Page:EB1911 - Volume 06.djvu/491

 CLAYTON-BULWER TREATY, a famous treaty between the United States and Great Britain, negotiated in 1850 by John M. Clayton and Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer (Lord Dalling), in consequence of the situation created by the project of an interoceanic canal across Nicaragua, each signatory being jealous of the activities of the other in Central America. Great Britain had large and indefinite territorial claims in three regions—Belize or British Honduras, the Mosquito Coast and the Bay Islands. On the other hand, the United States, without territorial claims, held in reserve, ready for ratification, treaties with Nicaragua and Honduras, which gave her a certain diplomatic vantage with which to balance the de facto dominion of Great Britain. Agreement on these points being impossible and agreement on the canal question possible, the latter was put in the foreground. The resulting treaty had four essential points. It bound both parties not to “obtain or maintain” any exclusive control of the proposed canal, or unequal advantage in its use. It guaranteed the neutralization of such canal. It declared that, the intention of the signatories being not only the accomplishment of “a particular object”—i.e. that the canal, then supposedly near realization, should be neutral and equally free to the two contracting powers—“but also to establish a general principle,” they agreed “to extend their protection by treaty stipulation to any other practicable communications, whether by canal or railway, across the isthmus which connects North and South America.” Finally, it stipulated that neither signatory would ever “occupy, or fortify, or colonize, or assume or exercise any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast or any part of Central America,” nor make use of any protectorate or alliance, present or future, to such ends.

The treaty was signed on the 19th of April, and was ratified by both governments; but before the exchange of ratifications Lord Palmerston, on the 8th of June, directed Sir H. Bulwer to make a “declaration” that the British government did not understand the treaty “as applying to Her Majesty’s settlement at Honduras, or its dependencies.” Mr Clayton made a counter-declaration, which recited that the United States did not regard the treaty as applying to “the British settlement in Honduras commonly called British-Honduras. . . nor the small islands in the neighbourhood of that settlement which may be known as its dependencies”; that the treaty’s engagements did apply to all the Central American states, “with their just limits and proper dependencies”; and that these declarations, not being submitted to the United States Senate, could of course not affect the legal import of the treaty. The interpretation of the declarations soon became a matter of contention. The phraseology reflects the effort made by the United States to render impossible a physical control of the canal by Great Britain through the territory held by her at its mouth—the United States losing the above-mentioned treaty advantages,—just as the explicit abnegations of the treaty rendered impossible such control politically by either power. But great Britain claimed that the excepted “settlement” at Honduras was the “Belize” covered by the extreme British claim; that the Bay Islands were a dependency of Belize; and that, as for the Mosquito Coast, the abnegatory clauses being wholly prospective in intent, she was not required to abandon her protectorate. The United States contended that the Bay Islands were not the “dependencies” of Belize, these being the small neighbouring islands mentioned in the same treaties; that the excepted “settlement” was the British-Honduras of definite extent and narrow purpose recognized in British treaties with Spain; that she had not confirmed by recognition the large, indefinite and offensive claims whose dangers the treaty was primarily designed to lessen; and that, as to the Mosquito Coast, the treaty was retrospective, and mutual in the rigour of its requirements, and as the United States had no de facto possessions, while Great Britain had, the clause binding both not to “occupy” any part of Central America or the Mosquito Coast necessitated the abandonment of such territory as Great Britain was already actually occupying or exercising dominion over; and the United States demanded the complete abandonment of the British protectorate over the Mosquito Indians. It seems to be a just conclusion that when in 1852 the Bay Islands were erected into a British “colony” this was a flagrant infraction of the treaty; that as regards Belize the American arguments were decidedly stronger, and more correct historically; and that as regards the Mosquito question, inasmuch as a protectorate seems certainly to have been recognized by the treaty, to demand its absolute abandonment was unwarranted, although to satisfy the treaty Great Britain was bound materially to weaken it.

In 1859–1860, by British treaties with Central American states, the Bay Islands and Mosquito questions were settled nearly in accord with the American contentions. But by the same treaties Belize was accorded limits much greater than those contended for by the United States. This settlement the latter power accepted without cavil for many years.

Until 1866 the policy of the United States was consistently for inter-oceanic canals open equally to all nations, and unequivocally neutralized; indeed, until 1880 there was practically no official divergence from this policy. But in 1880–1884 a variety of reasons were advanced why the United States might justly repudiate at will the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. The new policy was based on national self-interest. The arguments advanced on its behalf were quite indefensible in law and history, and although the position of the United States in 1850–1860 was in general the stronger in history, law and political ethics, that of Great Britain was even more conspicuously the stronger in the years 1880–1884. In 1885 the former government reverted to its traditional policy, and the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1902, which replaced the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, adopted the rule of neutralization for the Panama Canal.

See the collected diplomatic correspondence in I. D. Travis, History of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1899); J. H. Latané, Diplomatic Relations of the United States and Spanish America (Baltimore, 1900); T. J. Lawrence, Disputed Questions of Modern International Law (2nd ed., Cambridge, England, 1885); Sir E. L. Bulwer in 99 Quarterly Rev. 235-286, and Sir H. Bulwer in 104 Edinburgh Rev. 280-298.

 CLAY-WITH-FLINTS, in geology, the name given by W. Whitaker in 1861 to a peculiar deposit of stiff red, brown or yellow clay containing unworn whole flints as well as angular shattered fragments, also with a variable admixture of rounded flint, quartz, quartzite and other pebbles. It occurs “in sheets or patches of various sizes over a large area in the south of England, from Hertfordshire on the north to Sussex on the south, and from Kent on the east to Devon on the west. It almost always lies on the surface of the Upper Chalk, but in Dorset it passes on to the Middle and Lower Chalk, and in Devon it is found on the Chert-Beds of the Selbornian group” (A. J. Jukes-Browne, “The Clay-with-Flints, its Origin and Distribution,” Q.J.G.S., vol. lxii., 1906, p. 132). Many geologists have supposed, and some still hold, that the Clay-with-Flints is the residue left by the slow solution and disintegration of the Chalk by the processes of weathering; on the other hand, it has long been known that the deposit very frequently contains materials foreign to the Chalk, derived either from the Tertiary rocks or from overlying drift. In the paper quoted above, Jukes-Browne ably summarizes