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 their own church’s authoritative teachings are concerned. But can a historian separate the opinions which rose to authority in the church from the other opinions which succumbed? Or the accepted modifications of a theory from those which were rejected? Again, can we substitute church authority for that which is always the background of “dogma” as interpreted from inside—divine authority? Or, again, can we say definitely which doctrines are “enforced” in Protestant communions and so are “dogmas”? It has even been asserted by A. Schweizer (Christliche Glaubenslehre nach prot. Grundsätzen, 1863–1872) that Protestantism ought not to speak of dogmas at all, except as things of its imperfect past. And historically it seems plain that—since the age of Protestant scholasticism—there has been nothing in Protestant church life to which the name “dogma” can be assigned, without dropping a good deal of its original connotation. Dogma is no longer held to be of immediate divine authority. Hence Catholic, and scientific or historical, definitions of dogma are on different planes. They never properly meet.

4. A. Harnack varies in his usage. He is not prepared to exclude the great medieval pronouncements, or the modern Roman Catholic definitions, from the list of dogmas; but on the whole he prefers to keep in view “one historical species”—Loofs suggests that he ought perhaps rather to say one individual type—that greatest group of Christian dogmas which “was created by the Greek spirit upon the soil of the gospel” (Hist. of Dogma, Eng. tr., vol. i. pp. 17, 21, 22). Thus Harnack agrees with Catholic theologians in holding that, in the fullest sense, there is no dogma except the Catholic. He differs, of course, in holding dogma to be obsolete now. While Protestants, he thinks, have undermined it by a deeper conception of faith, Roman Catholics have come to attach more value to obedience and “implicit belief” than to knowledge; and even the Eastern Church lives to-day by the cultus more than by the vision of supernatural truth. Again, Harnack gravely differs from Catholic dogmatists in assigning a historical origin to what in their view is essentially divine—supernatural in origin, supernatural even in its declaration by the church. If they do not deny that Greek philosophy has entered into Christian doctrine, they consider it a colourless medium used in fixing the contents of revelation. In all this, Harnack speaks from a point of view of his own. He is no friend of Catholicism or of dogma. Perhaps his detachment makes for clearness of thought; Loofs’s friendliness towards dogma, but in a much humbler sense than the Catholic, involves the risk of confusion.

Both Loofs and Harnack contrast with “dogma” the work of individual thinkers, calling the latter “theology.” Hence they and other authorities wish to see “History of Dogma” supplemented by “Histories of Theology.” Our usual English phrase “History of Doctrine” ignores that distinction.

5. A place must be made for the definition proposed by a philosopher, J. M. E. McTaggart. In Some Dogmas of Religion (1906), he uses “dogma” of affirmations, whether supported by reasoning or merely asserted, if they claim “metaphysical” value, metaphysics being defined as “the systematic study of the ultimate nature of reality.” Briefly, a dogma is what claims ultimate, not relative, truth. This agrees with one feature in ordinary literary usage—the contrast between “dogmatizing” and suspending judgment, or taking refuge in conjecture. But it ignores another quality marked out in common speech—that in respect of which “dogmatism” is opposed to proof. Also it omits the political or social reference so much insisted on by Loofs and others. There are materials for misunderstanding here.

6. A very different view is implied in the symbolo-fidéisme of Athanase Sabatier and some other French Protestants: religious dogma consists of symbols in contrast to a scientific gnosis of reality. This is a radical version of the early Protestant idea of faith, and yields a theory of what in English we call “doctrine.” More precisely, it is a theory of what doctrine ought to be, or a deeper analysis of its nature; it is not a statement of what doctrine has been held to be in the past. And therefore the definition does not proceed from historical scholarship. Nor yet does it throw light upon “dogma,” if dogma is to be distinguished—somehow—from doctrine.

 DOGMATIC THEOLOGY, the name usually given in modern times to the systematic study of Christian doctrine or of dogma in the widest sense possible (see ). Among the many terms used in the early days of Protestant theology to denote the great systems, three deserve special notice—Thetic Theology, Positive Theology, Dogmatic Theology. “Thetic theology” is connected with academic life. It recalls the literal and original meaning of graduation “theses,” also Martin Luther’s memorable theses and the replies made to him. “Thetic theology,” a name now obsolete, naturally included the whole of doctrine, i.e. whatever would be argued for or against; and “dogmatic theology” came into use absolutely as a synonymous expression. “Positive theology” is also a term employed by Petau (De theologicis dogmatibus, 1644–1650), and more or less current even to-day in Roman Catholic scholarship (e.g. Joseph Turmel, Histoire de la théologie positive, 1906). “Dogmatic theology” proved to have most vitality in it. After some partial precedents of early date (e.g. F. Turrianus—one of the papal theologians at the Council of Trent,—Dogmaticus (liber?) de Justificatione, 1557), the title was used in 1659 by the Lutheran Lukas Friedrich Reinhard (1623–1688), professor of theology at Altdorf (Synopsis theologiae dogmaticae, eds. 1659, 1660, 1661), and his influence is already seen on the Reformed theologian Andreas van Essen (Essenius, 1618–1677), who, in 1659, published his Systematis theologiae pars prior, the tomus secundus in 1661, but Systematis dogmatici tomus tertius et ultimus in 1665. The same author published a shorter Compendium theologiae dogmaticum in 1669. A. M. Fairbairn holds that it was the fame of Petau which gave currency to the new coinage “dogmatic theology”; and though the same or kindred phrases had been used repeatedly by writers of less influence since Reinhard and Essenius, F. Buddeus (Institutiones theol. dogmat., 1723; Compendium, 1728) is held to have given the expression its supremacy. Noël Alexandre, the Gallican divine, possibly introduced it in the Roman Catholic Church (1693; Theologia dogmatica et moralis). Both Roman Catholic and Protestant authorities agree that the expression was connected with the new habit of distinguishing dogmatics from Christian ethics or moral theology, though A. Schweizer denies this of Reinhard. In another direction dogmas and dogmatic theology were also contrasted with truths of reason and natural theology. F. E. D. Schleiermacher, in his Kurze Darstellung des theologischen Studiums, and again in his great System, Der christliche Glaube dargestellt, ingeniously proposed to treat dogmatic as an historical statement, or report, of beliefs held in