Page:EB1911 - Volume 03.djvu/33

 that there should be constitutional government in the rest of the monarchy as well as in Hungary, and a parliament in which all the other territories should be represented. From both the Hungarian and the Austrian parliament there was to be elected a Delegation, consisting of sixty members; to these Delegations the common ministers were to be responsible, and to them the estimates for the joint services were to be submitted. The annual meetings were to be held alternately in Vienna and in Pest. They were very careful that these Delegations should not overshadow the parliaments by which they were appointed. The Delegations were not to sit together; each was to meet separately; they were to communicate by writing, every document being accompanied by a translation in Magyar or German, as the case might be; only if after three times exchanging notes they failed to agree was there to be a common session; in that case there would be no discussion, and they were to vote in silence; a simple majority was sufficient. There were to be three ministers for common purposes—(1) for foreign affairs; (2) for war; (3) for finance; these ministers were responsible to the Delegations, but the Delegations were really given no legislative power. The minister of war controlled the common army, but even the laws determining the method by which the army was to be recruited had to be voted separately in each of the parliaments. The minister of finance had to lay before them the common budget, but they could not raise money or vote taxes; after they had passed the budget the money required had to be provided by the separate parliaments. Even the determination of the proportion which each half of the monarchy was to contribute was not left to the Delegations. It was to be fixed once every ten years by separate committees chosen for that purpose from the Austrian Reichsrath and the Hungarian parliament, the so-called Quota-Deputations. In addition to these “common affairs” the Hungarians, indeed, recognized that there were certain other matters which it was desirable should be managed on identical principles in the two halves of the monarchy—namely, customs and excise currency; the army and common railways. For these, however, no common institutions were created; they must be arranged by agreement; the ministers must confer and then introduce identical acts in the Hungarian and the Austrian parliaments.

The main principles of this agreement were decided during the spring of 1867; but during this period the Austrians were not really consulted at all. The negotiations on behalf of the court of Vienna were entrusted to Beust, whom the emperor appointed chancellor of the empire and also minister-president of Austria. He had no previous experience of Austrian affairs, and was only anxious at once to bring about a settlement which would enable the empire to take a strong position in international politics. In the summer of 1867, however (the Austrian Reichsrath having met), the two parliaments each elected a deputation of fifteen members to arrange the financial settlement. The first matter was the debt, amounting to over 3000 million gulden, in addition to the floating debt, which had been contracted during recent years. The Hungarians laid down the principle that they were in no way responsible for debts contracted during a time when they had been deprived of their constitutional liberties; they consented, however, to pay each year 29½ million gulden towards the interest. The whole responsibility for the payment of the remainder of the interest, amounting annually to over a hundred million gulden, and the management of the debt, was left to the Austrians. The Hungarians wished that a considerable part of it should be repudiated. It was then agreed that the two states should form a Customs Union for the next ten years; the customs were to be paid to the common exchequer; all sums required in addition to this to meet the expenses were to be provided as to 30% by Hungary and as to 70% by Austria. After the financial question had been thus settled, the whole of these arrangements were then, on the 21st and the 24th of December 1867, enacted by the two parliaments, and the system of dualism was established.

The acts were accepted in Austria out of necessity; but no parties were really satisfied. The Germans, who accepted the principle of dualism, were indignant at the financial arrangements; for Hungary, while gaining more than an equal share of power, paid less than one-third of the common expenses. On the other hand, according to British ideas of taxable capacity, Hungary paid, and still pays, more than her share. The Germans, however, could at least hope that in the future the financial arrangements might be revised; the complaints of the Slav races were political, and within the constitution there was no means of remedy, for, while the settlement gave to the Hungarians all that they demanded, it deprived the Bohemians or Galicians of any hope that they would be able to obtain similar independence. Politically, the principle underlying the agreement was that the empire should be divided into two portions; in one of these the Magyars were to rule, in the other the Germans; in either section the Slav races—the Serbs and Croatians, the Czechs, Poles and Slovenes—were to be placed in a position of political inferiority.

The settlement with Hungary consisted then of three parts:—(1) the political settlement, which was to be permanent and has since remained part of the fundamental constitution of the monarchy; (2) the periodical financial settlement, determining the partition of the common expenses as arranged by the Quota-Deputations and ratified by the parliaments; (3) the Customs Union and the agreement as to currency—a voluntary and terminable arrangement made between the two governments and parliaments. The history of the common affairs which fall under the management of the common ministries is, then, the history of the foreign policy of the empire and of the army. It is with this and this alone that the Delegations are occupied, and it is to this that we must now turn. The annual meetings call for little notice; they have generally been the occasion on which the foreign minister has explained and justified his policy; according to the English custom, red books, sometimes containing important despatches, have been laid before them; but the debates have caused less embarrassment to the government than is generally the case in parliamentary assemblies, and the army budget has generally been passed with few and unimportant alterations.

For the first four years, while Beust was chancellor, the foreign policy was still influenced by the feelings left by the war of 1866. We do not know how far there was a real intention to revenge Königgrätz and recover the position lost in Germany. This would be at least a possible policy, and one to which Beust by his previous history would be inclined. There were sharp passages of arms with the