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 27. 4 (Pericles’ motive for the introduction of the dicasts’ pay). But while the object (, c. 6) and the date of this oligarchical pamphlet (for the date cf. Plutarch’s Solon, c. 15  , which points to a time when Conon, Alcibiades and Callias were prominent in public life) are fairly certain, the authorship is quite uncertain, as is also its relationship to another source of importance, viz. that from which are derived the accounts of the Four Hundred and the Thirty. The view taken of the character and course of these revolutions betrays a strong bias in favour of Theramenes, whose ideal is alleged to have been the . It has been maintained, on the one hand, that this last source (the authority followed in the accounts of the Four Hundred and the Thirty) is identical with the oligarchical pamphlet, and, on the other, that it is none other than the Atthis of Androtion. The former hypothesis is improbable. In favour of the latter two arguments may be adduced. In the first place, Androtion’s father, Andron, was one of the Four Hundred, and took Theramenes’ side. Secondly, the precise marks of time, which are characteristic of the Atthis, are conspicuous in these chapters. In view, however, of the fact that Androtion in his political career showed himself not only a democrat, but a democrat of the extreme school, the hypothesis must be pronounced untenable.

Value.—It is by no means easy to convey a just impression of the value of Aristotle’s work as an authority for the constitutional history of Athens. In all that relates to the practice of his own day Aristotle’s authority is final. There can be no question, therefore, as to the importance, or the trustworthy character, of the Second Part. But even here a caution is necessary. It must be remembered that its authority is final for the 4th century only, and that we are not justified in arguing from the practice of the 4th century to that of the 5th, unless corroborative evidence is available. In the First Part, however, where he is treating of the institutions and practice of a past age, Aristotle’s authority is very far from being final. An analysis of this part of the work discloses his dependence, in a remarkable degree, upon his sources. Occasionally he compares, criticizes or combines; as a rule he adheres closely to the writer whom he is using. There is no evidence, either of independent inquiry, or of the utilization of other sources than literary ones. Where “original documents” are quoted, or referred to, as e.g. in the history of the Four Hundred, or of the Thirty, it is probable that he derived them from a previous writer. For the authority of Aristotle we must substitute, therefore, the authority of his sources; i.e. the value of any particular statement will vary with the character of the source from which it comes. For the history of the 5th century the passages which come from Androtion’s Atthis carry with them a high degree of authority. It by no means follows, however, that a statement relating to earlier times is to be accepted simply because it is derived from the same source. And in passages which are derived from other sources than the Atthis a much lower degree of authority can be claimed, even for statements relating to the 5th century. The supremacy of the Areopagus after the Persian Wars, the policy attributed to Aristides (c. 24), and the association of Themistocles with Ephialtes, are cases in point. Nor must the reader expect to find in the Constitution a great work, in any sense of the term. The style, it is true, is simple and clear, and the writer’s criticisms are sensible. But the reader will look in vain for evidence of the philosophic insight which makes the Politics, even at the present day, the best text-book of political philosophy. It is perhaps hardly too much to say that there is not a single great idea in the whole work. He will look in vain, too, for any consistent view of the history of the constitution as a whole, or for any adequate account of its development. He will find occasional misunderstandings of measures, and confusions of thought. There are appreciations which it is difficult to accept, and inaccuracies which it is difficult to pardon. There are contradictions which the author has overlooked, and there are omissions which are unaccountable. Yet, in spite of such defects, the importance of the Constitution can hardly be exaggerated. Its recovery has rendered obsolete any history of the Athenian constitution that was written before the year 1891. Before this date our knowledge was largely derived from the statements of scholiasts and lexicographers which had not seldom been misunderstood. The recovery of the Constitution puts us for the first time in possession of the evidence. To appreciate the difference that has been made by its recovery, it is only necessary to compare what we now know of the reforms of Cleisthenes with what we formerly knew. It is much of it evidence that needs a careful process of weighing and sifting before it can be safely used; but it is, as a rule, the best, or the only evidence. The First Part may be less trustworthy than the Second; it is not less indispensable to the student of constitutional history.

.—A conspectus of the literature of the Constitution complete down to the end of 1892 is given in Sandys p. lxvii., and, though less complete, down to the beginning of 1895 in Busolt, Griechische Geschichte, 2nd ed. vol. ii. p. 15. In the present article only the most important editions, works or articles are mentioned.

Editions of the text: Editio princeps, ed. by F. G. Kenyon, 30th January 1891, with commentary. Autotype facsimile of the papyrus (1891). Aristotelis , ed. G. Kaibel et U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (Berlin, Weidmann, 1891). Aristotelis qui fertur  recensuerunt H. van Herwerden et J. van Leeuwen (Leiden, 1891). Teubner text, ed. by F. Blass (Leipzig, 1892). Edition of the text without commentary by Kenyon.

Most of these have passed through several editions. The fullest commentary is that contained in the edition of the text by J. E. Sandys (London, 1893). The best translations are those of Kenyon, in English, and of Kaibel and Kiessling, in German.

Works dealing with the subject: Bruno Keil, Die Solonische Verfassung nach Aristoteles (Berlin, 1892); G. Gilbert, Constitutional Antiquities of Sparta and Athens (Eng. trans., 1895); U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Aristoteles und Athen (2 vols., Berlin, 1893), a work of great importance, in spite of many unsound conclusions; E. Meyer, Forschungen, vol. ii. pp. 406 ff. (the section dealing with the Four Hundred is especially valuable). Articles: R. W. Macan, Journal of Hellenic Studies (April 1891); R. Nissen, Rheinisches Museum (1892), p. 161; G. Busolt, Hermes (1898), pp. 71 ff.; O. Seeck, “Quellenstudien zu des Aristoteles’ Verfassungsgeschichte Athens,” in Lehmann’s Beiträge zur alten Geschichte, vol. iv. pp. 164 and 270.

CONSUETUDINARY (Med. Lat. consuetudinarius, from consuetudo, custom), customary, a term used especially of law based on custom as opposed to statutory or written law. As a noun “consuetudinary” (Lat. consuetudinarius, sc. liber) is the name given to a ritual book containing the forms and ceremonies used in the services of a particular monastery, cathedral or religious order.

 CONSUL (in Gr. generally , a shortened form of  , i.e. praetor maximus), the title borne by the two highest of the ordinary magistrates of the whole Roman community during the republic. In the imperial period these magistrates had ceased practically to be the heads of the state, but their technical position remained unaltered. (For the modern commercial office of consul see the separate article below.)

The consulship arose with the fall of the ancient monarchy (see further : History, II. “The Republic”). The Roman reverence for the abstract conception of the magistracy, as expressed in the imperium and the auspicia, led to the preservation of the regal power weakened only by external limitations. The two new officials who replaced the king bore the titles of leaders (praetores) and of judges (judices; cf. Cicero, De legibus, iii. 3. 8, “regio imperio duo sunto iique a praeeundo judicando . . . praetores judices . . . appellamino”). But the new fact of colleagueship caused a third title to prevail, that of consules or “partners,” a word probably derived from consalio on the analogy of praesul and exul (Mommsen, Staatsrecht, ii. p. 77, n. 3). This first example of the collegiate principle assumed the form that soon became familiar in the Roman commonwealth. Each of the pair of magistrates could act up to the full powers of the imperium; but the dissent of his colleague rendered his decision or his action null and void. At the same time the principle of a merely annual tenure of office was insisted on. The two magistrates at the close of their year of office were bound to transmit their power to successors; and these successors whom they nominated were obliged to seek the suffrages of the