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 the particular contempts arising with reference to proceedings before the division; but the king’s bench division, in the exercise of the supervisory authority inherited from the old court of king’s bench as custos morum, also from time to time deals with acts constituting interference with justice in other inferior courts whether of record or not. The nature and limits of this jurisdiction after much discussion have been defined by decisions in 1903 and 1905 in attempts to try by newspapers cases under inquiry by justices or awaiting trial at assizes or quarter sessions. The exercise of this authority in the king’s bench division, being in a criminal cause or matter, is not the subject of appeal to any higher court.

Inferior courts of record have, as a general rule, power to punish only those contempts which are committed in facie curiae or consist in disobedience to the lawful orders or judgments of the court. For instance, a county court may summarily punish persons who insult the judge or any officer of the court or any juror or witness, or wilfully interrupt the proceedings, or misbehave in the court-house (County Court Act 1888, s. 162), and may also attack persons who having means refuse to comply with an order to pay money, or refuse to comply with an order to deliver up a specific chattel or disobey an injunction. A court of quarter sessions has at common law a like power as to contempts in facie curiae and is said to have power to punish its officials for contempt in non-attendance or neglect of duty.

Contempt of court is a misdemeanour and is punishable by fine and imprisonment or either at discretion. The offence may be tried summarily, or may be prosecuted on information or on indictment as was done in the case of the Weekly Dispatch already mentioned. The prerogative

of pardon extends to all contempts of court which are dealt with by a sentence of clearly punitive character; but it is doubtful whether it extends to committals for disobedience to orders made in aid of the execution of a civil judgment.

Contempt is usually dealt with summarily by the court contemned in the case of contempt in facie curiae. The offender may be instantly apprehended and without further proof or examination fined or sent to prison. In the case of other contempts the High Court not only can deal with contempts affecting itself, but can also intervene summarily to protect inferior courts from contempts. This jurisdiction was asserted and exercised in the Moat Farm case (1903) and the South Wales Post case (1905) already mentioned.

Except in cases of contempt in facie curiae evidence on oath as to the alleged contempt must be laid before the court, and application made for the “committal” or “attachment” of the offender. The differences between the two modes are technical rather than substantial.

The procedure for dealing with contempt of court varies somewhat according as the contempt consists in disobeying an order of the High Court made in a civil cause, or consists in interference with the course of justice by persons not present in court nor parties to the cause. In the first class of cases the court proceeds by order of committal or giving leave to issue writ of attachment. In either case the person said to be in contempt must have full notice of the proposed motion and of the grounds on which he is said to be in contempt; and the rules regulating such proceedings must be strictly complied with (R. v. Tuck, 1906, 2 Ch. 692). In proceedings on the crown side of the king’s bench division it is still usual to apply in the first place for a rule nisi for leave to attach the alleged offender who is given an opportunity of explaining, excusing or justifying the incriminated acts. It is essential that before punishment the alleged offender should have had full notice as to the specific offence charged and opportunity of answering to it. The king’s bench procedure is that generally used for interference with the due course of criminal justice or disobedience to prerogative writs such as mandamus.

An order of committal is an order in execution specifying the nature of the detention to be suffered, or the penalty to be paid. The process of attachment merely brings the accused into court; he is then required to answer on oath interrogatories administered to him, so that the court may be better informed of the circumstances of the contempt. If he can clear himself on oath he is discharged; if he confesses the court will punish him by fine or imprisonment, or both, at its discretion. But in very many cases on proper apology and submission, and undertaking not to repeat the contempt, and payment of costs, the court allows the proceedings to drop without proceeding to fine or imprison.

From time to time proposals have been made to deprive the superior courts of the power to deal summarily with contempts not committed in facie curiae, and to require proceedings on other charges for contempt to go before a jury. This distinction has already been made in some British colonies, e.g. British Guiana, by an ordinance of 1900 (No. 31). Recent decisions in England have so fully defined the limits of the offence and declared the practice of the courts that it would probably only result in undue licence of the press if the power now carefully and judicially exercised of dealing summarily with journalistic interference with the ordinary course of justice were taken away and the delay involved in submitting the case to a jury were made inevitable. The courts now only act in clear cases, and in cases of doubt can always send the question to a jury. The experience of other countries makes it undesirable to part with the summary remedy so long as it is in the hands of a trusted judicature.

 CONTI, PRINCES OF. The title of prince of Conti, assumed by a younger branch of the house of Condé, was taken from Conti-sur-Selles, a small town about 20 m. S.W. of Amiens, which came into the Condé family by the marriage of Louis of Bourbon, first prince of Condé, with Eleanor de Roye in 1551.

(1558–1614), the third son of this marriage, was given the title of marquis de Conti, and between 1581 and 1597 was elevated to the rank of a prince. Conti, who belonged to the older faith, appears to have taken no part in the wars of religion until 1587, when his distrust of Henry, third duke of Guise, caused him to declare against the League, and to support Henry of Navarre, afterwards King Henry IV. of France. In 1589 after the murder of Henry III., king of France, he was one of the two princes of the blood who signed the declaration recognizing Henry IV. as king, and he continued to support Henry, although on the death of Charles cardinal de Bourbon in 1590 he himself was mentioned as a candidate for the throne. In 1605 Conti, whose first wife Jeanne de Cöeme, heiress of Bonnétable, had died in 1601, married the beautiful and witty Louise Marguerite (1574–1631), daughter of Henry duke of Guise and Catherine of Cleves, whom, but for the influence of his mistress Gabrielle d’Estrées, Henry IV. would have made his queen. Conti died in 1614. His only child Marie having predeceased him in 1610, the title lapsed. His widow followed the fortunes of Marie de’ Medici, from whom she received many marks of favour, and was secretly married to (q.v.), who joined her in conspiring against Cardinal Richelieu. Upon the exposure of the plot the cardinal exiled her to her estate at Eu, near Amiens, where she died. The princess wrote Aventures de la cour de Perse, in which, under the veil of fictitious scenes and names, she tells the history of her own time.

In 1629 the title of prince de Conti was revived in favour of (1629–1666), second son of Henry II. of