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 Christian monarchy against the revolution as the chief duty of the Prussian government. He was prepared on this ground for a close alliance with Austria. He found, however, a deliberate intention on the part of Austria to humble Prussia, and to degrade her from the position of an equal power, and also great jealousy of Prussia among the smaller German princes, many of whom owed their thrones to the Prussian soldiers, who, as in Saxony and Baden, had crushed the insurgents. He therefore came to the conclusion that if Prussia was to regain the position she had lost she must be prepared for the opposition of Austria, and must strengthen herself by alliances with other powers. The solidarity of Conservative interests appeared to him now a dangerous fiction. At the time of the Crimean War he advocated alliance with Russia, and it was to a great extent owing to his advice that Prussia did not join the western powers. Afterwards he urged a good understanding with Napoleon, but his advice was met by the insuperable objection of King Frederick William IV. to any alliance with a ruler of revolutionary origin.

The change of ministry which followed the establishment of a regency in 1857 made it desirable to appoint a new envoy at Frankfort, and in 1858 Bismarck was appointed ambassador at St Petersburg, where he remained for four years. During this period he acquired some knowledge of Russian, and gained the warm regard of the tsar, as well as of the dowager-empress, herself a Prussian princess. During the first two years he had little influence on the Prussian government; the Liberal ministers distrusted his known opinions on parliamentary government, and the monarchical feeling of the prince regent was offended by Bismarck’s avowed readiness for alliance with the Italians and his disregard of the rights of other princes. The failure of the ministry, and the estrangement between King William and the Liberal party, opened to him the way to power. Roon, who was appointed minister of war in 1861, was an old friend of his, and through him Bismarck was thenceforward kept closely informed of the condition of affairs in Berlin. On several occasions the prospect of entering the ministry was open to him, but nothing came of it, apparently because he required a free hand in foreign affairs, and this the king was not prepared to give him. When an acute crisis arose out of the refusal of parliament, in 1862, to vote the money required for the reorganization of the army, which the king and Roon had carried through, he was summoned to Berlin; but the king was still unable to make up his mind to appoint him, although he felt that Bismarck was the only man who had the courage and capacity for conducting the struggle with parliament. He was, therefore, in June, made ambassador at Paris as a temporary expedient. There he had the opportunity for renewing the good understanding with Napoleon which had been begun in 1857. He also paid a short visit to England, but it does not appear that this had any political results. In September the parliament, by a large majority, threw out the budget, and the king, having nowhere else to turn for help, at Roon’s advice summoned Bismarck to Berlin and appointed him minister-president and foreign minister.

Bismarck’s duty as minister was to carry on the government against the wishes of the Lower House, so as to enable the king to complete and maintain the reorganized army. The opposition of the House was supported by the country and by a large party at court, including the queen and crown prince. The indignation which his appointment caused was intense; he was known only by the reputation which in his early years he had won as a violent ultra-Conservative, and the apprehensions were increased by his first speech, in which he said that the German question could not be settled by speeches and parliamentary decrees, but only by blood and iron. His early fall was predicted, and it was feared that he might bring down the monarchy with him. Standing almost alone he succeeded in the task he had undertaken. For four years he ruled without a budget, taking advantage of an omission in the constitution which did not specify what was to happen in case the crown and the two Houses could not agree on a budget. The conflict of the ministers and the House assumed at times the

form of bitter personal hostility; in 1863 the ministers refused any longer to attend the sittings, and Bismarck challenged Virchow, one of his strongest opponents, to a duel, which, however, did not take place. In 1852 he had fought a duel with pistols against Georg von Vindre, a political opponent. In June 1863, as soon as parliament had risen, Bismarck published ordinances controlling the liberty of the press, which, though in accordance with the letter, seemed opposed to the intentions of the constitution, and it was on this occasion that the crown prince, hitherto a silent opponent, publicly dissociated himself from the policy of his father’s ministers. Bismarck depended for his position solely on the confidence of the king, and the necessity for defending himself against the attempts to destroy this confidence added greatly to the suspiciousness of his nature. He was, however, really indispensable, for his resignation must be followed by a Liberal ministry, parliamentary control over the army, and probably the abdication of the king. Not only, therefore, was he secure in the continuance of the king’s support, but he had also the complete control of foreign affairs. Thus he could afford to ignore the criticism of the House, and the king was obliged to acquiesce in the policy of a minister to whom he owed so much.

He soon gave to the policy of the monarchy a resolution which had long been wanting. When the emperor of Austria summoned a meeting of the German princes at Frankfort to discuss a reform of the confederation, Bismarck insisted that the king of Prussia must not attend. He remained away, and his absence in itself made the congress unavailing. There can be no doubt that from the time he entered on office Bismarck was determined to bring to an issue the long struggle for supremacy in Germany between the house of Habsburg and the house of Hohenzollern. Before he was able to complete his preparations for this, two unforeseen occurrences completely altered the European situation, and caused the conflict to be postponed for three years. The first was the outbreak of rebellion in Poland. Bismarck, an inheritor of the older Prussian traditions, and recollecting how much of the greatness of Prussia had been gained at the expense of the Poles, offered his help to the tsar. By this he placed himself in opposition to the universal feeling of western Europe; no act of his life added so much to the repulsion with which at this time he was regarded as an enemy of liberty and right. He won, however, the gratitude of the tsar and the support of Russia, which in the next years was to be of vital service to him. Even more serious were the difficulties arising in Denmark. On the death of King Frederick VII. in 1863, Prince Frederick of Augustenburg came forward as claimant to the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, which had hitherto been joined to the crown of Denmark. He was strongly supported by the whole German nation and by many of its princes. Bismarck, however, once more was obliged to oppose the current of national feeling, which imperiously demanded that the German duchies should be rescued from a foreign yoke. Prussia was bound by the treaty of London of 1852, which guaranteed the integrity of the Danish monarchy; to have disregarded this would have been to bring about a coalition against Germany similar to that of 1851. Moreover, he held that it would be of no advantage to Prussia to create a new German state; if Denmark were to lose the duchies, he desired that Prussia should acquire them, and to recognize the Augustenburg claims would make this impossible. His resistance to the national desire made him appear a traitor to his country. To check the agitation he turned for help to Austria; and an alliance of the two powers, so lately at variance, was formed. He then falsified all the predictions of the opposition by going to war with Denmark, not, as they had required, in support of Augustenburg, but on the ground that the king of Denmark had violated his promise not to oppress his German subjects. Austria continued to act with Prussia, and, after the defeat of the Danes, at the peace of Vienna the sovereignty of the duchies was surrendered to the two allies—the first step towards annexation by Prussia. There is no part of Bismarck’s diplomatic work which deserves such careful study as these