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 as an associate of the Royal Academy, or one holding a degree in a learned society lower than that of fellow. In English law the associates are officers of the supreme court, whose duties are to draw up the list of causes, enter verdicts, hand the records to the parties, &c., and generally to conduct the business of trials. By the Judicature (Officers) Act 1879 they were styled masters of the supreme court, but the office is now amalgamated with the crown office department, of which they are clerks. ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS, or, a term used in psychology to express the conditions under which representations arise in consciousness, and also for a principle put forward by an important historical school of thinkers to account generally for the facts of mental life. Modern physiological psychology has so altered the approach to this subject that much of the older discussion has become antiquated, but it may be recapitulated here for historical purposes.

Earlier Theory.—In the long and erudite Note D**, appended by Sir W. Hamilton to his edition of Reid’s Works, many anticipations of modern statements on association are cited from the works of ancient or medieval thinkers; and for Aristotle, in particular, the glory is claimed of having at once originated the doctrine and practically brought it to perfection. As translated by Hamilton, but without his interpolations, the classical passage from the De Memoria et Reminiscentia runs as follows:—

“When, therefore, we accomplish an act of reminiscence, we pass through a certain series of precursive movements, until we arrive at a movement on which the one we are in quest of is habitually consequent. Hence, too, it is that we hunt through the mental train, excogitating from the present or some other, and from similar or contrary or coadjacent. Through this process reminiscence takes place. For the movements are, in these cases, sometimes at the same time, sometimes parts of the same whole, so that the subsequent movement is already more than half accomplished.”

The passage is obscure, but it does at all events indicate the various principles commonly termed contiguity, similarity and contrast. Similar principles are stated by Zeno the Stoic, by Epicurus (see Diog. Laert. vii. § 52, x. § 32), and by St Augustine (Confessions, x. e. 19). Aristotle’s doctrine received a more or less intelligent expansion and illustration from the ancient commentators and the schoolmen, and in the still later period of transition from the age of scholasticism to the time of modern philosophy, prolonged in the works of some writers far into the 17th century, Hamilton adduced not a few philosophical authorities who gave prominence to the general fact of mental association—the Spaniard Ludovicus Vives (1492–1540) especially being most exhaustive in his account of memory.

In Hobbes’s psychology much importance is assigned to what he called, variously, the succession, sequence, series, consequence, coherence, train of imaginations or thoughts in mental discourse. But not before Hume is there express question as to what are the distinct principles of association. John Locke had, meanwhile, introduced the phrase “Association of Ideas” as the title of a supplementary chapter incorporated with the fourth edition of his Essay, meaning it, however, only as the name of a principle accounting for the mental peculiarities of individuals, with little or no suggestion of its general psychological import. Of this last Hume had the strongest impression; he reduced the principles of association to three—Resemblance, Contiguity in time and place, Cause and (or) Effect. Dugald Stewart put forward Resemblance, Contrariety, and Vicinity in time and place, though he added, as another obvious principle, accidental coincidence in the sounds of words, and further noted three other cases of relation, namely, Cause and Effect, Means and End, Premisses and Conclusion, as holding among the trains of thought under circumstances of special attention. Reid, preceding Stewart, was rather disposed to make light of the subject of association, vaguely remarking that it seems to require no other original quality of mind but the power of habit to explain the spontaneous recurrence of trains of thinking, when become familiar by frequent repetition (Intellectual Powers, p. 387).

Hamilton’s own theory of mental reproduction, suggestion or association is a development, greatly modified, of the doctrine expounded in his Lectures on Metaphysics (vol. ii. p. 223, seq.), which reduced the principles of association first to two—Simultaneity and Affinity, and these further to one supreme principle of Redintegration or Totality. In the ultimate scheme he posits no less than four general laws of mental succession concerned in reproduction: (1) Associability or possible co-suggestion (all thoughts of the same mental subject are associable or capable of suggesting each other); (2) Repetition or direct remembrance (thoughts coidentical in modification, but differing in time, tend to suggest each other); (3) Redintegration, direct remembrance or reminiscence (thoughts once coidentical in time, are, however, different as mental modes, again suggestive of each other, and that in the mutual order which they originally held); (4) Preference (thoughts are suggested not merely by force of the general subjective relation subsisting between themselves, they are also suggested in proportion to the relation of interest, from whatever source, in which they stand to the individual mind). Upon these follow, as special laws:—A, Primary—modes of the laws of Repetition and Redintegration—(1) law of Similars (Analogy, Affinity); (2) law of Contrast; (3) law of Coadjacency (Cause and Effect, &c.); B, Secondary—modes of the law of Preference, under the law of Possibility—(1) laws of Immediacy and Homogeneity; (2) law of Facility.

The Associationist School.—This name is given to the English psychologists who aimed at explaining all mental acquisitions, and the more complex mental processes generally under laws not other than those which have just been set out as determining simple reproduction. Hamilton, though professing to deal with reproduction only, formulates a number of still more general laws of mental succession—law of Succession, law of Variation, law of Dependence, law of Relativity or Integration (involving law of Conditioned), and, finally, law of Intrinsic or Objective Relativity—as the highest to which human consciousness is subject; but it is in a sense quite different that the psychologists of the so-called Associationist School intend their appropriation of the principle or principles commonly signalized. As far as can be judged from imperfect records, they were anticipated to some extent by the experientialists of ancient times, both Stoic and Epicurean (cf. Diogenes Laertius, as above). In the modern period, Hobbes is the first thinker of permanent note to whom this doctrine may be traced. Though, in point of fact, he took anything but an exhaustive view of the phenomena of mental succession, yet, after dealing with trains of imagination, or what he called mental discourse, he sought in the higher departments of intellect to explain reasoning as a discourse in words, dependent upon an arbitrary system of marks, each associated with, or standing for, a variety of imaginations; and, save for a general assertion that reasoning is a reckoning—otherwise, a compounding and resolving—he had no other account of knowledge to give. The whole emotional side of mind, or, in his language, the passions, he, in like manner, resolved into an expectation of consequences, based on past experience of pleasures and pains of sense. Thus, though he made no serious attempt to justify his analysis in detail, he is undoubtedly to be classed with the associationists of the next century. They, however, were wont to trace their psychological theory no further back than to Locke’s Essay. Bishop Berkeley was driven to posit expressly a principle of suggestion or association in these terms:—“That one idea may suggest another to the mind, it will suffice that they have been observed to go together, without any demonstration of the necessity of their coexistence, or so much as knowing what it is that makes them so to coexist” (New Theory of Vision, § 25); and to support the obvious application of the principle to the case of the sensations of sight and touch before him, he constantly urged that association of sound and sense of language which the later school has always put in the foreground, whether as illustrating the principle in general or in explanation of the supreme importance of language for knowledge. It was natural, then, that Hume, coming after Berkeley, and assuming Berkeley’s results, though he reverted to the larger inquiry of Locke, should be more explicit in his reference to association; but he was original also, when he spoke of it as a “kind of attraction which in the mental world will be found to have as extraordinary effects as in the natural, and to show itself in as many and as various forms” (Human Nature, i. 1, § 4). Other inquirers about the same time conceived of association with this breadth of view, and set themselves to track, as psychologists, its effects in detail.

David Hartley in his Observations on Man, published in 1749 (eleven years after the Human Nature, and one year after the better-known Inquiry, of Hume), opened the path for all the investigations of like nature that have been so characteristic of English psychology. A physician by profession, he sought to combine with an elaborate theory of mental association a minutely detailed hypothesis as to the corresponding action of the nervous system, based upon the suggestion of a vibratory motion within the nerves thrown out by Newton in the last paragraph of the Principia. So far, however, from promoting the acceptance of the psychological theory, this physical hypothesis proved to have rather the opposite effect, and it began to be dropped by Hartley’s followers (as F. Priestley, in his abridged edition of the Observations, 1775) before it was seriously impugned from without. When it is studied in the original, and not taken upon the report of hostile critics, who would not, or could not understand it, no little importance must still be accorded to the first attempt, not seldom a curiously felicitous one, to carry through that parallelism of the physical and psychical, which since then has come to count for more and more in the science of mind. Nor should it be forgotten that Hartley himself, for all his paternal interest in the doctrine of vibrations, was careful to keep separate from its fortunes the cause of his other doctrine of mental association. Of this the point lay in no mere restatement, with new precision, of a principle of coherence among “ideas,” but in its being taken as a clue by which