-19 in an elaborate poetical figure (the wife as a source of bodily pleasure), in which the reference is clear from the context; but there is no authority, in the Old Testament or in other literature of this period, for