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 of the council of state and of the Corps Législatif, where his advice on the state of public opinion was frequently useful. He had a hand in the negotiations for the Concordat, but, according to Lucien Bonaparte, looked on that measure as “ill-advised and retrograde.” His services in the diplomatic sphere were more important. At Mortfontaine, his country-house, he concluded with the envoy of the United States a convention which bears that name (1800). He also presided over the negotiations which led to the treaty of Lunéville with Austria (February 9, 1801); and he and Maret represented France in the lengthy discussions with the British envoy, Lord Cornwallis, which resulted in the signature of the treaty of Amiens (March 25, 1802). This diplomatic triumph in its turn led to the consolidation of Napoleon’s power as First Consul for life (August 1, 1802) with the chief voice in the selection of his successor. On this question the brothers disagreed. As neither Joseph nor Napoleon had a male heir, the eldest brother, whose ideas of primogeniture were very strict, claimed to be recognized as heir, while Napoleon wished to recognize the son of Louis Bonaparte. On the proclamation of the French empire (May 1804) the friction became acute. Napoleon offered to make Joseph king of Lombardy if he would waive all claim of succession to the French throne, but met with a firm refusal.

Meanwhile Joseph had striven earnestly, but in vain, to avert a rupture with England, which came about in May 1803. In 1805 he acted as chief of the French government while Napoleon was campaigning in Germany. Early in 1806 he proceeded to Naples with a French force in order to expel the Bourbon dynasty from southern Italy, Napoleon adding the promise that the Neapolitan crown would be for Joseph if he chose to accept it. The conquest of the mainland was speedily effected, though Gaëta, Reggio and the rock of Scylla held out for some months. The Bourbon court retired to Sicily, where it had the protection of a British force. By the decree of the 30th of March 1806 Napoleon proclaimed Joseph king of Naples, but allowed him to keep intact his claims to the throne of France. In several letters he enjoined his brother to greater firmness in his administration: “These peoples in Italy, and in general all nations, if they do not find their masters, are disposed to rebellion and mutiny.” The memoirs of Count Miot de Melito, whom Joseph appointed minister of war, show how great were the difficulties with which the new monarch had to contend—an almost bankrupt treasury, a fickle and degraded populace, Bourbon intrigues and plots, and frequent attacks by the British from Sicily. General Stuart’s victory at Maida (July 3) shook Joseph’s throne to its base; but the surrender of Gaëta soon enabled Massena to march southwards and subdue Calabria. During his brief reign at Naples, Joseph effected many improvements; he abolished the relics of feudalism, reformed the monastic orders, reorganized the judicial, financial and educational systems, and initiated several public works. In everything he showed his desire to carry out the aims which he expressed to his consort in April 1806: “Justice demands that I should make this people as happy as the scourge of war will permit.”

From these well-meant, but not always successful, efforts he was suddenly called away by Napoleon to take the crown of Spain (May 1808). There his difficulties were far greater. Despite the benevolent intentions announced to the Spaniards in his proclamation dated Bayonne, 23rd of June 1808, all reconciliation between them and the French was impossible after Napoleon’s treatment of their de facto king, Ferdinand VII. For the varying fortunes of King Joseph in Spain and in the eventful years of the Peninsular War, see and. His sovereignty was little more than titular. Compelled to leave Madrid hastily in August 1808, owing to the Spanish success at Baylen, he was reinstated by Napoleon at the close of the year; and he was thereafter kept in a subordinate position which led him on four occasions to offer to abdicate. The emperor took no notice of these offers, and ordered him to govern with more energy. Between February and May 1810 the emperor placed the northern and north-eastern provinces under the command of French generals as military districts, virtually independent of Joseph’s authority. Again the king protested, but in vain. As his trusted adviser, Miot de Melito, observed in his memoirs, Joseph tried to be constitutional king of Spain, whereas after the experience of the years 1808–1809 he could only succeed in the Peninsula by becoming “the mere instrument of a military power.” “Bearing a title which was only an oppressive burden, the king had in reality ceased to exist as a monarch, and barely retained some semblance of authority over a small part of the French army as a general. Reduced by the exhausted state of his treasury to the last extremity he at length seriously thought of departure.” Joseph took this step in April 1811, and proceeded to Paris in order to extort better terms, or offer his abdication; but he had to return with a monthly subsidy of 500,000 francs and the promise that the army of the centre (the smallest of the five French armies) should be under his control. Late in that year Napoleon united Catalonia to France. Wellington’s victory at Salamanca (July 22, 1812) compelled Joseph to leave his capital; and despite the retirement of the British in the autumn of that year, Joseph’s authority never fully recovered from that blow. The end of his nominal rule came in the next year, when Wellington utterly overthrew the chief French army, commanded by King Joseph and Marshal Jourdan, at Vittoria (June 21, 1813). The king fled from Spain, was disgraced by Napoleon, and received the order to retire incognito to Mortfontaine. The emperor wrote to the minister of war (July 11, 1813):—“His [Joseph’s] behaviour has never ceased bringing misfortune upon my army; it is time to make an end of it.”

Napoleon was equally dissatisfied with his brother’s conduct as lieutenant-general of France, while he himself was conducting the campaign of 1814 in the east of France. On the 30th of March, Joseph empowered Marmont to make a truce with the assailants of Paris if they should be in overpowering strength. On the surrender of the capital Joseph at once retired. The part which he played during the Hundred Days (1815) was also insignificant. It is strange that, four days after Waterloo, Napoleon should have urged him to inspirit the Chamber of Deputies with a view to a national resistance (Lettres nouvelles de Napoléon). In point of fact Joseph did little beyond seeking to further the emperor’s plans of escape to America. After the surrender of his brother to the captain of H.M.S. “Bellerophon” at Rochefort, Joseph went to the United States. Settling in Bordentown, New Jersey, he adopted the title of comte de Survilliers, and sought to promote plans for the rescue of his brother from St Helena. In 1830 he pleaded, but unsuccessfully, for the recognition of the claims of the duke of Reichstadt (king of Rome) to the French throne. He afterwards visited England, and for a time resided at Genoa and Florence. In the latter city, the cradle of his race, he died on the 28th of July 1844. In person he somewhat resembled Napoleon, but utterly lacked his strength and energy. He was fitted for an embassy or judgeship, but was too mild, supine and luxurious for the tasks thrust upon him by his brother. Yet his correspondence and memoirs prove that he retained for Napoleon warm feelings of affection.

(1775–1840), prince of Canino, was born at Ajaccio on the 21st of May 1775. He followed his elder brothers to the schools of Autun and Brienne. At that time he wished to enter the French army, but, being debarred by defective sight, was destined for the church, and with this aim in view went to the seminary at Aix in Provence (1786). His excitable and volatile disposition agreed ill with the